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Three Essays in Corporate Finance and Banking
Roberto Pinto
ABSTRACT
My dissertation is divided into two blocks. The first block comprises two chapters of the thesis and
it addresses the general question of how the employer-employee contracting relationship affects the
firm’s optimal policies. There are several economic mechanisms through which this contracting ten-
sion feedbacks onto the firm’s policies. I focus on two: the employer-employee risk-sharing and the
role of employees as monitoring over the firm’s activities. The second block deals with the stability
of a banking system. In this chapter, my co-authors and I analyze how the disclosure of truthful
information in a banking system characterized by network frictions (i.e., trading constraints) affects
banks’ risk-sharing and portfolio riskiness.
In the first chapter, I analyze the risk-sharing mechanism by studying the relationship between
firms’ financing policies and the costs of personal bankruptcy. These costs are borne by those
individuals who hold debt in their finances. Firm’s leverage decisions affect the probability of
default and, hence, impose a cost on their employees who bear a higher firm’s risk. I show that
firms increase leverage in response to more generous personal bankruptcy exemptions. Higher
exemption levels benefit individuals by reducing their financial exposure when filing for personal
bankruptcy. Results suggest that firms may be able to use financial leverage to extract the benefits
from policies which aim at helping employees. These policies provide an insurance during bad times
when hit by a shock, such as unemployment, they may be forced to file for personal bankruptcy.
In the second chapter, I provide a novel perspective on the role of a powerful workforce within
the firm. I show that firms increase the proportion of long-term debt while keeping the leverage
ratio unchanged in response to a more powerful workforce. Empirical evidence is consistent with
the idea that firms exploit the positive effect of the active monitoring by stronger employees on
the credit markets. The literature extensively studies the negative effects of powerful employees
while providing mixed results. The usual argument involves the reduction of the firm’s equity
value because of higher wage requests and loss of flexibility. One can interpret these as negative
shocks to the first moment of the cash flow distribution. However, the literature overlooks the fact
that workers’ payoff structure makes them averse to equity maximizing policies (i.e., risk-taking
behavior). Powerful workers (as much as debtholders) have incentives to oppose risky policies. The
negative effect on the first moment may be balanced out by a lower volatility of cash flows. The
effects on the first and second moments of the cash flow distribution are opposing and the net effect
remains an open empirical question. The maturity decisions are associated with the firm’s ability
to commit not to shift risk after the debt is in place. The zero effect on the leverage ratio suggests
that firms are not strategically using debt to gain bargaining power over workers’ wage request.
In the third chapter, my co-authors and I theoretically show that the disclosure of truthful
information can be detrimental if banks in the system are not perfectly connected to each other
and there are limits to risk sharing. This result goes against the common belief that the disclosure
of good information in the market is always beneficial. The magnitude of this effect depends on
the structure (e.g. density of connections among institutions) of the banking system. Alarmingly,
a simulation exercise shows that this negative effect is more pronounced for network systemically
important institutions. The economic intuition is that the value of the information is different across
banks. Once the information is disclosed, banks that have a greater number of trading opportunities
attach more value to the new information. However, banks with fewer opportunities cannot use the
information for trading while still internalizing the negative effects from other banks re-adjustments.
Our results speak to the recent trends of regulators around to world striving to restore the soundness
and safety of financial systems but making balance sheets of financial institutions (such as banks)
as transparent as possible. The stress test procedure has been developed as part of this endeavor.
To my mother and in the ever-living memory of my father.
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Roberto Pinto∗
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(Latest Version)
ABSTRACT
I show that firms increase leverage in response to more generous personal bankruptcy ex-
emptions. Higher exemption levels benefit individuals by reducing their financial exposure
when filing for personal bankruptcy. My empirical strategy exploits staggered changes in ex-
emptions across U.S. states. I find that firms increase leverage by 79 basis points in response
to a 1% rise in exemptions. This result suggests that firms extract benefits from policies
aimed at helping employees. My paper highlights the potentially unintended consequences
of policies that fail to take into account that corporate capital structure decisions trade-off
employees’ risk aversion against the benefits of debt.
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Introduction
In the United States, the household debt-to-disposable income ratio has rapidly increased
over the past two decades and peaked at 132% in 2007 (see Figure 1). Debt increases
employees concern about their income and job stability because personal bankruptcy can
entail large costs (see White (1998)). However, little is known about the effect of employees’
exposure to personal bankruptcy on firms’ policies.1 This is surprising given that capital
structure decisions may trade-off employees’ risk aversion against the benefits of debt.
In this paper, I empirically explore the impact of changes in personal bankruptcy ex-
emptions on corporate financing policies.2 I study how reductions in costs of personal
bankruptcy affect firm leverage decisions by exploiting across-state, over-time increases in
personal bankruptcy exemptions.3 Several contributions show that non-insurable costs borne
by workers during unemployment entail a compensation in the form of higher wages (see
Baily (1974), Harris and Holmstro¨m (1982), Berk et al. (2010), and Chemmanur, Cheng,
and Zhang (2013)). Firms’ financing policies influence the expected value of these costs
through their effect on the likelihood of financial distress and, hence, layoffs. Thus, reduc-
tions in unemployment costs faced by workers can influence firm risk-taking behavior at
fixed wages. Since personal bankruptcy often stems from unemployment, exemptions form
an important component of the expected costs of involuntary job loss.4
1Around 4% of U.S. firms are offering a new perk that would help employees repay their student loans.
A recent survey conducted on a sample of 1,000 individuals with loans shows that 80% would like to work
for an employer with some debt repayment benefit. Source: www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-
02/what-it-s-actually-worth-when-companies-pay-employee-student-debt)
2Agrawal and Matsa (2013), exploiting a different channel, provide evidence on the sensitivity of firms’
financing decisions to indirect costs borne by employees.
3The literature has explored many types of unemployment costs. For example, job search (Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994)), delay of reemployment (Katz and Bruce (1990)), loss of human capital (Berk, Stanton, and
Zechner (2010)), wage cuts, and other social and psychological costs. I focus on the specific costs stemming
from personal bankruptcy. Lefgren, McIntyre, and Miller (2010) show that the bankruptcy protection system
is a large source of insurance providing more resources to American households than all state unemployment
insurance programs combined.
4Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (2000) reports that 67.5% of bankruptcy filers state that job loss
is the main reason for their inability to service debt. Gerardi, Herkenhoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2017)
show that being unemployed increases the probability of personal bankruptcy by 5-13 percentage points,
ceteris paribus, compared with the sample average default rate of 3.9%. They find that unemployment is
the strongest predictor of personal bankruptcy. Moreover, Graham, Kim, Li, and Qiu (2017) show that the
2
To formalize the idea behind the empirical analysis, I develop a model that highlights the
link between firms’ financing decisions and the costs of personal bankruptcy. In the model,
the firm offers an employment contract to a debt-carrying individual – which I refer to as a
“levered employee” hereafter. The levered employee bears the costs of personal bankruptcy
when the firm is unable to pay wages due to default. During contract negotiation, the worker
is willing to exchange a higher wage for a reduced default risk. Thus, a trade-off arises: an
extra unit of corporate debt carries tax advantages for the firm but also increases labor costs
since it increases the likelihood of default. Importantly, the model highlights that firms will
respond to reductions in the financial risk of unemployment by holding workers at their
participation constraint. Thus, my model predicts that firms exploit reductions in the costs
of personal bankruptcy by bearing more risk, which I measure as firm leverage.
I use staggered changes in personal bankruptcy exemptions across U.S. states to identify
changes in employees’ costs of personal bankruptcy.5 Exemptions define the dollar value
of debtors’ assets that creditors cannot seize in case of personal bankruptcy. Hence, in
states that increase protection, individuals with personal debt outstanding are better off
because they can retain more of their assets. I focus on homestead and non-homestead
exemptions which vary across states and time.6 Homestead exemptions protect (up to
a specified amount) the equity value owned by the debtor in his main residence. Non-
homestead exemptions refer to any personal assets (and pre-determined dollar values) that
can be exempted from liquidation under Chapter 7 filing. I collected data on the home-
stead and non-homestead exemptions at the state level and observed 36 homestead and 73
non-homestead increases for the sample period 1995-2008. The institutional features of the
personal bankruptcy laws in the United States offer a unique environment to exploit the
ex-ante wage premium compensating for the ex-post wage loss due to the firm’s default is within the same
order of magnitude as the tax benefits of debt.
5Protection in personal bankruptcy generates other positive effects besides the direct monetary ones.
Dobbie and Song (2015) find that protection increases annual earnings by $5,562, decreases five-year mortality
by 1.2 percentage points, and decreases five-year foreclosure rates by 19.1 percentage points.
6Figure 2 provides an example of all bankruptcy exemptions for the states of New Hampshire and New
Jersey.
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large variation in the costs of personal bankruptcy.
I compare leverage decisions of firms’ in states that increase exemptions to firms in states
without changes in a difference-in-differences framework and find that employees’ personal
bankruptcy entails significant non-insurable costs which are an important determinant of
firms’ capital structure. I estimate that, on average, firms increase the leverage ratio by 79
basis points for a 1% percent rise in (homestead) exemptions. This corresponds to a total
debt increase of $18.34 million from a pre-treatment average of $441.88 million. For the
average homestead exemption raise, I compute a corporate debt increase of around $40.42
million. Corresponding to around 3.5% of total asset value for the average firm in my sample,
this increase in corporate debt is economically relevant.
My baseline empirical specification works in annual differences to account for firm fixed-
effects and controls for industry-by-year fixed effects. Thus, identification comes from over-
time, across-state policy shifts in exemptions. The estimated impacts will have a causal
interpretation if these policy shifts are unrelated to other time-varying determinants of firm
leverage. To mitigate these concerns, I employ several sets of control variables. First, I
include a set of time-varying firm controls that the literature has shown to correlate strongly
with leverage (see Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Second, I include a set of controls that
capture changes in state labor market conditions, housing prices, and economic growth.
Third, I account for other potential policy shifts that might be correlated with exemptions,
such as changes in corporate tax policy. Finally, to account for possible spurious correlations
in average state leverage and increases in exceptions over time, I include a set of state-fixed
effects. Since I work in differences, these account for state-specific trends. My results are
robust to the inclusion of all of these potential confounders.
I also empirically rule out the effect of other plausible confounders that vary within states
across time and that could potentially coincide both with changes in bankruptcy exemptions
and affect firms’ leverage within the state border. For example, when increasing bankruptcy
protection, states could simultaneously change other non-bankruptcy related laws which
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likely cause firms to increase their leverage. I examine house market booms, labor market
characteristics, and unobservable economic shocks from neighboring states. I find that none
of these alternative explanations significantly affect my baseline results.
My model highlights two conditions that need to hold for the economic mechanism
to be relevant. First, unemployment needs to affect the probability of filing for personal
bankruptcy. Sullivan et al. (2000) find that over two-thirds of filers motivate their bankruptcy
as a consequence of job loss. Recently, Gerardi et al. (2017) show that being unemployed
increases the probability of personal bankruptcy by 5-13 percentage points, ceteris paribus,
compared with the sample average default rate of 3.9%. They find that unemployment is
the strongest predictor of personal bankruptcy. Second, levered employees should not be
able to pocket the surplus created by higher bankruptcy exemptions (e.g., becoming riskier
by increasing their debt exposure). I show that personal borrowing is unrelated to changes
in bankruptcy exemptions, which is in line with Severino and Brown (2016).
Despite addressing several econometric issues, I still find a statistically and economically
significant effect of costs of personal bankruptcy on firms’ financing policies. Interpreting
these results through the lens of my model suggests a simple economic mechanism. Ex-
emptions work as insurance on levered employees’ assets. In my model, the variation in
bankruptcy protection creates slack in employees’ participation constraint by reducing ex-
pected unemployment costs. Firms are able to exploit this slack by increasing leverage until
the constraint is again binding. In this way, corporations can make a debt-for-equity ex-
change, which is all at the expense of the creditors who now hold more unsecured personal
debt (i.e., lower recovery value).
I contribute to the literature, first, by quantifying the relevance of employees’ financial
risk on corporate policies. The corporate finance literature has neglected the fact that em-
ployees are active borrowers, thus, subjected to the risk and costs of bankruptcy. These costs
can be large and cannot be credibly insured by the employer in the employment contract.
My results highlight a novel economic mechanism that works through the employer-employee
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risk-sharing agreement. Specifically, this mechanism allows firms to (fully or partially) ex-
tract benefits from subsidies given to employees that are meant to alleviate expected unem-
ployment costs. Second, I implement an empirical identification strategy that isolates the
sensitivity of firms’ leverage to shocks occurring exclusively to the labor side of the firm. My
estimates speak to the open debate in the literature on whether firms use financing policies
to strategically gain bargaining power or as a risk-sharing mechanism, and lend empirical
support for the latter.
These results suggest new avenues for future research. My findings hint at potential unex-
pected consequences of pro-employee policies when failing to account for strategic corporate-
employee interactions. For example, in 2005 the U.S. personal bankruptcy system shifted
from debtor- to creditor-friendly. The rationale behind this change was to reduce the abuse of
the benevolent bankruptcy system. However, my findings indicate the potential for spillovers
on the corporate side as the costs of personal bankruptcy abruptly increased, which in turn
can influence corporate risk-taking decisions.
Related Literature. This paper is broadly connected to the literature that studies the
influence of labor on corporate policies. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) wrote the paper most
closely related to my study, showing that unemployment risk affects firms’ capital structure
decisions. Their empirical identification uses state-level variation in unemployment benefits,
which are likely to affect the cost of unemployment. My paper departs from Agrawal and
Matsa (2013) by identifying and quantifying a new channel, costs of personal bankruptcy,
which connects private and corporate leverage.
My study is also related to Cerqueiro and Pen˜as (2017), which shows that firms owned by
mid-wealth entrepreneurs, whose assets become fully protected in bankruptcy, suffer a reduc-
tion in credit availability. Another related paper is Dobbie and Goldsmith-Pinkham (2015),
which uses state-level variation in bankruptcy homestead exemptions and non-recourse mort-
gage protection to assess the effects on household balance sheets and the macroeconomy
during the Great Recession.
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My paper is related to the literature on the personal borrowing decisions and the agency
problems in the labor markets. For example, Bernstein (2016) quantifies the effect of house-
hold debt overhang, stemming from personal debt, on the labor supply decisions. The
intuition is that household debt, just as corporate debt, generates an overhang problem
if the benefits from a higher supply of labor accrue to debtholders. Finally, Severino and
Brown (2016) find that personal bankruptcy exemptions tend to affect the composition of
household debt rather than the aggregate supply.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 1 presents a simple theoretical model and its em-
pirical testable implications. Section 2 introduces the empirical strategy and describes the
data. Section 3 presents the main results of the paper. Section 4 discusses the identifi-
cation assumptions and present empirical evidence supporting them. Section 5 discusses
confounding events and presents robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes, exploring
the implications of the main results for policy-making and raising further questions about
the connection between personal bankruptcy exemption policies and corporate borrowing.
1 Theory and Empirical Implications
I provide a setting in which the variation in the personal bankruptcy protection identifies
the sensitivity of firms’ financing decisions due to risk-sharing considerations. My aim is
to highlight the economic mechanism through which personal bankruptcy protection affects
firms’ capital structure decisions in a standard framework.
Intuitively, corporate debt creates an advantage for the firm because interest payments are
tax deductible. However, more debt increases the probability of the firm’s default and, hence,
the compensation in the form of wage required to hire a debt-carrying employee (or levered
employee). The levered employee cares about the firm’s default exclusively through its
negative effect on her financial costs generated by the subsequent personal bankruptcy filing.
Thus, from the firm’s standpoint, a trade-off arises: an additional unit of debt generates tax
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benefits but it also increases the cost of labor. A more generous personal bankruptcy system
lowers these costs and, hence, reduces the compensation required by the levered employee for
bearing non-insurable costs of personal bankruptcy. In the model, an increase in protection is
a subsidy granted to the levered employee whose benefits, however, are eventually (partially
or totally) extracted by the firm through issuing debt.
The firm’s capital structure and the employment contract are set in the form of corpo-
rate debt and promised wage, respectively. The firm promises to pay both obligatory debt
repayment and the wage out of the cash flow, which I informally refer to as firm net worth.
The firm may choose to default if the net worth is lower than the sum of current debt and
wage payments. The employee suffers from this default because she does not collect the
wage payment. Therefore, as the probability of corporate default increases, employees de-
mand higher promised compensation. Finally, I assume that the employee bankrupts on her
unsecured debt following the firm’s default. However, there is an option to limit losses in
bankruptcy due to the personal bankruptcy protection granted by the state laws.
To link the theoretical model to my empirical specification, I show that as a consequence
of a state increasing personal bankruptcy protection firms have an incentive to increase
corporate debt, exploiting the slack in the employee’s participation constraint. In this way,
the firm can make a debt-for-equity exchange and exploit tax advantages. Because of the
stronger protection in bankruptcy, employees exhibit lower effective risk aversion; — all this
happens at the expense of creditors who now hold more unsecured personal debt (i.e., lower
expected recovery value).
Let us consider a one-period model (two dates, t ∈ {0, 1}). A firm needs employees to
implement a project generating random revenues (net of non-labor costs) X. For simplicity,
I assume that X is distributed uniformly over the support [0, X¯]. The manager (running the
firm in the shareholders’ interest) chooses the corporate debt and wage policy that maximize
the firm’s value, V , determined by risk-neutral investors. Without loss of generality, the
number of employees is normalized to one and the risk-free rate to zero, and the corporate
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debt market is assumed to be perfectly competitive and composed of risk-neutral agents.
At time t = 0, the manager chooses the firm capital structure and the employment
contract. Corporate debt is a modeled as a zero-coupon bond with nominal value D, paid
at time t = 1. The employment contract is fully specified by a promised fixed wage, ω, paid
at time t = 1. Both debt claims are serviced upon observing the realization of the random
revenues X.
Corporate debt has two effects. On the one hand, it gives rise to tax advantages propor-
tional to the corporate tax rate, τ , levied on the firm’s earnings before interests and taxes
(net of debt and wage payments) because interests on the debt are tax deductible. On the
other hand, corporate debt increases the probability of firm’s insolvency, which makes the
labor cost higher. I assume that the firm defaults only for liquidity reason when X < ω+D.
The realized value of X is known to the firm, creditors, and the employee. There is perfect
information in the model. The price of corporate debt at time t = 0 is irrelevant because I
assume that the value of equity is reduced by exactly the same amount as the value of debt
by means of a debt-for-equity exchange. This swap ensures that there is no impact on the
firm’s value.
The employee is risk-neutral and holds an exogenous amount of personal debt with a face
value of B due at time t = 1. At time t = 0, she has two employment options. She can
either work in the firm, in which case she receives a wage ω when the firm is solvent and
zero in case of its default. In the latter case, the employee will also bankrupt and receive a
subsidy equals to H < B.7 This variable captures the cost of filing for personal bankruptcy
(a higher H implies a lower cost). Alternatively, the employee can accept a riskless outside
opportunity which pays ω¯ and it always allows her to pay back her debt, that is ω¯−B ≥ 0.
The employee accepts to work in the firm if the expected income from the job is, at
least, as large as the expected income from taking the risk-free option. Formally, this can
7For the sake of simplicity, I do not include explicit costs of personal bankruptcy. The economic mechanism
would be the same if I include exogenous costs C with ∂C/∂B > 0.
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be written as,
H
ω +D
X¯
+ (1− ω +D
X¯
)(ω −B) ≥ ω¯ −B (1)
It is worth noting that the personal bankruptcy protection, H, reduces the required wage,
ω, because it makes the employee’s personal bankruptcy less costly.
The manager is assumed to have all the bargaining power. He offers the employment
contract, defined by the promised wage ω, by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the em-
ployee. Hence, he has an incentive to minimize the labor costs by setting the wage at the
minimum level consistent with the participation constraint in Equation (1). This implies
that, in equilibrium, the constraint will bind.8
Given this setup, the manager chooses the corporate debt, D, and the wage, ω, such that
to maximize the firm’s value and satisfy the employee’s participation constraint in Equation
(1) with equality. Formally, the firm’s value is given by,
V =
X¯
2︸︷︷︸
Expected cash-flow
+ [1− Pr(X < ω +D)] τD︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax advantages
− [1− Pr(X < ω +D)] (1− τ)ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor costs
(2)
which is simply the sum of the expected cash-flow from the project plus tax benefits on
corporate debt and labor costs minus the labor expense.
Definition 1.1. For a given set of parameter (B,H, τ, X¯, ω¯), the pair {D∗, ω∗} defines the
optimal corporate debt, D, and wage, ω, maximizing the firm’s value in Equation (2) and
satisfying the participation constraint in Equation (1) with equality.
The expressions for {D∗, ω∗} are given in Appendix D.
The level of personal bankruptcy protection, H, influences the equilibrium quantities
of the economy. However, I leave aside how the equilibrium quantities arise in economies
with different levels of personal bankruptcy protection. My empirical analysis focuses on
8Intuitively, for any given pair {D,ω}, if the constraint is not binding the firm can set a lower wage that
still satisfies the participation constraint and increases the firm’s value by reducing labor costs. This process
can be iterated until the constraint binds.
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studying how the equilibrium corporate debt responds when the economy is perturbed by
an exogenous increase in the personal bankruptcy protection, H. Specifically, I estimate
the sensitivity of the corporate debt to policy shifts in the personal bankruptcy protection
with a linear regression. The optimal corporate debt delivers a non-linear relationship with
the level of bankruptcy protection, H. To connect the theoretical and empirical model, I
perform a linear approximation of the corporate debt evaluated at the optimal level for a
fixed set of parameters, (H˜, B˜, τ˜ , ˜¯ω, ˜¯X).
Since my empirical model estimates the linear relation between corporate debt and per-
sonal bankruptcy protection, I use the first order Taylor’s expansion to linearize this relation
around the optimum and model it as a linear regression for a generic firm i operating in
industry j headquartered in the state s at time t. Formally,
Dijst = β0 + β1Hst + υijst (3)
I empirically estimate the parameter β1, which measures the sensitivity of the firm’s
corporate debt to changes in the personal bankruptcy protection, H.9
The model provides an important guidance in identifying the causal relationship be-
tween shifts in personal bankruptcy protection and the firm’s corporate leverage response.
Specifically, variation in the personal bankruptcy protection must be uncorrelated with the
variation generated by the components of the error term, υ. The theoretical model suggest
which factors may correlate with changes in personal bankruptcy protection and affect cor-
porate leverage. In particular, I can express the error term as υ(B, τ, ω¯, X¯). This leads me
to model it as a function of additive components, which account for firm-specific (and/or
9In Appendix D, I derive an analytical formulation for β1 and discuss conditions under which this pa-
rameter is bounded from below at zero. Intuitively, given a bundle of optimal quantities {D∗, ω∗}, the firm
will not find it optimal to reduce corporate debt when the policy shift introduces slack in the participation
constraint (see Equation (1)). To exploit the slackness, the firm can keep fixed the quantity of debt and
lower the wage such that to make the participation constraint binding again. Alternatively, it can keep
the wage fixed and increase debt to let the participation constraint bind again. Lastly, the firm can use
both strategies simultaneously: increase debt and reduce the wage targeting the binding condition of the
participation constraint.
11
industry) characteristics (i.e., X¯) and time-varying and time-invariant state variables (i.e.,
B, τ , and ω¯). Formally,
υijst = ajt + ai + as · t+Xit + Zst + ijst
where ajt captures time-varying industry shocks, ai absorbs firm-specific unobservables, as · t
captures state-level time trends, Xit controls for time-varying firm observables, and Zst
accounts for the time-varying observable state-level characteristics. The last term, , contains
within states and across time variation that cannot be accounted for because collinear with
the changes in personal bankruptcy protection. By using the first-difference operator across
the time dimension leads to,
∆υijst = ajt + as + ∆Xit + ∆Zst + ∆ijst (4)
The personal bankruptcy protection varies within U.S. states and across time. This means
that my identification comes from within states across time variation of H. By modeling
the error term like in Equation (4), I can difference out the variation which may correlate
with a shift in H coming from firm-level, industry, state-level time trends, and observable
state/firm characteristics. The remaining threat to my identification is the presence of
omitted variables, which vary within states across time and correlate with H. This variation
is contained in the term . I take steps to deal with these threats by analyzing plausibly
confounding events and ruling them out empirically. The key takeaway from this simple
model is that personal bankruptcy protection influences corporate debt decisions through its
effect on the labor side, showing how benefits of subsidies to employees can be extracted by
firms through financing policies.
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2 Empirical Strategy, Data, and Summary Statistics
This section presents the empirical methodology identifying the causal relationship be-
tween employees’ risk of personal bankruptcy and firms’ financing decisions, describes the
data sources, and shows summary statistics of the main variables.
2.1 Empirical Strategy
To capture variation in the expected costs of personal bankruptcy levied on levered
employees, I use staggered increases in homestead and non-homestead bankruptcy exemp-
tions across state and time. To estimate the sensitivity of leverage to the costs of personal
bankruptcy, I compare financing decisions of firms in states that increase personal bankruptcy
exemptions to the ones of firms in states that keep the level of exemptions unchanged in
a difference-in-differences framework. Formally, the firm’s leverage decision is described by
the following linear model,
∆Levijst =β1 D.∆Homesteadst−1 + β2 D.∆Non-Homesteadst−1+
γ∆Xijst−1 + ϕ∆Zst−1 + ajt + ijst,
(5)
where ∆Lev is the change in book leverage (∆ is the first-difference operator) of firm i in in-
dustry j headquartered in state s at time t. Variables ∆Homestead and ∆Non-Homestead are
state-level changes in the nominal value of personal bankruptcy protection. These variables
are equal to one when a state increases its homestead or non-homestead exemptions and zero
otherwise, respectively.10 A set of time-varying firm controls, Xit−1, is used to absorb effects
attributable to firm-specific performance and a set of time-varying state controls, Zst−1, to
account for local economic and labor conditions.11 Moreover, industry-by-year fixed-effects,
10I also estimate the model in Equation (5) using the magnitude of these changes. This captures the
sensitivity of leverage response as a function of the size of the increases in exemptions.
11I include standard firm controls as in Rajan and Zingales (1995), that is: collateral, market-to-book
ratio, size, Altman’s Z score, and return of assets. To control for for local conditions, I use GDP growth,
unemployment rate, house prices index changes, and changes in unemployment benefits. More details on the
definition and computation of variables can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table.
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ajt remove time-varying unobservable industry shocks. The model in first difference takes
care of firm-specific fixed effects. Lagged covariates account for lags in the firms’ response
to changes in personal bankruptcy exemptions.
I compare leverage decisions of firms’ in states that increase exemptions to firms in states
without changes. The coefficients of interest, β1 and β2, measure the firm’s leverage sensitiv-
ity to increases in personal bankruptcy exemptions. The empirical identification comes from
within states across time variation of bankruptcy exemptions. This identification strategy
relies on the standard difference-in-differences assumption that shifts in firms’ leverage policy
are the result of the rise in personal bankruptcy. Although this assumption is not formally
testable, in Section 4, I provide empirical evidence of its plausibility.
2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
The final dataset contains firm- and state-level observations. Firms’ balance-sheet data
are associated with the state in which they are headquartered.12 I will now introduce the
main data sources used to construct the final sample.
Firms’ balance sheet and income statement information are from Compustat Annual
Updates. The sample includes all US firms (13,204 non-US based firm-year observations
dropped), excluding financial (SIC code 6; dropped 35,882 observations) and utilities (SIC
code 49; dropped 5,401 observations), with non-missing observations for the book leverage
ratio. This gave me a total of 80,374 firm-year observations for 11,302 unique firms over the
time period from 1995 to 2008. This is the total after dropping 4,625 firm-year observations
with negative or missing values for the total asset (Compustat item at).
I collected state-level data on personal bankruptcy exemptions, homestead and non-
homestead, as defined in Chapter 7 of the US Bankruptcy Code. States which chose to “opt
12Figure 4 shows the distribution of all firms in the sample according to the headquarter location. The
distribution has three peaks for California, New York, and Texas. However, there seems to be a representative
sample of firms for the majority of US states. It important to stress that the distribution is not based on
the state of incorporation. It is well known that most firms are incorporated in Delaware (for many reasons
related to the expertise of its Court of Chancery) although the business takes place elsewhere.
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out” of the federal bankruptcy exemptions, set specific dollar amount for exempted assets
in the bankruptcy proceeding. I manually gathered this data from state legal documents for
all US states from 1995 to 2008. I observed 36 homestead and 73 non-homestead increases
for the sample period 1995-2005.13 I also used several editions of the Elias, Leonard, and
Renauer (2007) textbook, which is commonly used as a guideline by prospective filers, as
support to the data collection process.14 Table 1, which provides details on the exemptions
across states for the year 2005, gives a sense of the data.
Data on unemployment benefits are critical in my analysis to ensure that my results are
not confounded by the effect described by Agrawal and Matsa (2013). I gathered these data
from the US Department of Labor website, “Significant Provisions of State Unemployment
Insurance Laws”, available from 1977 to 2016.15
I also used data on per-capita personal debt from the “New York Fed Consumer Credit
Panel”. The dataset is a 5% random sample of individuals in the US who have a credit
history with Equifax and a social security number associated with their credit files. I was
able to gather, for every state, information on three debt types, namely: per-capita mortgage,
per-capita auto loans, and per-capita credit card balance from 1999 to 2014.
To account for time-varying state-specific macroeconomic and labor conditions, I col-
lected data on GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, changes in house prices, the degree of
unionization, and the disposable per-capita income for every state from 1995 to 2008. GDP,
disposable income, and unemployment data are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). Housing prices data is taken from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).16 Fi-
13I focus on rises in exemptions because of the limited number of reductions. In my sample, there is only
1 case of homestead and 14 cases of non-homestead decreases. The disproportion in the number of events
is mostly due to the fact that non-homestead are defined as the sum of exempted values of several personal
assets. If the value of non-homestead exemption changes just for one asset, then this counts as a shock
to non-homestead exemptions. The Variable List and Descriptions table provides more details on which
personal assets are included into non-homestead.
14Figure 2, in New Hampshire and New Jersey, is an example of how exemptions data can be found in
their book.
15https://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/statelaws.asp
16The FHFA is an independent federal agency created as the successor regulatory agency resulting from
the statutory merger of the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO), and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (FHFA).
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nally, data on state-level unionization level are from the Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson
website http://www.unionstats.com.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables in the analysis. Statistics in
this table refer to the time period from 1995 to 2008. Panel A reports statistics for the two
main dependent variables: firms’ book leverage and per-capita personal debt (all types). The
average of the total per-capita personal debt (defined as the sum of per-capital mortgage,
auto loans, and credit card) is around $29,440 during the sample period from 1999 to 2008.17
The leverage ratio is computed as the total book value of debt over total book value of assets.
In line with other empirical corporate finance studies, firms in my sample have an average
leverage of 23%. In general, summary statistics of my sample indicate comparability with
datasets used in other empirical corporate finance studies. This suggests that I am working
with a representative sample of publicly traded firms in the US between 1995 and 2008. All
financial controls have been Winsorized with 1% tails.
Panel B in Table 2 shows statistics of personal bankruptcy exemptions: homestead and
non-homestead. The main moments of the sample distribution match the ones in other stud-
ies using the same data (see Severino and Brown (2016)). The average nominal homestead
protection is $60,704. This value expresses the average equity value of the filer’s main resi-
dence that can be exempted from liquidation under the Chapter 7 procedure. The average
non-homestead protection is about $7,661, which represents the average amount of non-
homestead (or personal) assets that a filer can exempt during the bankruptcy procedure.18
Panel C and D report summary statistics for state-level economic indicators and firm-
specific balance sheet information. The average state provides an annual maximum amount
of unemployment benefits of about $7,768, while the average maximum weekly payment for
the eligible unemployed is around 300$. It is worth noting the difference in magnitude be-
17The presence of levered employees (i.e., personal debt exposure) is at the core of the expected costs of
the personal bankruptcy channel. Employees with debt outstanding are directly affected by changes in the
leniency of personal bankruptcy laws.
18The Variable List and Descriptions table contains detailed information on what constitutes a non-
homestead asset.
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tween personal bankruptcy protection and unemployment benefits. The former are benefits
accruing to individuals conditional on filing for personal bankruptcy. The latter is a cash
transfer conditional on unemployment. Statistics suggest that the job loss and filing for
personal bankruptcy are highly positively correlated events and Sullivan et al. (2000) report
that over two-thirds filers attribute bankruptcy to the involuntary job loss. Bankruptcy
exemptions are considered to contribute to filers’ fresh start after bankruptcy.
2.3 What Drives Changes in Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions?
In this section, I investigate state-level observables that may systematically explain both
the likelihood and the magnitude of increases in personal bankruptcy exemptions. The
purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, it provides evidence that changes in personal
bankruptcy protection do not systematically coincide with other changes that are likely to
affect firms’ leverage decisions. Second, it highlights factors that can constitute possible
confounders.
In the spirit of Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), I model the probability and the magnitude
of rises in the personal bankruptcy exemptions as a linear function of covariates that capture
local economic conditions and that can be correlated with state policy changes. I include time
and state fixed-effects to account for common unobservable time-trends and time-invariant
unobservables, respectively.
Table 3 shows the results from the linear probability model.19 Column (1) shows that
states with recent tax cut are less likely to increase homestead protection. States with a
recent tax-cut are about 7.1 percentage points less likely to provide higher homestead ex-
emptions and increases are about 5.6% smaller. This result is closely related to the significant
effect of political power. States with a democratic governor are about 4 percentage points
more likely to increase homestead protection. The magnitude of these changes, however,
does not statistically differ between states with the Democratic or Republican governor.
19As a benchmark, the unconditional probability of a homestead increase is approximately 8.07%, while
the unconditional expected change is about 4.41%.
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Importantly, tax raises (positively connected to firms’ leverage) are neither associated with
a higher probability nor with a larger magnitude of homestead exemption increases. This
result is important because it would be hard to disentangle an effect of tax increase from an
effect of personal bankruptcy exemption rise if these events happened systematically at the
same time.20
Changes in the house price index (∆HPI) affect both the probability and the magni-
tude of homestead increase. Higher house market prices are associated with higher home-
stead exemptions. The strong correlation between the house market prices and the personal
bankruptcy protection could compromise my empirical identification. Chaney, Sraer, and
Thesmar (2012) show that a booming housing market leads firms to increase investment
and leverage exploiting the fact that their collateralizable assets (such as a building) become
more valuable (referred to as collateral effect). For this reason, Section 5.1 addresses this
issue in more detail. This correlation suggests to include changes in house price index, ∆HPI,
as a control variable in the baseline specification. That should capture the share of firms’
leverage variation due to the collateral channel.
I also investigate the role of recourse. Recourse loans allow secure creditors to go after
the debtor’s non-exempted assets in the case the sale of the collateral is not sufficient to
cover the liability outstanding.21 In the US, forty states are classified as recourse states.
Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) point out that the remaining ones are considered non-recourse
because a deficiency judgment is either not available or highly impractical. The idea is that
an increase in personal bankruptcy exemptions is more valuable for levered employees in a
state allowing recourse loans. Exemptions shield debtor’ assets from deficiency judgments.
Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) in Table 3 report results from estimating the linear model
in which I include an indicator variable controlling for the variation generated by the recourse
20Section 5.2 investigates the possible confounding effect of tax changes with greater accuracy. Results
suggest the absence of a statistically significant relationship between changes in tax and personal bankruptcy
protection policies.
21In the case of mortgage, lenders can obtain a deficiency judgment which covers the difference between
the credit owed and the recovered amount from the market value of the home.
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status of a state.22 Estimates show that recourse status (variable D.Recourse) does not affect
the probability of a homestead increase. It does, however, affect positively its magnitude.
Recourse states on average increase homestead exemptions around 2.5% more than non-
recourse (around $1,500). Creditors can seize only non-exempt assets, hence, this suggests
a higher relevance of exemptions in states allowing recourse.
Another important result of my identification strategy is the lack of statistically signifi-
cant relation between homestead protection and unemployment benefit generosity (variable
Ln(Max UB)). Higher unemployment benefits make layoffs less costly and, de facto, provide
unemployed with a source of income. Larger unemployment benefits are expected to atten-
uate the risk of personal bankruptcy, hence its costs. Results in Table 3 suggest that states’
decisions to change these two policies are uncorrelated; the generosity of unemployment ben-
efits neither affects the probability of exemptions changes nor their magnitude. Estimates are
statistically insignificant. Column (6) reports some significance. This specification excludes
state fixed-effects but considers the role of recourse states. A one-percent increase in the
log of unemployment benefits is associated with a change in homestead exemptions of about
8.6 basis points. The estimate is economically modest, but, importantly, the coefficient is
positive. The marginal benefit of a higher personal bankruptcy protection is expected to be
reduced once I control for unemployment benefits generosity.
Last, I study the influence of neighboring states. Levered employees may strategically
purchase properties or move to a place where they will enjoy a better bankruptcy protection.
Neighboring states are likely the best candidates for this strategic behavior. This aspect is
very relevant since neighbors of a treated state are part of the control group. Changes in
personal bankruptcy protection induced by unobservable conditions common to all neigh-
boring states may generate bias in my estimates. Following Heider and Ljungqvist (2015),
I construct a variable (Homestead Comp. and Non-Hoemstead Comp.) capturing the co-
movement of personal bankruptcy protection within groups of neighboring states.23 Results
22Notice that inclusion of this dummy variable implies the impossibility of including state fixed-effects.
23Neighboring states are defined according to CENSUS divisions as shown in Figure 6. More details on
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show that states with homestead exemptions closer to the highest among neighbors are less
likely to increase them. Exceeding neighbors’ homestead exemption by one standard devi-
ation reduces the probability of an increase by 0.076 standard deviations, which translates
into a drop of the unconditional probability by more than 2 percentage points.
Results in this section suggest the presence of variables which correlate both with states’
decision of increasing exemptions and firms’ leverage policy. I take steps to account for these
variables in my baseline specification.
3 Main Findings
The theory presented in Section 1 predicts a positive relation between leverage and per-
sonal bankruptcy exemptions. I find that firms increase their leverage in response to a
reduction in the costs of personal bankruptcy implied more generous homestead exemptions.
The effect is robust across several model specifications.
3.1 Baseline Specifications
My main results come from estimating the coefficients β1 and β2 in Equation (5). They
capture the sensitivity of firms’ leverage to changes in the homestead and non-homestead
bankruptcy exemptions, respectively. The direction and magnitude of these estimates pro-
vide several insights. First, they confirm the importance of employer-employees implicit
risk-sharing agreements. Second, they measure the extent to which these agreements in-
fluence firms’ financing decisions. Third, these estimates provide a new insight into the
relevance of employees’ financial risk on firms’ policies because the exogenous variation in
my experiment only impacts the levered side of the firms’ workforce.
Table 4 reports the regression results. Both from a statistical and economic perspective,
only homestead exemptions have a substantial impact on firms’ leverage decisions. Estimates
the variable construction can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table.
20
are significant across all the specifications. Non-homestead exemptions have no statistically
significant effects on firms’ leverage and a limited economic magnitude. This result suggests
that individuals attach more value to protection over the house when making employment
and borrowing decisions. Because homestead exemptions are much greater in dollar value
compared to non-homestead ($60,704 versus $7,661, on average), I focus my discussion on
the estimates for homestead exemptions. Nevertheless, I include and report results for the
non-homestead variable in all specifications.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows that in response to an increase in homestead exemptions,
firms increase their book leverage by 82 basis points, on average, as compared to firms
in the same industry (according to the 2-digit Standard Industry Classification code) that
are headquartered in states that did not change their homestead exemptions in a given
year. Treated firms have an average book leverage of 0.19 in the year before the change in
homestead exemptions. Hence, 82 basis points translate into about 4.32% increase in pre-
treatment leverage (0.82/0.19). This is a sizable effect also considering that the standard
deviation of the annual changes in leverage is around 13 basis points.
The model includes industry-by-year fixed-effects to control for time-varying industry
shocks and accounts for time-varying firm characteristics by including collateral, market-to-
book ratio, size, return-on-assets, and Altman’s Z-score as controls. Additionally, a set of
state characteristics GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income,
unemployment benefits, and changes in the house prices index control for economic con-
ditions which may influence firms’ leverage decisions.24 The regression in first-difference
has two advantages. First, it removes unobservable firm fixed-effects. Moreover, unlike the
level regression with the inclusion of firm fixed-effects, this specification allows for repeated
treatments (i.e., a sequence of exemption increases).
The sensitivity of firms’ leverage to increases in non-homestead exemptions is not sta-
tistically significant across all model specifications. The point estimate in Column (1) is
24The analysis on the determinants of exemptions in Section 2.3 provides a useful guideline to pin down
those state-level variables which correlate with personal bankruptcy exemptions.
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positive (the expected direction) while its magnitude is small, 25 basis points, and statisti-
cally insignificant (p-value = 0.169). The average non-homestead increase in my sample is
around $1,700. Considering the modest economic magnitude of these exemptions, it would
be suspicious if small dollar value changes can reverberate so strongly on levered employees’
willingness to bear additional risk.
The model includes state-level changes in unemployment benefits to control for the ben-
eficial effects of other state insurance programs, which guarantee a stream of income during
the unemployment spell. The variable, D.∆ Max UB, is an indicator taking value one if a
state changes its nominal value of unemployment benefits, and zero otherwise.25 Agrawal and
Matsa (2013) use the variation in the state-level unemployment benefits to capture changes
in the unemployment risk. They show that firms choose more conservative financing poli-
cies to mitigate employees’ unemployment risk exposure. Although our papers are closely
related, my analysis goes one step further by attempting to identify employees’ financial risk
as an important cost that makes employees more risk-averse.
Surprisingly, the effect of unemployment benefits on firms’ leverage is not statistically
significant and actually, negative. This is the opposite of what one would expect.26 An
economically plausible, yet speculative, explanation for these results is attributable to the
fact that the personal bankruptcy channel has become more relevant since the sharp increase
of household indebtedness. As Figure 1 shows, since the 90s’ households have substantially
increased their borrowing. In my sample period, the average debt-to-disposable income ratio
increased from 80% to 120% (with a peak around 130% in 2007).
The within states across time variation of bankruptcy exemptions does not allow me to
control for within-state time-varying unobservables. Specifically, I cannot include state-by-
year fixed-effects. The strictest specification allowed is in Column (2), which includes both
25In the regression specification I separate positive and negative changes to account for asymmetric effects
on leverage.
26Although not reported for the sake of brevity, using the full sample from 1977 to 2008 I was able to
replicate Agrawal and Matsa (2013) results. Unfortunately, it is not possible to have a joint analysis with
both unemployment benefits and bankruptcy protection for the whole sample period because of the lack of
data on the latter.
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industry-by-year and state fixed-effects. Since I work in differences, the latter controls for
state time trends. The point estimate is smaller, 64 basis points, but statistically significant
(p-value = 0.059). The economic magnitude is also substantial compared to the 13 basis
points annual standard deviation for changes in leverage.
I will now investigate in more detail the sensitivity of leverage to the size of the increase in
homestead exemptions. I split shocks into large, medium, and small according to whether the
magnitude of the increase falls into the first, second or third tercile of the sample distribution
of homestead rises. The firms’ leverage response depends on the size of the increase in
exemptions. I estimate a treatment effect of around 95 basis points for large, around 55
basis points for medium, and 13 basis points for small increases. As one would expect, the
effect is monotonically increasing from smaller to larger shocks. Although the coefficient on
medium shocks is still sizable, 55 basis points, it is only marginally significant (p-value =
0.14). Instead, the coefficient on small shocks is both not statistically significant and small
in terms of economic magnitude. This coefficient roughly matches the annual standard
deviation of leverage changes. Economically, are likely to be inflation adjustments rather
than structural changes of personal bankruptcy protection.
This intuition is further confirmed by the estimates in Column (4) and (5) where I use
percentage change of exemptions instead of indicator variables. These estimates take into
account the magnitude of the exemption changes. I estimate that firms increase leverage
by 79 basis points for a 1% percent rise in homestead exemptions (p-value = 0.08). This
corresponds to an increase in total debt of $18.34 million given that the pre-treatment average
is $441.88 million. For the average homestead exemption increase, I compute a debt increase
of around $40.42 million.27
My results survive the strictest specifications allowed. This should alleviate the concern
about whether treated and control firms would have continued on the parallel trend in the
absence of exemptions’ increase. However, there is still a concern that the estimated sensitiv-
27These computations are performed by using the average pre-treatment leverage of 19% to back out the
increased amount of debt by keeping constant the level of total asset value.
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ity of leverage to changes in the personal bankruptcy protection is the result of randomness.
To mitigate this concern I performed a simulation exercise in the spirit of Bertrand, Duflo,
and Mullainathan (2004), which comprises 1,000 iterations. First, I generated 36 homestead
and 73 non-homestead increases. Then, I randomly assigned them to states, and finally, I
estimated the parameters β1 and β2 of the baseline specification in Equation (5). Figure
9 plots the estimates, which show an average treatment effect of zero for both homestead
and non-homestead. I observe a point estimate larger than the actual treatment effect only
in three iterations. This simulation exercise suggests that the likelihood of capturing pure
randomness in the actual estimates is statistically negligible.28
The estimation of standard errors is an additional concern regarding the empirical method-
ology. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that in a difference-in-differences framework with repeated
cross-sectional and serially correlated outcome variables there is an overrejection of the null
hypothesis. The problem is that standard deviation of the difference-in-differences estima-
tors are severely understated.29 All my specifications include clustered standard errors at
the state level, which take into account the within-group correlation structure. As shown in
Bertrand et al. (2004), when the number of groups is sufficiently large (they provide a rule
of thumb of 50 groups), clustering partially mitigates the problem. My estimations on the
full sample include 51 groups for clustered standard errors.
28Additionally, I compute the t-statistics and check the rejection rate of the null hypothesis. One would
expect that using the t-statistic’s threshold of 1.96, then I should reject the null of no effect (β = 0) about
5% of the time. In my simulation exercise, I find that 10% of the time the absolute value of the t-statistic
is greater than 1.96. By considering only estimates with a positive coefficient (i.e., the sign predicted by
the theory), then the rejection rate is around 6%. Both results are positive considering that Bertrand et al.
(2004), in a similar simulation exercise, find a stunning rejection rate of 67.5% when standard errors are
computed without clustering. Although not tabulated, this result is available upon request.
29They describe three factors contributing to this problem. First, difference-in-differences estimation
usually relies on fairly long time series. Second, the dependent variables are usually highly positively serially
correlated. Last, the treatment variable typically changes itself very little within a state over time. These
three factors reinforce each other so that the standard error for the estimator can severely understate its
standard deviation.
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4 Threats to Identification
In this section, I provide empirical support to the identification assumptions behind the
difference-in-differences framework. The key assumption, discussed in the next sub-section,
is the zero correlation assumption. Economically, this condition means that without the
treatment the average responses for both treated and control group should be the same.
Moreover, I perform a sanity check. The economic mechanism previously described
requires that levered employees do not change their borrowing behavior (e.g., becoming
more levered). This needs to hold true to avoid that the reduction in the costs of personal
bankruptcy is offset by an increase in financial risk implied by more personal debt. Using
aggregate data on individuals’ per-capita debt, I show that, on average, rises in bankruptcy
exemptions are not associated with increases in individuals’ personal debt. These findings
are in line with Severino and Brown (2016). Firms are able to extract benefits from more
generous exemptions to the extent that these benefits are not captured by employees.
4.1 Pre-Trends and Potential After-Treatment Reversals
Under the parallel trends assumption, in the absence of changes in personal bankruptcy
protection the evolution of leverage for both treated and control firms would follow the same
trend. In line with the previous literature, I use pre-treatment data to show that trends of
the leverage follow a similar path for both firms in control and treated states. Specifically,
this is achieved by including the lead variable of the personal bankruptcy exemptions in
the model in Equation (5). Moreover, I include up to four lag variables of the personal
bankruptcy exemptions in order to assess potential treatment reversal. The idea is to test
for possible reversal of the treatment effect estimated for the fiscal year subsequent the
increase in personal bankruptcy exemptions.
The baseline result for the multivariate regression specification in Table 4 shows a leverage
increase of 82 basis points on average as a response to an increase of personal bankruptcy
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protection. This is significant at the 1% level. Table 6 estimates the same baseline model
but also includes up to four lags and one lead variable of the dummy capturing state-level
increases in personal homestead exemptions. To ensure robustness to different specifications,
I estimate four models in which I gradually remove the lag variables and in the last model,
I exclude the lead variable. Results appear to be stable across all specifications.
The first lag of homestead increases is statistically significant and similar in magnitude
as the result in the baseline specification across all columns. The first column with all lags
and one lead estimate an average treatment effect of the first lag of around 73 basis points.
There is a leverage reduction in the subsequent year (t-2), but it is small in magnitude and
statistically not significant across all specifications. Also in the third and fourth year after the
shock changes in leverage are negligible statistically and in magnitude. This result suggests
a persistent treatment effect which does not revert in the years after the shocks. Table 6
also reports estimates for the lead of increases in homestead exemptions capturing potential
firms’ anticipation and providing suggestive evidence of comparability of firms in treated and
control states in the year preceding the policy change in personal bankruptcy protection. The
coefficient is positive and has a magnitude of around 33 basis points. However, the estimated
average effect is not statistically significant.
There are many factors and events that may threaten my identification. For example,
firms in treated states might anticipate pro-debtors policies (e.g., higher exemptions) if a
Democratic governor is elected in that state. This might taint the parallel trend between
the outcome variable in treated and control states. I take steps to ensure that as many
as possible observable factors and events are considered to avoid the contamination of the
main policy change of interest used as an exogenous shock, namely the increase in personal
bankruptcy protection laws. In particular, I look at the determinants of personal bankruptcy
exemptions and potential confounding events. In an untabulated estimation, I include vari-
ables capturing state political power in the year before the change in personal bankruptcy
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exemptions.30 Interestingly, the treatment effect increases in magnitude while the coefficient
on the lead variable shrinks both in magnitude and statistical power. This result encour-
ages extra care when considering other likely policy changes the democratic party might
enact besides increasing personal bankruptcy protection. Section 5 takes care of potential
contemporaneous confounding effects (e.g., tax increases, more unemployment benefits, etc).
These findings carry important implications. I show that the leverage increase induced
by an increase of homestead protection is persistent. There is no statistical evidence of
a reversion to the pre-treatment level. Additionally, the lack of statistical significance on
the lead coefficient indicates that firms’ outcome variable in treated and control states in
the year before the personal bankruptcy increase are comparable. Moreover, there is little
evidence on firms anticipating pro-debtors policies. They become even more negligible once
the state-level political influence is taken out of the regression by including proper controls.
Figure 7 graphically shows the estimation results, underlying the statistical similitude of
firms in treated and control states especially during the year the policy change takes place.
In the subsequent year, firms in treated states on average increase their leverage ratio.
4.2 Are Higher Bankruptcy Exemptions Systematically Affecting
Personal Borrowing?
In this section, I provide evidence that higher personal bankruptcy exemptions are not
systematically associated with higher personal borrowing, testing the hypothesis that higher
exemptions have zero effect on the individuals’ borrowing behavior. This result is an impor-
tant piece of evidence for my identification.
The intuition behind this idea is as follows. If a state increases personal bankruptcy
protection (e.g., in the form of higher exemptions), then outstanding personal debt becomes
more valuable for debtors. Existing debt contracts were priced under less debtor-friendly
30These variables are D.Democratic (contemporaneous and lagged), 3Y to Election, 2Y to Election, and
1Y to Election. More details on these variables can be found in the Variables List and Description table.
Estimates remain available upon request.
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exemptions and creditors are now holding riskier claims as their expected recovery is reduced.
Thus, higher personal bankruptcy protection creates a surplus generated by the transfer from
creditors to levered employees. Increasing personal borrowing or filing for bankruptcy are
the two alternatives that levered employees can use to expropriate this available surplus.
The latter alternative creates fewer concerns for two reasons. Figure 3 shows a stable rate
of filings for Chapter 7. One would expect spikes in years when states increase bankruptcy
exemptions. This is also consistent with White (1998), who shows that the rate of Chapter
7 filings is too low as compared to the share of individuals who would benefit from it. The
option value of strategical bankruptcy is not high enough to offset its costs.
However, changes in borrowing behavior generate more concerns and it is also a more
plausible reaction as it involves fewer negative consequences. I show that, on average, individ-
uals do not increase their personal borrowing in response to greater protection by estimating
the following model,
∆PC Household Debtst =ψ1 ·D.∆Homesteadst−1 + ψ2 ·D.∆Non-Homesteadst−1
+ φ ·∆Zst−1 + at + as + st,
(6)
where the ∆PC Household Debt is the change in the per-capita household debt in state s at
time t. ∆Homestead and ∆Non-Homestead are indicator variables capturing changes in the
nominal value of homestead and non-homestead exemptions in state s at time t− 1. Z is a
set of time-varying state controls to account for variation in the local economic conditions.
I include time and state fixed effects to account for time-variant unobservables common to
every state and time-invariant state unobservable.
Table 7 reports the results. Increases in the homestead and non-homestead protections
do not generate statistically significant changes in the total amount of per-capita personal
debt. I estimate a sensitivity of borrowing decisions to an increase in the homestead of
around by -0.2%. This point estimate is not statistically significant (p-value= 0.831) and it
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actually shows a negative sign. Similar results are obtained by analyzing the sensitivity of
specific types of personal debt: per-capita mortgage, credit card, and auto loans to increase
in exemptions. The amount of per-capita credit card debt shows a slightly significant and
positive sensitivity an increase in non-homestead protection. All my estimates are consistent
with the results in Severino and Brown (2016).
The key takeaway from Table 7 is that there is no evidence of a shift in personal borrowing
behavior in response to greater bankruptcy protection. Although individuals’ demand for
debt might increase because of the higher exemptions/protection, credit suppliers adjust the
interest rate to account for the lower expected recovery. Data shows that, in equilibrium,
these two effects offset each other.
5 What Else Could be Driving Leverage Decisions?
Confounding Factors and Robustness Tests
Results in Section 3 provide robust evidence that firms increase leverage in response to
policies affecting levered employees’ risk (and costs) of personal bankruptcy. I show that
time-varying industry shocks are not driving these leverage decisions, industry-by-year fixed
effects account for that. Moreover, given that I work in differences, the inclusion of state
fixed-effects controls for state-specific time trend in leverage. The remaining challenge to
interpret my results as causal is the possibility of residual variation (orthogonal to all controls
already included in the specification) that varies within states across time and correlates with
rises in exemptions. I addressed this concern by first analyzing three plausible confounding
factors related to firms’ financing decisions, changes in exemptions, or both (e.g., housing
market). Then, I examined the effect of unobservable local economic conditions of states
neighboring the state/s that increased exemptions.
Altogether, my empirical tests reject the possibility that these factors are driving firms’
leverage decisions.
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5.1 The Collateral Effect of a Booming Housing Market
Chaney et al. (2012) show that a booming housing market allows firms owning real estate
to increase borrowing and investment if the pledgeable value of their collateral/building has
increased (hereafter, collateral channel). In a simple setting a` la Hart and Moore (1994),
the ability to pledge collaterals improves firms’ financing capacity. Considering that results
in Table 3 shows a strong correlation between homestead exemptions and changes in house
price index (variable ∆HPI). In this section, I seek to ensure that the economic channel of
my analysis is separated by the one described in Chaney et al. (2012).
I take several steps to isolate the sensitivity of firms’ leverage that is attributable to
the purely collateral channel from the sensitivity due to risk-sharing consideration. First
and foremost, I include changes in house price index (variable ∆HPI) in all specifications.
This is expected to capture the variation in leverage related to the variation in the value
of collateralizable assets/real estate. Additionally, I run specific tests aimed at alleviating
concern about the influence of the collateral channel. Table 8 shows results of these empirical
tests.
Column (1) in Table 8 shows the results from the baseline specification as a benchmark. In
Column (2), I estimate the baseline specification with the exclusion of the control variable
∆HPI. The correlation with homestead exemptions suggests that results might be biased
because of their endogenous nature. It is important that the point estimates with (82 basis
points) and without this variable (85 basis points) are statistically indistinguishable from
each other.
Columns (3), (4), and (5) show that the collateral channel is not driving the results. I
exploit information about firms’ ownership of real estate and their headquarters to establish
this result. The idea is to exclude from the sample all firms for which I have information
about ownership of collateralizable assets. If my variable is simply capturing the effect of
the collateral channel, then I should observe a drop in the point estimate by excluding these
firms. Following Chaney et al. (2012), I use data on firms owning real estate (variable RE
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Owner) from Compustat and headquarters owners (variable HQ Owner) from their publicly
available dataset.31 Column (3) excludes firms owning real estate, Column (4) excludes firms
owning their headquarters, and Column (5) excludes both types of firms. Results are robust
as all estimates show a larger magnitude of the treatment effect as compared to the baseline
specification.
In the last column, I test whether the sensitivity of leverage to changes in homestead ex-
emptions in the states with large, medium, and small house price changes follow a monotonic
pattern. The hypothesis is that if changes in homestead exemptions are spuriously capturing
the effect of the collateral channel, I should find a larger effect in states with higher housing
market shocks. Interestingly, Column (6) neither shows a monotonically decreasing pattern
from large to small house price shocks nor a stronger effect for states with larger housing
market shocks.
Taken together, results in Table 8 suggest the rejection of the hypothesis that housing
market shocks are driving the sensitivity of leverage to changes in bankruptcy exemptions.
5.2 The Usual Suspect: Corporate Income Tax Increases and Cuts
States pass bills containing many interventions, so it could be that states are system-
atically changing both corporate income tax and personal bankruptcy exemptions. Both
policies predict an increase in the firms’ use of debt. Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) estimate
that firms increase their long-term leverage by about 40 basis points for every percentage-
point tax increase. In this section, I test the hypothesis that the effect of changes in per-
sonal bankruptcy protection is confounded by simultaneous state corporate tax rate increase
and/or cut and find no supporting evidence for that.
Figure 8 provides visual evidence of the overlap between tax and personal bankruptcy
exemptions changes (homestead and non-homestead). The figure focuses on the sample from
31More information about the construction of these variables can be found in the variable List and De-
scriptions table.
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1995 to 2006 because the main specification does not consider years after 2005.32 The figure
shows in blue states that in the three-year period considered have experienced both corporate
income tax rate and personal bankruptcy exemptions changes. The former includes both
tax raise and cut. The latter increase in either homestead or non-homestead exemptions, or
both. Therefore, the figure is very conservative in pinning down the severity of this overlap.
The graphic evidence alone suggests a minimum interference between these policy changes.
However, I ensure statistical robustness by estimating the model in Equation (5) with the
inclusion of changes in corporate income tax rates. I collected data on corporate tax changes
from the Appendix A and B in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). Column (1) in Table 9 shows a
statistically unchanged magnitude for the coefficient measuring the sensitivity of leverage to
homestead exemptions (86 basis points with p− value = 0.003) as compared to the baseline
specification in Table 4.
Furthermore, Column (3) in Table 9 ensures robustness to state-level time-invariant un-
observable by including state fixed effects. The last column of the table provides evidence
that political power is not the driver of the effect on leverage. Both corporate tax changes
and increases in personal bankruptcy protection are correlated to democratic state governors.
All the variables capturing political power at the state-level are not statistically significant.33
This exercise shows that corporate tax changes are unlikely to undermine the validity of
my empirical identification. Although both corporate tax and personal bankruptcy exemp-
tions positively impact firms’ leverage, they work through different channels.
32As discussed in Section E, in 2005 there has been a structural change of the personal bankruptcy code
resulted from the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act.
33I include an indicator variable equal to one if in the year of increases in personal bankruptcy and/or
tax changes the state Governor is from the democratic party, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, I include
three indicator variables equal to one if the next gubernatorial election is in three, two, or one year and zero
otherwise.
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5.3 Labor Market Characteristics: Bargaining Power and Unem-
ployment Risk
In this section, I provide evidence that the labor market characteristics are not likely to
be the driver of firms’ leverage response in my empirical framework. My empirical design
takes costs of personal bankruptcy as among those costs that employees internalize when
a firm becomes riskier. Greater personal bankruptcy protection lowers these costs giving
the firm slackness to increase the leverage without being required to compensate employees
for bearing an extra risk of financial distress. My identification might be contaminated by
shocks to the employees’ power or unemployment risk. I would still observe firms increase
their leverage ratios but in response to different shocks. I tackle this issue by implementing
two empirical strategies: the first addresses employees’ bargaining power, and the second
addresses the unemployment risk.
The relation between firms’ financing decisions and its workforce is a time-honored idea.
The theoretical literature formalizes two main scenarios. The first shows the potential strate-
gic aspect of leverage, while the second focuses on the risk-sharing considerations.34 The
hypothesis I test in this paper hinges on the relevance of the latter idea.
First, I control for the share of variation in leverage attributable to employees’ power.
More specifically I use labor union presence to capture the extent of employees’ bargaining
power with the management. Following the literature, I consider a strong union presence at
the state-level as a proxy for a high employees’ bargaining power. I use three variables to
34Perotti and Spier (1993) are among the first formalizing the idea that firms can strategically sell part
of the future surplus to debtholders (by making a debt-for-equity swap) such that to reduce the available
surplus to be bargained over with the employees. A similar idea was already in Bronars and Deere (1991).
These theories start a strand of empirical literature testing the hypothesis that firms may increase the
leverage to gain bargaining power over their employees. Empirics have found contrasting (however not a
contradicting) results on this issue. Matsa (2010) finds support, while Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2015) does
not. Although contrasting, these results point to two different directions. One underlining the strategic
bargaining advantages, and the other the willingness of preserving financial flexibility as key drivers of
corporate financial policy. Closest to my paper is Berk et al. (2010) who shows that firms choose more
conservative financing policies in order to provide insurance to their employees whose premium is reflected
in lower entry wages. They formalize the idea of a trade-off between tax advantages of debt financing and
leverage-induced human costs of bankruptcy. Agrawal and Matsa (2013) find supportive empirical evidence.
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capture union power.
The first is defined as the fraction of workers in a state which is either covered by a
collective bargaining agreement if they are union members or covered by a union contract if
they are not members. Furthermore, I exploit variation in states with or without Right-to-
Work Laws. Labor unions in states with RWLs in place are expected to be weaker.35 The last
variable captures the presence of a union at firm-level, an indicator This is an indicator equal
to one if a firm’s employees hold a unionization election. Moreover, I include an additional
indicator variable equal to one if the firm becomes unionized as result of the aforementioned
election. These three specifications are expected to isolate the leverage decisions driven by
strategic motives, leaving the remaining treatment effect likely to be caused by the reduction
in the employees’ costs of personal bankruptcy.
The second empirical strategy looks at state heterogeneity in terms of unemployment
risk by considering mass layoff events.36
Table 10 summarizes results from both strategies. Results from Columns (1) to (6) refer
to employees’ power. Results from Columns (7) to (9) refer to the effect of unemployment
risk.
The baseline result in Table 10 Column (1) shows a treatment effect of around 81 basis
points after the inclusion of the changes in employees’ power captured by changes in the
fraction of unionized workers in a given state (variable ∆Unionization). The estimate is
statistically indistinguishable from the one in Table 4 Column (2), which has the same
35In these states, unions cannot oblige workers of unionized firms to be union members and pay fees. There
are at least two reasons why a union should be weaker in these states. First, they have less financial power
due to the lack of payer members. Second, RWLs also affect unions’ incentives to exert a high level of effort.
The basic idea of these laws is to secure employees’ right to decide for themselves whether or not to join or
financially support a union. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) introduce the employees’ right
to organize into unions, engage in collective bargaining to gain better contractual terms, and take actions
such as strikes. The act authorizes unions to serve as workers “exclusive bargaining representative”. This
requires that all employees of an unionized firms accept the union contract. Individuals may not negotiate
separately, whether or not they belong to the union. Then unions started negotiating contracts that made
paying their dues a condition of employment. In response, many states passed “Right-to-Work laws (RWLs)
that prohibit these provisions. Under RWLs, unions cannot make fees compulsory for non-members.
36Please refer to the Variable List and Descriptions table for more details on the data on mass layoff
events.
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model specification but without controlling for employees’ power. Interestingly, the average
treatment effect is larger in magnitude and statistically more significant for firms in states
with a lower presence of a union. This is confirmed by the results from estimating the
model on a sample split according to the presence of Right-to-Work laws in a given state.
Columns (4) and (5) show that the estimated average treatment is larger in magnitude and
more statistically significant in states in which labor unions are expected to be weaker. The
difference is large and statistically significant. Column (6) supports the two previous findings
as well by considering firm-specific unionization events.37
These results suggest that employees’ bargaining power is unlikely to be the cause of
firms increasing their leverage strategically. On the contrary, in line with findings in Pinto
(2016), firms with more powerful employees encounter more difficulties in making financing
decisions which increase the volatility of employees’ payoff.
Titman (1984) has already presented the argument that capital structure can be used
to ensure employees against unemployment risk. The question is whether my specification
is only capturing extreme time-varying unemployment risk level within the state. This
variation could be controlled by introducing state-by-year fixed-effect. However, because
the treatment varies within state across years, then this strategy is not feasible. In order
to overcome this intrinsic weakness of the model, I use mass layoff events within states.38
They are expected to capture the extent to which a state is suffering an exceptionally high
or low unemployment risk in the same year the state decided to increase the bankruptcy
exemptions.
The last three columns of Table 10 present results of a baseline specification with included
the continuous variables ∆Mass Layoff controlling for the fraction of private-sector employ-
ees who become unemployed as a consequence of a mass layoff event. The point estimate,
37A caveats to this specification. Coefficients of union election and union victory cannot be considered
as capturing the causal effect of union elections on leverage. This is because the control group is not well
defined. The only purpose in this specification is to absorb the leverage variation related to firm-specific
events that might confound my identification.
38Data can be freely downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website at the section Mass Layoff
Statistic. More info on the mass layoff variable can be found in the Variable List and Description table.
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around 63 basis points, is statistically indistinguishable from the specification without the
inclusion of mass layoff events. Columns (8) and (9) estimate the model on two subsamples
partitioned according to whether a given state suffers a large or small mass payoff in the
same year when bankruptcy exemptions are increased. A state is assigned to the high or
low unemployment risk group if its mass layoff event position is above or below the sample
median of the variable Mass Layoff, respectively.
If my specification is only capturing time-varying state-level unemployment risk, we
should find firms increasing their leverage when the unemployment risk is low. However,
my results show no statistical difference in the leverage sensitivity with respect to changes
in homestead exemption in states with high or low unemployment risk (proxied by mass
layoffs). The estimates are 59 and 51 basis points, respectively.
5.4 What is the Role of Neighbors of Treated States?
In this section, I discuss the idea that unobservable local economic conditions might
drive changes in exemptions, therefore the leverage response is actually due to these shocks
rather than changes in costs of personal bankruptcy. Local economic conditions are likely
to spillover across borders of neighboring states. Using firms in states far from the treated
state and its neighbors as a control group could inflate the estimated treatment effect. I
employ three strategies to rule out this possibility.
In the first strategy, I control for economic condition common to neighboring states by
including in the main model specification in Equation (5) both neighbors fixed-effects. I
apply standard definitions by the Census to identify neighboring states. The Census splits
the United States into four groups (called Regions) and each region is subsequently divided
into two or three subgroups (called Divisions).39 This strategy helps to eliminate effects due
to common time-invariant unobservable at neighboring level. Table 11 reports estimates from
this specification. Columns (1) and (2) show that results survive the inclusion of region and
39Figure 6 shows a map of Regions and Divisions.
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division fixed effects. I estimate a leverage sensitivity to homestead increase of about 76 and
62 basis point for the specification with the region and division fixed-effects, respectively.
The magnitude of these effects is very similar to the one obtained by the estimating the
model with state fixed-effects (check Table 4 Column (2) for details).
The second strategy consists of a falsification test in which I analyze how leverage of
firms’ headquartered in a state neighboring a treated state react to changes in bankruptcy
exemptions. More specifically, I include in model specification an indicator equal to one
if a firm is headquartered in states neighboring the actual treated state/states and zero
for all other states (included the treated one). Table 11 shows results in Columns (5) and
(6). The coefficients of interest in the table are False Reg. D.∆Homestead and False Div.
D.∆Homestead, which consider all states in a region or division as neighbors, respectively. If
the actual drivers of firms’ leverage response are local economic conditions, one would expect
to find statistically significant estimates. Results show that all coefficients are not significant
and also small in magnitude, 16 and -11 basis points, as compared to the treatment effect in
my baseline regression (Table 4, around 82 basis points).
In the last test, I run the following experiment. I estimate the baseline model in Equa-
tion (5) using only states which eventually have been treated at least once in my sample.
Moreover, I restrain the control group formed by neighboring states as defined by the Census
divisions. This specification alleviates the concern of inflated estimates due to the control
states being in very far from the treated one and possibly with different economic conditions.
Despite the drop in observations (from 38,072 to 10,193), Columns (5) and (6) in Table 11
show a statistically significant treatment effect. The magnitude, around 79 basis point, is
similar to the baseline specification with all states included.
Overall, these three empirical strategies do not suggest the presence of an omitted vari-
able, such as local economic conditions, driving both firms’ leverage decisions and states’
choice to change their personal bankruptcy protection laws.
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5.5 Robustness Checks
Table 12 reports robustness tests. Column (1) shows that the effect is robust when
estimating the model using debt issuance as the outcome variable. Column (2) uses market
leverage as the dependent variable and shows a statistically unchanged sensitivity to changes
in costs of personal bankruptcy. The point estimate is around 85 basis points.
Could the effect just be an artifact of the specific sample period? I address this concern
by estimating the baseline specification on samples split according to four different time
periods. I first show that including years after the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act (i.e., from 2006 to 2008) still provides a statistically significant
estimate but smaller in magnitude. This suggests that the BAPCPA indeed affected the
relevance of exemptions as an insurance for bankruptcy filers. The result is confirmed when
estimating the model only for the period after 2005, where the sensitivity of leverage is both
not statistically significant and also small in magnitude. Columns (4) and (5) report results
from estimating the model form the periods 1995-2000 and 2001-2005, respectively, and the
model confirms the main findings.
“Anything that causes income to decline puts a family at risk for bankruptcy. Layoffs
and firings create huge vulnerability. Even if the worker finds another job, a period without
income may create insurmountable debts, especially if that worker was carrying substantial
debt loads when unemployment hit. Job turnover, rather than the actual unemployment
rate, may be a better predictor of economic distress”, Sullivan et al. (2000). I test this idea
in the data and estimate the treatment effect only using firms in industries with a higher
turnover rate. Confirming the intuition in Sullivan et al. (2000), my estimates show a higher
magnitude of the leverage sensitivity to changes in the costs of personal bankruptcy.
Column (8) addresses the concern that states which increase bankruptcy exemptions are
fundamentally different from those which do not change them, which would pose doubts on
the adequacy of firms in the latter states as a control group. To attenuate this concern, I
estimate the model using exclusively firms in states which are treated at least once during
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my sample period.
The last column addresses the problem of the correct location of firms’ headquarters.
Heider and Ljungqvist (2015) point out that Compustat backfills the firms’ headquarters
location. This means that whenever a firm changes the address of its headquarter, this field
in the dataset is modified also for all past years. The risk is to wrongly place firms into
treated and control groups. Using the data in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015), I show that the
point estimate is actually larger once accounting for the misplacement of firms’ headquarters.
6 Conclusion
This paper empirically explores the impact of changes in personal bankruptcy exemptions
on corporate financing policies, showing that firms increase leverage in response to more
generous personal bankruptcy exemptions. I interpret this result to mean that firms can
extract benefits from pro-employee policies. Firms increase leverage by 79 basis points in
response to a 1% rise in homestead exemptions. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is
the first to propose personal bankruptcy as a channel affecting firms’ financing policies, and
its contribution lies also in the empirical identification of the sensitivity of firms’ leverage
stemming solely from risk-sharing considerations.
My work also opens avenues for future research by suggesting potentially unintended
consequences of pro-employee policies when they fail to account for corporate reactions. For
example, the 2005 shift in the US from a debtor- to creditor-friendly personal bankruptcy
system sharply increased the costs of personal bankruptcy and had the unintended conse-
quence of making high leverage more costly for firms. In addition, it would be interesting to
further investigate how firms use the additional debt financing raised when exemptions are
high, which would help in assessing whether this transfer of surplus from employees to the
firm is efficient.
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A Variable List and Descriptions
Variable Label Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Book Leverage Ratio between the total book value of debt (Compustat variables
dltt+dlc) over the total value of assets (Compustat variable at).
PC Household Debt The per-capita total household debt outstanding in a given state.
This variable is computed as the sum of the per-capita credit
card, auto, and mortgage balance for each US state.
Panel B: Key Explanatory Variables
Homestead The dollar value of homestead exemptions. They refer to the equity
value of the house which cannot be seized by creditors during the
foreclosure following the Chapter 7 filing of an individual.
Non-Homestead The dollar value of non-homestead exemptions. They refer to the
maximum dollar value of personal items that cannot be seized
by creditors during the liquidation process following the Chapter
7 filing. This variable is the sum of the protected dollar value of
motor vehicles, jewelry, tools of the trade including implements
and books, and the wild card (special protection that can be
applied to any other non-specified personal items).
Max W. UB The maximum weekly allowance that an unemployed individual is
entitled to receive given his/her state of residency.
Max UB The maximum allowance that an unemployed individual is entitle
to receive given his/her state of residency. This variable is com-
puted by multiplying the maximum weekly allowance times the
maximum number of weeks for which an individual in entitled to
receive unemployment benefits.
Panel C: General Controls Variables
GDP Growth State-level gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate. Data are
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Unempl. Rate State-level unemployment rate. Data are from the regional and
state employment and unemployment by the US. Bureau of La-
bor Statistics.
PC Disp. Income State-level per-capita disposable income. It is computed as the
total personal income net of personal current taxes.
(Continued)
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Variable Label Description
HPI State-level house prices index (HPI). The HPI is a weighted, repeat-
sales index. It measures average price changes in repeat sales or
refinancing on the same properties. Data are from the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA).40.
Unionization The state-level percentage of workers which are whether covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, if they are union members,
or covered by a union contract, if they are not members. Data
are from the website http://www.unionstats.com managed by
Barry Hirsch (Georgia State University) and David Macpherson
(Trinity University).
Market to Book (M/B) Ratio of market value of assets (Compustat variables at + csho ∗
prccf − ceq) over the total value of assets.
Collateral (Cltr) Ratio between the sum of inventories (Compustat variable invt)
and property, plant and equipment (Compustat variable ppent)
over the total value of assets.
Size The natural logarithm of firms’ sales (Compustat variable sale).
Z-Score The modified Altman Z-Score which is computed as follows,
Z-Score =3.3
EBITDA
total assets
+
sales
total assets
+ 1.4
retained earnings
total asset
+ 1.2
working capital
total assets
(7)
ROA Return on assets computed at the ratio of earnings before inter-
est, taxes, depreciation and amortization (Compustat variable
ebitda) and the lagged value of Total Assets (Compustat vari-
able at).
D.Tax Cut A dummy variable equal to one if a given US state in a given year
cuts its top marginal corporate income tax rate and zero other-
wise. The variable is the one in Heider and Ljungqvist (2015).
(Continued)
40The Federal Housing Finance Agency is an independent federal agency created as the successor reg-
ulatory agency resulting from the statutory merger of the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development
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Variable Label Description
D.Tax Increase A dummy variable equal to one if a given US state in a given year
increases its top marginal corporate income tax rate and zero
otherwise. The variable is the one in Heider and Ljungqvist
(2015).
D.Democratic A dummy variable equal to one if the Governor of a given US state
in a given mandate is from the democratic party and zero other-
wise. Data have been manually collected from election websites.
3Y to Election A dummy variable equal to one if the next gubernatorial election
will be held in three years and zero otherwise. Similarly, 2Y to
Election and 1Y to Election are indicator variables being equal to
one when next election will be in two and one years respectively
and zero otherwise.
D.Recourse A dummy variable equal to one if a given US state allows recourse
loans and zero otherwise. Recourse entitles lenders to go after
defaulting creditors and obtain a deficiency judgment. Data are
from Ghent and Kudlyak (2011).
RWL A dummy variable equal to one if a given US state has Right-To-
Work Laws in place. Table 13 reports all US states and the year
in which each state introduced these laws.
D. Union Election A dummy variable equal to one if a firm in a given year experience
a unionization election organized by its employees.
D. Union Victory A dummy variable equal to one if employees decide, as result of
a unionization election, to form a collective bargaining unit and
being represented by a labor union.
Mass Layoff The fraction of private-sector employees who lose their jobs in a
mass layoff event. Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Mass Layoff Statistics.
Homestead Comp. The difference between the dollar value of the nominal homestead in
a state minus the highest nominal homestead among neighboring
states. Groups of neighboring states are defined according to
CENSUS divisions.
(Continued)
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Variable Label Description
Non-Homestead Comp. The difference between dollar values of the nominal non-homestead
of a state minus the highest nominal non-homestead among
neighboring states. Groups of neighboring states are defined ac-
cording to CENSUS divisions.
RE Owner An indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports any real estate
holding in 1993. I construct the variable as in Chaney et al.
(2012) by using the Compustat variable dpacb.
HQ Owner An indicator variable equal to one if a firm reports headquarter
ownership in its 1997 10K files. The variable is the same used in
Chaney et al. (2012).
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B Figures
Figure 1. Households Leverage Dynamic
This figure shows the dynamic across years of the household leverage, which is defined as the ratio between
the total amount of debt outstanding held by individuals (i.e., consumer debt and mortgage loans) over
the total disposable income (i.e., income after taxes). Data are from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
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Figure 2. Illustration of a Complete Set of Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions
The figure shows the complete set of personal bankruptcy exemptions for the state of New Hampshire and
New Jersey. Data are from Elias et al. (2007).. APPENDIx.1:.STATE.AND.FEDERAL.ExEMPTION.TABLES. 329
New	Hampshire
Federal.bankruptcy.exemptions.available..All.law.references.are.to.New.Hamp-
shire.Revised.Statutes.Annotated.unless.otherwise.noted.
ASSET EXEMPTION LAW
homestead Real.property.or.manufactured.housing.(&.the.land.
it’s.on.if.you.own.it).to.$100,000
480:1
insurance Firefighters’.aid.insurance 402:69
Fraternal.benefit.society.benefits 418:17
Homeowners’.insurance.proceeds.to.$5,000 512:21(VIII)
miscellaneous Jury,.witness.fees 512:21(VI)
Property.of.business.partnership 304-A:25
Wages.of.minor.child 512:21(III)
pensions Tax-exempt.retirement.accounts,.including.401(k)s,.
403(b)s,.profit-sharing.and.money.purchase.plans,.
SEP.and.SIMPLE.IRAs,.and.defined-benefit.plans
11.U.S.C..
§.522(b)(3)(C)
Traditional.and.Roth.IRAs.to$1,095,000.per.person 11.U.S.C..
§.522(b)(3)(C);.
(n)
ERISA-qualified.retirement.accounts.including.IRAs.
&.Roth.IRAs
Federally.created.pension.(only.benefits.building.
up)
512:2.(xIx)
512:21(IV)
Firefighters 102:23
Police.officers 103:18
Public.employees 100-A:26
personal	
property
Beds,.bedding,.&.cooking.utensils. 511:2(II)
Bibles.&.books.to.$800 511:2(VIII)
Burial.plot,.lot 511:2(xIV)
Church.pew 511:2(xV)
Clothing. 511:2(I)
Cooking.&.heating.stoves,.refrigerator 511:2(IV)
Domestic.fowl.to.$300 511:2(xIII)
Food.&.fuel.to.$400 511:2(VI)
Furniture.to.$3,500 511:2(III)
Jewelry.to.$500 511:2(xVII)
Motor.vehicle.to.$4,000 511:2(xVI)
Proceeds.for.lost.or.destroyed.exempt.property 512:21(VIII)
Sewing.machine 511:2(V)
1.cow,.6.sheep.&.their.fleece,.4.tons.of.hay 511:2(xI);.(xII)
1.hog.or.pig.or.its.meat.(if.slaughtered) 511:2(x)
public	 Aid.to.blind,.aged,.disabled;.public.assistance 167:25
benefits Unemployment.compensation 282-A:159
Workers’.compensation 281-A:52
tools	of	trade Tools.of.your.occupation.to.$5,000 511:2(Ix)
Uniforms,.arms,.&.equipment.of.military.member 511:2(VII)
Yoke.of.oxen.or.horse.needed.for.farming.or.team-
ing
511:2(xII)
wages 50.times.the.federal.minimum.hourly.wage.per.
week
512:21(II)
Deposits.in.any.account.designated.a.payroll..
account.
512:21(xI)
Earned.but.unpaid.wages.of.spouse 512:21(III)
wildcard $1,000.of.any.property 511:2(xVIII)
Unused.portion.of.bibles.&.books,.food.&.fuel,.
furniture,.jewelry,.motor.vehicle,.&.tools.of.trade.
exemptions.to.$7,000.
511:2(xVIII)
New	Jersey
Federal.bankruptcy.exemptions.available..All.law.references.are.to.New.Jersey.
Statutes.Annotated.unless.otherwise.noted.
ASSET EXEMPTION LAW
homestead None,.but.survivorship.interest.of.a.spouse.
in.property.held.as.tenancy.by.the.entirety.is.
exempt.from.creditors.of.a.single.spouse
Freda v. Commercial 
Trust Co. of New 
Jersey,.570.A.2d.409.
(N.J.,1990)
insurance Annuity.contract.proceeds.to.$500.per.month 17B:24-7
Disability.benefits 17:18-12
Disability,.death,.medical,.or.hospital.benefits.for.
civil.defense.workers
App..A:9-57.6
Disability.or.death.benefits.for.military.member 38A:4-8
Group.life.or.health.policy.or.proceeds 17B:24-9
Health.or.disability.benefits 17:18-12;.17B:24-8
Life.insurance.proceeds.if.clause.prohibits.
proceeds.from.being.used.to.pay.beneficiary’s.
creditors
17B:24-10
Life.insurance.proceeds.or.avails.if.you’re.not.the.
insured
17B:24-6b
pensions Tax-exempt.retirement.accounts,.including.
401(k)s,.403(b)s,.profit-sharing.and.money.pur-
chase.plans,.SEP.and.SIMPLE.IRAs,.and.defined-
benefit.plans
11.U.S.C..
§.522(b)(3)(C)
Traditional.and.Roth.IRAs.to.$1,095,000.per.
person
11.U.S.C..
§.522(b)(3)(C);.(n)
Alcohol.beverage.control.officers 43:8A-20
City.boards.of.health.employees 43:18-12
Civil.defense.workers App..A:9-57.6
County.employees 43:10-57;..
43:10-105
ERISA-qualified.benefits.for.city.employees 43:13-9
Firefighters,.police.officers,.traffic.officers 43:16-7;.43:16A-17
IRAs In re Yuhas,.104.F.3d.
612.(3rd.Cir..1997)
Judges 43:6A-41
Municipal.employees 43:13-44
Prison.employees 43:7-13
Public.employees 43:15A-53
School.district.employees 18A:66-116
State.police 53:5A-45
Street.&.water.department.employees 43:19-17
Teachers 18A:66-51
Trust.containing.personal.property.created.
.pursuant.to.federal.tax.law,.including.401(k).
plans,.IRAs,.Roth.IRAs,.&.higher.education.(529).
savings.plans
25:2-1;.In re Yuhas,.
104.F.3d.612.(3d.
Cir..1997)
personal	
property
Burial.plots 45:27-21
Clothing 2A:17-19
Furniture.&.household.goods.to.$1,000 2A:26-4
Personal.property.&.possessions.of.any.kind,.
stock.or.interest.in.corporations.to.$1,000.total
2A:17-19
public	
benefits
Old.age,.permanent.disability.assistance 44:7-35
Unemployment.compensation 43:21-53
Workers’.compensation 34:15-29
tools	of	
trade
None
wages 90%.of.earned.but.unpaid.wages.if.annual.
income.is.less.than.250%.of.federal.poverty.level;.
75%.if.annual.income.is.higher
2A:17-56
Wages.or.allowances.received.by.military.
.personnel
38A:4-8
wildcard None
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Figure 3. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 Personal Bankruptcy Filings
This figure shows the quarterly Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 personal bankruptcy filings across time. Event
(1) is the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). Event
(2) captures the date since changes introduced by the BAPCPA started to be applied to bankruptcy cases.
Data are from Statistics Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Firms’ Headquarters Across US States
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Figure 5. Distribution of States Level Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions
Dollar values of the homestead and non-homestead exemptions in the legend are expressed in thousands.
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8.91 − 57.35
6.71 − 8.91
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4.68 − 5.36
3.80 − 4.68
0.00 − 3.80
Non−Homestead Exemptions
Figure 6. Census Definition of Regions and Divisions
The figure shows the geographic distribution of regions and divisions as defined by Census. The latter depicts
groups including states and the District of Columbia for the presentation of its data. The United States
is subdivided into four census regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, and West. Moreover, each of the four
census regions is divided into two or more census divisions.
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Figure 7. Parallel Trends Between Firms in Treated and Control Group
The figure plots the point estimates for the increase in homestead exemptions obtained by estimating the
model in Equation (5) with the inclusion of lead and lag variables. The model includes firm control: Collat-
eral, Market-to-book ratio, Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score; and state level controls: GDP growth rate,
unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income, unemployment benefits, D.Democratic, 3Y to Election,
2Y to Election, and 1Y to Election and changes in the house prices index (∆HPI). More details on the
variables’ computation can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table. Standard errors are robust
and clustered at state level. Industry-by-Year fixed effects are included in the model.
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Figure 8. States Experiencing both Tax and Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions Changes
The figure shows in blue states that in the three-year period considered have experienced both corporate
tax rate changes and personal bankruptcy exemption increases. The former is defined as either a cut or an
increase (or both) in the state corporate income tax rate. The latter is defined by an increase in either state
homestead or non-homestead (or both) exemptions.
Tax and Exemption Changes, 1995 − 1997 Tax and Exemption Changes, 1998 − 2000 
Tax and Exemption Changes, 2001 − 2003 Tax and Exemption Changes, 2004 − 2006 
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Figure 9. Falsification Test: Estimation with False Homestead and Non-Homestead Ex-
emption Shocks
The figure shows the distribution of false treatments obtained by estimating 1000 times the model in Equation
(5) with the inclusion, in each iteration, of 36 homestead and 73 non-homestead exemption changes, which
have been randomly assigned to a state in a given year.
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C Tables
Table 1. Bankruptcy Exemptions Across States in 2005
Table 1. The table reports a snapshot of the homestead and non-homestead bankruptcy exemptions in
2005 for all US states and the federal. Homestead refers to the amount of equity value in the debtor’s house
which is exempt from the liquidation in the bankruptcy procedure. Non-homestead refers to exemptions
that apply to the debtors’ personal properties, which include Motor Vehicles, Tools of trade (each state lists
the tools to which debtors can apply the exempted amount), Cash and bank deposit, and a wildcard which
provides debtors with a pre-specified amount that can be applied to any other item which is not included
in the list of non-homestead exemptions. Double for married refers to the possibility for married couples to
double their exemptions. This variable is equal to one if the state allows this possibility and zero otherwise.
Federal Option is the possibility to file for federal exemptions rather than using the ones decided by the
specific state.
State Homestead Non-Homestead Doubled Federal
if Married Option
Vehicles Tools Cash/Bank Wild Card
Alaska 67,500 3,750 3,500 1,750 0 0 0
Albama 10,000 0 0 0 3,000 1 0
Arizona 150,000 5,000 2,500 150 0 0 0
Arkansas Unlimited 1,200 750 0 500 1
California 75,000 2,300 6,075 0 0 1 0
Colorado 90,000 3,000 3,000 0 0 1 0
Connecticut 150,000 1,500 0 0 1,000 1 1
Delaware 0 2,575 200 0 850 1 0
DC Unlimited 0 75 0 500 1
Florida Unlimited 1,000 0 1,000 0 0
Georgia 20,000 3,500 1,500 0 600 1 0
Hawaii 36,900 2,575 0 0 0 1 1
Idaho 50,000 3,000 1,500 0 800 0 0
Illinois 15,000 1,200 750 0 2,000 1 0
Indiana 15,000 0 0 100 4,000 1 0
Iowa Unlimited 5,000 10,000 0 100 0
Kansas Unlimited 20,000 750 0 0 0
Kentucky 10,000 2,500 300 0 1,000 1 0
Louisiana 25,000 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maine 70,000 5,000 5,000 0 400 1 0
Maryland 0 0 5,000 0 6,000 1 0
Massachusetts 500,000 700 500 1,200 0 0 1
Michigan 7,000 0 1,000 0 0 1 1
Minnesota 200,000 3,800 9,500 0 0 0 1
(Continued)
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State Homestead Non-Homestead Doubled Federal
if Married Option
Vehicles Tools Cash/Bank Wild Card
Mississippi 150,000 0 0 0 0 1 0
Missouri 15,000 3,000 2,000 0 1,250 0 0
Montana 200,000 2,500 3,000 0 0 1 0
Nebraska 12,500 0 2,400 0 2,500 0 0
Nevada 200,000 15,000 4,500 0 0 0 0
New Hampshire 200,000 4,000 5,000 0 1,000 1 1
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
New Mexico 60,000 4,000 1,500 0 500 1 1
New York 20,000 2,400 600 2,500 0 1 0
North Carolina 20,000 1,500 750 0 500 1 0
North Dakota 80,000 1,200 0 5,000 7,500 0 0
Ohio 10,000 1,000 750 400 400 1 0
Oklahoma Unlimited 3,000 5,000 0 0 0
Oregon 33,000 1,700 3,000 7,500 400 1 0
Pennsylvania 0 0 0 0 300 1 1
Rhode Island 200,000 10,000 1,200 0 0 0 1
South Carolina 10,000 1,200 750 1,000 0 1 0
South Dakota Unlimited 0 0 0 6,000 0
Tennessee 7,500 0 1,900 0 4,000 1 0
Texas Unlimited 30,000 30,000 0 0 1
Utah 40,000 2,500 3,500 0 0 1 0
Vermont 75,000 2,500 5,000 700 400 0 1
Virginia 10,000 2,000 10,000 0 0 1 0
Washington 40,000 2,500 5,000 0 2,000 0 1
West Virginia 50,000 2,400 1,500 0 800 1 0
Wisconsin 40,000 1,200 7,500 1,000 0 0 1
Wyoming 20,000 2,400 2,000 0 0 1 0
Federal 36,900 2,950 1,850 0 975 1
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Table 2. Summary Statistics
Summary statistics for the sample from 1995 to 2008. The sample consists of 80,374 firm-year observations
for which the there are non-missing values for the variable Book Leverage. Homestead and Non-Homestead
exemptions data are hand-collected from state bankruptcy statues and textbooks used as a guideline to
apply to Chapter 7 (see Elias et al. (2007)). Unemployment benefits data (variables Max W. UB and
Max UB) are from the US Department of Labor’s “Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance
Laws”. Balance sheet variables are from Compustat. These variables have been Winsorized at 1% tails. All
Household Debt types, GDP Growth, Unempl. Rate, PC Disp. Income is from the US Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The house price index variable, ∆ HPI, is constructed using data from the independent
federal agency Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). State-level unionization data are from the Barry
Hirsch and David Macpherson website www.unionstats.com. More details on the variable construction can
be found “Variable List and Description” table.
Mean S.D. 25th Median 75th
Firm-Year Observations (N = 80,374)
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Book Leverage 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.17 0.37
PC Household Debt 29,440 12,351 20,360 27,030 34,980
PC Mortgage 23,774 11,523 15,290 21,230 28,950
PC Auto Loan 2,728 698 2,240 2,720 3,200
PC Credit Card 2,938 551 2,580 2,940 3,250
Panel B: Key explanatory Variables
Homestead 60,704 75,526 15,000 34,850 75,000
Non-Homestead 7,661 8,610 4,250 5,706 8,500
Panel C: State-Level Economic Indicators
Max W. UB 296.27 63.22 252.22 286.14 329.97
Max UB 7,768 1,793 6,564 7,464 8,579
GDP Growth 5.49 2.45 4.00 5.30 6.90
Unempl. Rate 4.82 1.21 3.94 4.82 5.60
PC Disp. Income 25,068 3,890 22,194 24,645 27,202
∆HPI 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06
Unionization 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.18
Panel D: Firm-Level Financial Controls
Collateral 0.37 0.26 0.14 0.35 0.57
M/B 2.35 4.10 0.81 1.25 2.26
Size 4.54 2.54 2.96 4.66 6.28
Z-Score 3.85 14.60 1.23 3.05 5.68
ROA -0.09 0.92 -0.05 0.10 0.18
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Table 3. Determinants of Homestead and Non-Homestead Exemptions
The table reports estimates for the determinants of changes in personal bankruptcy exemptions (homestead
and non-homestead). In Columns (1)-(4), results are from estimating a linear probability model in which
the dependent variables, D.∆Homestead and D.∆Non-Homestead, are indicators equal to one whenever, in a
given state, the nominal value of personal bankruptcy exemptions increase, and zero otherwise. In Columns
(5)-(8), results are from estimating a linear model in which the dependent variables, ∆Homestead and ∆Non-
Homestead, are percentage changes in the nominal value of personal bankruptcy exemptions. Details on the
definition and computation of variables can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table. Standard
errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level.∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability of Increase Magnitude of Increase
D.∆ Homestead D.∆Non-Homestead ∆Homestead ∆ Non-Homestead
D.Tax Cutt−1 -0.071∗∗ -0.072∗∗ 0.036 -0.015 -0.056∗ -0.042∗∗ 0.028 0.020
(0.031) (0.029) (0.093) (0.078) (0.029) (0.019) (0.040) (0.034)
D.Tax Increaset−1 0.020 -0.002 -0.120∗∗ -0.076∗ 0.004 0.001 -0.046 -0.035
(0.055) (0.070) (0.056) (0.041) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022)
D.Democratict−1 0.039∗ 0.007 0.004 -0.029 0.015 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.020) (0.018) (0.040) (0.033) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.016)
3Y to Election -0.037 -0.039 0.017 0.038 -0.011 -0.015 -0.032 -0.031
(0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027)
2Y to Election -0.003 -0.008 -0.004 0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.059 -0.066
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.049) (0.032) (0.029) (0.037) (0.041)
1Y to Election -0.001 -0.001 -0.024 0.008 0.012 0.013 -0.081∗∗ -0.068∗∗
(0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) (0.032)
Ln(Max UB)t−1 0.186 0.043 0.626 -0.064 0.102 0.086∗∗ 0.093 0.030
(0.141) (0.085) (0.390) (0.089) (0.122) (0.033) (0.136) (0.042)
Homestead Comp.t−1 -0.278∗∗ -0.040∗ 0.508∗ -0.074 -0.192∗∗ -0.030∗∗ 0.214 -0.034
(0.118) (0.022) (0.274) (0.044) (0.090) (0.014) (0.176) (0.021)
Non-Homestead Comp.t−1 0.004 0.001 0.013∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001∗∗ -0.004 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000)
GDP Growtht−1 -0.003 0.001 0.011 0.010 -0.000 -0.001 0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Unempl. Ratet−1 -0.002 0.001 0.092∗∗∗ 0.026 0.002 -0.000 0.042∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.019) (0.015) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.014) (0.007)
PC Disp. Incomet−1 ($K) -0.808∗∗ -0.193 -1.746∗ 0.107 -0.719∗∗ -0.163∗∗ -0.715∗ 0.005
(0.392) (0.146) (0.870) (0.131) (0.336) (0.067) (0.391) (0.079)
∆HPIt−1 0.944∗∗ 0.914∗∗ 1.102∗ -0.041 0.757∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.139 -0.230
(0.401) (0.370) (0.571) (0.644) (0.326) (0.253) (0.329) (0.318)
Unionizationt−1 0.486 0.818∗∗∗ 1.890 0.499 -0.060 0.296 1.237 0.175
(0.869) (0.296) (1.342) (0.400) (0.734) (0.193) (0.850) (0.138)
D.Recourse 0.009 -0.122∗∗∗ 0.025∗ 0.013
(0.038) (0.043) (0.015) (0.017)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 643 643 594 594 643 643 594 594
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.050 0.111 0.034 0.065 0.051 0.067 0.016
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Table 4. Main Result: Increase of Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions on Book Leverage
The table shows results from estimating Equation (5). The dependent variable in specifications (1) to (5) is
the first difference in firms’ book leverage. The last column uses the log-changes in leverage. D.∆Homestead
and D.∆Non-Homestead are indicator variables equal to one if at time t− 1 state s increases homestead or
non-homestead exemptions, respectively, and zero otherwise. ∆Homestead and ∆Non-Homestead are their
percentage changes. In Column (3), homestead changes are split in Large, Medium, and Small depending
on the increase being in the top, middle, and bottom terciles, respectively. State-level economic indicators
include GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income, unemployment benefits, and
changes in the house prices index (∆HPI). Firms’ financial controls include Collateral, Market-to-book ratio,
Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score. All firms’ financial controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. Both economic
indicators and firms’ controls are included as lagged changes. More details on the computation of variables
can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and
clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Changes in Book Leverage Log-Change
Indicator Variables:
D.∆Homesteadt−1 0.820∗∗∗ 0.639∗ 0.071∗
(0.278) (0.331) (0.036)
D.∆Large Homesteadt−1 0.947∗∗
(0.398)
D.∆Medium Homesteadt−1 0.550
(0.364)
D.∆Small Homesteadt−1 0.134
(0.975)
D.∆Non-Homesteadt−1 0.254 0.291 0.287 0.011
(0.182) (0.222) (0.223) (0.018)
D.∆Max UBt−1 -0.108 -0.198 -0.192 -0.006
(0.195) (0.221) (0.219) (0.009)
∆Homesteadt−1 0.975∗∗ 0.792∗
(0.413) (0.442)
∆Non-Homesteadt−1 0.371 0.131
(0.412) (0.404)
∆Max UBt−1 -1.027 -1.510
(0.930) (1.091)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 38,037 38,037 38,037 38,037 38,037 30,447
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.010
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Table 5. Effect of the Recourse States, Unemployment Benefits, and Per-capita Disposable
Income
The table shows results from investigating how the marginal effect of homestead exemption increase is
affected by states recurse status, the unemployment benefit generosity, and the individuals’ per-capita dis-
posable income. Results are from estimating the model in Equation (5) with interaction terms on the main
explanatory variable D.∆Homestead. Column (1) interacts shocks in homestead protection with the recourse
status of states. Column (2) interacts changes in homestead protection with a dummy indicating whether
the state is in the top, middle, or bottom tercile in terms of unemployment benefit generosity. Column (3)
interacts shocks in homestead protection with a dummy indicating whether the state is in the top, middle,
or bottom tercile in terms of per-capita disposable income. The dependent variable across all specifications
is the first difference of firms’ book leverage. All specifications include state economic indicators: GDP
growth rate, unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income, unemployment benefits, and changes in the
house prices index (excluding Column (2)); and firm financial controls: Collateral, Market-to-book ratio,
Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score. All firms’ financial controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. All estimates
are OLS in first-difference to remove firm fixed effects and include year fixed effects. Standard errors in
parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable: Change in Book Leverage
D.∆Homesteadt−1
Inter. w/D.Recourse 0.992∗∗∗
(0.248)
D.∆Homesteadt−1
Inter. w/Large Max UB 0.504
(0.359)
Inter. w/Medium Max UB 1.174∗∗
(0.492)
Inter. w/Small Max UB 1.512∗∗∗
(0.422)
D.∆Homesteadt−1
Inter. w/Large PC Disp. Income 0.565∗
(0.332)
Inter. w/Medium PC Disp. Income 1.262∗∗∗
(0.357)
Inter. w/Small PC Disp. Income 1.668∗∗∗
(0.297)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,037 38,037 38,037
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.017
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Table 6. Identification Assumption: Parallel Trends and Potential Reversals
Table reports result from the estimation of models in Equation (5) with the inclusion of lead and lags
for changes in homestead protection to investigate possible pre-trend or potential firms’ anticipation. The
dependent variable across all specifications is the first difference of firms’ book leverage. All firms’ financial
controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. All estimates are OLS in first-difference to remove firm fixed effects and
include year fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Change in Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D.∆Homesteadt−4 0.313 0.326
(0.215) (0.216)
D.∆Homesteadt−3 -0.100 0.021 -0.123
(0.278) (0.223) (0.277)
D.∆Homesteadt−2 -0.292 -0.319 -0.283
(0.389) (0.386) (0.389)
D.∆Homesteadt−1 0.727∗∗ 0.705∗∗ 0.723∗∗ 0.785∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.283) (0.276) (0.277)
D.∆Homesteadt 0.125 0.156 0.108 0.130
(0.427) (0.430) (0.410) (0.428)
D.∆Homesteadt+1 0.326 0.339 0.313
(0.242) (0.245) (0.237)
D.∆Non-Homesteadt−1 0.292 0.284 0.265 0.301
(0.184) (0.183) (0.180) (0.188)
∆Max UBt−1 -0.981 -1.099 -0.840 -0.992
(0.957) (0.953) (0.923) (0.941)
∆Collateral 6.779∗∗∗ 6.762∗∗∗ 6.745∗∗∗ 6.791∗∗∗
(0.831) (0.831) (0.828) (0.830)
∆M/B -0.337∗∗∗ -0.335∗∗∗ -0.334∗∗∗ -0.337∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
∆Size 0.520∗∗ 0.524∗∗ 0.526∗∗ 0.520∗∗
(0.224) (0.223) (0.223) (0.223)
∆Altman’s Z-Score 0.050∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
∆ROA 0.194 0.192 0.195 0.194
(0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.168)
∆GDP Growtht−1 0.069∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.072∗∗
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032)
∆Unempl. Ratet−1 -0.172 -0.172 -0.140 -0.171
(0.207) (0.205) (0.205) (0.208)
∆HPIt−1 -1.825 -1.635 -1.458 -1.790
(3.645) (3.863) (3.803) (3.593)
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 37,919 37,944 37,991 37,939
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
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Table 7. How Do Changes in Personal Bankruptcy Exemptions Affect Personal Borrowing?
The table reports estimates from estimating the model in Equation (6). In column (1) the dependent variable
is defined as changes in total per-capita personal borrowing which is defined as the sum of the per-capita:
mortgage, credit card, and auto loans. From column (2) to (4) the dependent variable is given by the single
components of the total per-capita personal borrowing. More details on the definition and computation of
variables can be found in the Variable List and Descriptions table. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust
and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable:
∆PC Tot. Debt ∆PC Mortgage ∆PC Credit Card ∆PC Auto Loan
D.∆Homestead -0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.005
(0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.011)
D.∆Non-Homestead -0.002 -0.004 0.008∗ 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
D.∆Max UB 0.001 -0.001 0.005 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
∆PC Disp. Income 0.138 0.197 -0.125 0.065
(0.180) (0.220) (0.105) (0.157)
∆GDP Growth 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
∆Unempl. Rate 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.012∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007)
∆HPI 0.229∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.070) (0.039) (0.093)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 455 455 455 455
Adjusted R2 0.449 0.478 0.558 0.574
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Table 8. Confounding Factor: House Pricing Channel
The table reports results from estimating the model in Equation (5) on subsamples addressing the threat of
housing prices changes as a potential confounding factor undermining my empirical identification. Column
(1) establishes the baseline by estimating the model on the full sample as in Table 4. Column (2) exclude
the change in the house prices index (∆HPI) variable. Column (3) excludes firms owning buildings as
reported in Compustat. Column (4) excludes firms owning their headquarters as constructed in Chaney
et al. (2012). Column (5) excludes firms of both Column (2) and Column (3). Column (6) interact the
variable D.∆Homestead with Large, Medium, and Small changes in house prices depending on whether the
homestead increase takes place in a state in the top, middle, or bottom tercile according to the variable
∆HPI. All specifications include state economic indicators: GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, per-
capita disposable income, unemployment benefits, and changes in the house prices index (excluding Column
(2)); and firm financial controls: Collateral, Market-to-book ratio, Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score.
All firms’ financial controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. All estimates are OLS in first-difference to remove
firm fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Change in Book Leverage
Baseline No ∆HPI No RE No HQ No RE & HQ Inter.
Owner Owner Owner w/∆HPI
D.∆Homesteadt−1 0.820∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗ 0.943∗∗∗ 0.903∗∗
(0.278) (0.273) (0.372) (0.311) (0.412)
Inter. w/Large ∆HPI 0.810∗∗∗
(0.240)
Inter. w/Medium ∆HPI 0.458
(0.491)
Inter.w/Small ∆HPI 2.111∗∗
(0.866)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,037 38,037 25,534 32,152 22,491 38,037
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.017
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Table 9. Confounding Factor: Corporate Income Tax Changes
The table reports results from estimating the model in Equation (5) with the inclusion of corporate income
state tax changes as a potential confounding factor. Column (1) includes as control an indicator variable
capturing both state tax increases and cut. Column (2) differentiates between tax increase and cut. Column
(3) adds to the previous column state fixed-affects to account for time-invariant state specific unobservables.
Column (4) includes variables accounting for the political power of the states. All specifications include state
economic indicators: GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income, unemployment
benefits, and changes in the house prices index (∆ HPI); and firm financial controls: Collateral, Market-to-
book ratio, Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score. All firms’ financial controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. All
estimates are OLS in first-difference to remove firm fixed effects and include industry-by-year fixed-effects.
Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Change in Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline: Tax: Political Power
Tax Change Increase & Cut
D.∆Homesteadt−1 0.862∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.650∗ 0.823∗∗∗
(0.275) (0.274) (0.327) (0.298)
D.∆Non-Homesteadt−1 0.248 0.251 0.291 0.249
(0.174) (0.175) (0.218) (0.209)
D.∆ Crop. Taxt−1 0.430∗∗
(0.195)
D.Corp. Tax Increaset−1 0.670∗∗ 0.621∗∗ 0.594∗∗
(0.320) (0.298) (0.295)
D.Corp. Tax Cutt−1 0.356 0.323 0.296
(0.236) (0.381) (0.392)
D.Democr. Govern.t−1 -0.136
(0.137)
3Y to Gubern. Election -0.227
(0.297)
2Y to Gubern. Election 0.185
(0.242)
1Y to Gubern. Election 0.309
(0.201)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE No No Yes Yes
Observations 38,037 38,037 38,037 37,979
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
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Table 11. Confounding Factor: Cross-State Influence of Exemption Shocks
The table shows results from testing possible confounding effects stemming from local economic condition
spilling over from neighboring states. Columns (1)-(9), deal with the hypothesis that both changes in leverage
and bankruptcy exemptions are driven by the unobservable local economic condition. Columns (1)-(4) report
estimates from the baseline model in Equation (5) with the inclusion of Region and Division fixed-effects.
The definitions of Regions and Divisions are provided by Census. Columns (5) and (6) report a falsification
test by including indicator variables equal to one for states neighboring treated states. In particular, Column
(5) estimate the treatment effect for states being in the same region than the actual treated state (or states).
Column (6), instead, estimate the treatment effect for states being in the same division than the actual
treated state (or states). Column (7) and (8) restrict the regression analysis by considering as control group
only firms in states in the same division than the treated states. All specifications include state economic
indicators: GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, per-capita disposable income, unemployment benefits,
and changes in the house prices index (∆HPI); and firm financial controls: Collateral, Market-to-book ratio,
Size, ROA, and the Altman’s Z-Score. All firms’ financial controls are Winsorized at 1% tails. All estimates
are OLS in first-difference to remove firm fixed effects and include year fixed effects. Standard errors in
parenthesis are robust and clustered at state level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Change in Book Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Region and Division FE False Shocks: Only Treated
Region Division and neighbors
D.∆Homesteadt−1 0.757∗∗ 0.623∗∗ 0.878∗∗ 0.788∗∗ 0.765∗∗ 0.794∗
(0.292) (0.292) (0.336) (0.296) (0.353) (0.396)
D.∆Non-Homesteadt−1 0.212 0.204 0.111 0.279
(0.187) (0.212) (0.283) (0.213)
False D.∆Homestead 0.157
(0.170)
False D.∆Non-Homestead -0.106
(0.234)
False D.∆Homestead 0.297
(0.231)
False D.∆Non-Homestead 0.044
(0.236)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-by-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Census Region FE Yes No Yes No No No
Census Division FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 38,037 38,037 38,037 38,037 10,193 10,193
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.007 0.007
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Table 13. List of States with/without Right-To-Work Laws in Place
The table reports the list of states with (or without) Right-to-Work laws in place and the year in which they
introduced them. Whenever the year of the introduction is equal to ”No” it means that the state as of 2015
has not introduced these laws.
State Year Introduction RWLs
Albama 1953
Alaska No
Arizona 1946
Arkansas 1947
California No
Colorado No
Connecticut No
Delaware No
District of Columbia No
Florida 1944
Georgia 1947
Hawaii No
Idaho 1985
Illinois No
Indiana 2012
Iowa 1947
Kansas 1958
Kentucky No
Louisiana 1976
Maine No
Maryland No
Massachusetts No
Michigan 2012
Minnesota No
Mississippi 1954
Missouri No
Montana No
State Year Introduction RWLs
Nebraska 1946
Nevada 1951
New Hampshire No
New Jersey No
New Mexico No
New York No
North Carolina 1947
North Dakota 1947
Ohio No
Oklaoma 2001
Oregon No
Pennsylvania No
Rhode Island No
South Carolina 1954
South Dakota 1946
Tennessee 1947
Texas 1947
Utah 1955
Vermont No
Virginia 1947
Washington No
West Virginia 2016
Wisconsin 2015
Wyoming 1963
D The Model Derivations
D.1 Optimal Debt and Wage
The firm value is given by,
V =
X¯
2︸︷︷︸
E[X]
+ [1− Pr(X < ω +D)]Dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax benefits
− [1− Pr(X < ω +D)](1− τ)ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Labor expenses
, (8)
where the expected cash-flow is net of non-labor costs. For simplicity, I assume that in default
the firm is worth zero. It is a strong assumption but it simplifies the analysis and shut down
also the seniority issues related to the splitting rule in case of the firm’s insolvency.41 The
firm’s default happens if either of the two claims is not paid in full.
41More details on the role of seniority can be found in Ellul and Pagano (2017).
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Given the uniform distribution assumption for the random variable, X, the firm’s problem
can be written as follows,
max
D,ω
V =
X¯
2
+ (1− ω +D
X¯
)(τD − (1− τ)ω)
s.t.
ω +D
X¯
H + (1− ω +D
X¯
)(ω −B) ≥ ω¯ −B (PC)
(9)
In equilibrium the participation constraint binds. The wage can be express as function
of parameters and the corporate debt,
ω(D) =
X¯ −D +B +H
2
± 1
2
√
(X¯ −D +B +H)2 − 4(ω¯X¯ −D(B +H)) (10)
Substituting the wage into the objective function and then taking the derivative with
respect to D yields the following first order condition,
FOC
def
= −
(
∂ω(D∗)
∂D
+ 1
)
(τD∗ − (1− τ)ω(D∗))+
(
τ − (1− τ)∂ω(D
∗)
∂D
)(
X¯ − (ω(D∗) +D∗)) = 0
(11)
D∗ =
[
X¯ − 2ω(D∗)] (∂ω(D∗)
∂D
(1− τ)− τ
)
− ω(D∗)
∂ω(D∗)
∂D
(1− 2τ)− 2τ . (12)
The optimal debt, D∗, is the solution to the non-linear function in Equation (12), which
will then determine the wage, ω∗, that satisfies Equation (10). In equilibrium, the firm has
an incentive to keep the employee at the participation constraint, leaving no money on the
table.
D.2 Linear Approximation
Let {D∗, ω∗} be the equilibrium quantities. I linearize the debt function around the
following set of parameters (H˜, B˜, τ˜ , ˜¯ω, ˜¯X). The first order Taylor’s expansion delivers the
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following equation,
D(H,B, τ, ω¯, X¯) = D∗(H˜, B˜, τ˜ , ˜¯ω, ˜¯X)︸ ︷︷ ︸
β0
+
∂D∗
∂H
∣∣∣∣
H=H˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
β1
(H − H˜) + υ(B˜, τ˜ , ˜¯ω, ˜¯X) (13)
I am interested in deriving an analytical formulation for the parameter β1 while the expan-
sions around all other parameters are relegated into an error term. I derive β1 by using the
first order condition in Equation (11). Some algebra leads to,
∂D∗
∂H
=
∂ω∗
∂D∂H
[
(1− τ˜)( ˜¯X − ω∗ −D∗) + τ˜(D∗ + ω∗)− ω∗
]
− ∂ω∗
∂H
[
(1− τ˜)(2∂ω∗
∂D
− τ˜)]
∂ω∗
∂D
(1− 2τ˜)− 2τ˜ − ∂2ω∗
∂D2
[(1− τ˜)( ˜¯X − ω∗ −D∗) + τ˜(D∗ + ω∗)− ω∗]
≥ 0
(14)
Equation (14) shows the sensitivity of corporate debt to increase in personal bankruptcy
protection that I estimate in the data. The model implies that this parameter can be
either zero or positive. I am linearizing the optimal debt function around an arbitrary point
H˜. At the optimum the participation constraint is binding and becomes slack after the
increase in the bankruptcy protection. The firm has no incentive to reduce debt. It can
either leave the optimal amount unchanged and exploit the slackness by lowering the labor
costs through the wage. Alternatively, the slackness can be exploited by increasing the
amount of debt and pocketing the tax benefits. The empirical model quantifies the extent
to which the firm follows this latter strategy. Admati, Demarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer
(2017) formally document this asymmetry in firms’ leverage reaction. Shareholders increase
leverage following positive shocks, but have no incentives to reduce it after negative shocks.
This is commonly known as the leverage ratchet effect.
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E The US Personal Bankruptcy System: Institutional
Details
The US personal bankruptcy procedure has always been considered as debtor-friendly.
As shown in White (1998), a considerable share of individuals could gain from filing for
Chapter 7 because of the extremely favorable conditions some states guarantee to debtors.
Notably, the legislator establishes a set of exemptions shielding the debtor’s assets against
the seizure by unsecured creditors. In practice, the law fixes the specific value of assets that
cannot be used to repay unsecured debtors during the liquidation procedure. In this section,
I clarify the legal aspects of these exemptions and summarize the important changes the US
legislator made, changes which must be considered in the empirical analysis.
Very broadly, the US personal bankruptcy system features two filing procedures, named
after the number of the chapter they appear in the bankruptcy code. The is Chapter 7
filing. Under this procedure, debtors repay creditors by handing over all unprotected assets
to a bankruptcy trustee which proceed to their liquidation. Most of the unsecured debt is
discharged if funds from the liquidation are not enough to pay back the full amount. The
second is the Chapter 13 filing. Under this procedure, debtors must propose a repayment
plan to the judge who has to accept. This procedure does not involve the bankruptcy of
filers. Debtors keep their assets but use the future income for the repayment.
The personal bankruptcy code underwent substantial changes in 2005 following the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA). In the next two
sections, I describe the bankruptcy system before and after 2005, highlighting how the filer’s
position has been affected by the new rules. It is worth noting that the reform has fully
affected the bankruptcy code, corporate and personal. However, its primary motivation was
to make it more difficult for some consumers to file bankruptcy under Chapter 7.42
42In the Opening Statement at the Bankruptcy Reform Hearing (Senate Committee on the Judiciary),
Sen. Chuck Grassley said “this legislation eliminates some of the opportunities for abuse that exist under
the current system. Our current system allows wealthy people to continue to abuse the system at the expense
of everyone else. People with good incomes can run up massive debts and then use bankruptcy to get out
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E.1 Personal Bankruptcy Before the BAPCPA
The personal bankruptcy code before 2005 allowed debtors to freely choose between filing
for Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. In a Chapter 7 filing, the filer must turn over to the bankruptcy
court all his/her assets. Several assets are partially or totally exempted from liquidation.
Following this procedure, many types of unsecured debt are discharged as many assets are
not available for liquidation. Moreover, debtors have no obligations in using their future
income to repay those creditors who did not get served during the liquidation (regardless of
their income status).
The interesting aspect of this procedure is the generosity of exemptions, namely the
dollar amount of an asset that cannot be used by the bankruptcy trustee to repay creditors.
Although the bankruptcy is a matter of federal law, states are allowed to set their own
exemption levels. Filers for Chapter 7 are subjected to the exemptions set by the state in
which they reside. Sixteen states contemplate the federal option which allows filers to use
federal instead of the state exemptions (see Table 1 for details).
Exemptions apply to a variety of assets. However, they can be categorized, for simplicity,
in homestead and non-homestead (or personal) exemptions. The former defines the amount
of the equity in the debtor’s principal residence which is protected in bankruptcy. The
equity value is defined as the difference between the market value of the house net of the
mortgage pending on it. Non-homestead exemptions, instead, define the amount for any
pre-specified asset that can be exempted from bankruptcy. The most common are motor
vehicles, jewelry, tools of the trade including implements and books, and the wild card which
is a special protection granting a specific dollar amount that can be applied to any personal
item which is not listed. Moreover, twenty-nine states allow married couples to double the
exemptions’ amount (see Table 1 for details).
of honoring them. Omissis. . . it has been estimated that every American family pays as much as $550 a
year in a hidden tax as a result of the actions from these abuses. My bankruptcy reform legislation will help
eliminate this hidden tax by implementing a means test to make wealthy people who can repay their debts
actually honor them”.
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The situation is different for Chapter 13 filers, who are not obliged to repay creditors
using personal assets. The procedure imposes filers to propose a repayment plan to the
judge, who can accept it without consultation with the creditors. It is rational for Chapter
13 filers to propose an amount in the repayment plan which matches exactly the value of
non-protected assets under Chapter 7. Essentially, exemptions under Chapter 7 implicitly
set the minimum amount that must be offered in the repayment plan to be accepted by the
judge. There are no incentives to offer a higher amount as in that case filers would be better
off by filing for Chapter 7. This is the case because debtors have the liberty of choosing
between the two procedures.
At this point, it is clear why the personal bankruptcy code is considered debtor-friendly
and clear that protection by exemptions makes filing for Chapter 7 a very appealing option.43
Data on bankruptcy filings confirm that. Figure 3 shows the number of Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 filings. Before 2005, the former are on average more than double than the
latter. The last thing left to describe is how exemptions appear across states. In this
regard, the US personal bankruptcy code is characterized by a great heterogeneity regarding
generosity in exemptions. Table 1 shows the amounts for homestead and non-homestead
exemptions across the US states in 2005. The choice of an arbitrary year does not influence
this heterogeneity. Figure 5 shows the average homestead and non-homestead exemptions
across US states from 1995 to 2008. Homestead vary from a minimum of zero in four states
(Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) to a maximum of unlimited protection
in eight states (Arkansas, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Texas). Similarly, non-homestead exemptions go from no protection to about
sixty thousand dollars.
43In this paper I am only considering the ex-post consequences of personal bankruptcy. It is clear that from
an ex-ante perspective a debtor-friendly system might result in higher cost of borrowing. This argument can
be found fully developed in Cerqueiro and Pen˜as (2017).
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E.2 Personal Bankruptcy After the BAPCPA
The intent of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA)
is to set up rules such that the bankruptcy filings are not simply an easy way to get rid of
massive borrowing exposures. In short, the reform makes it harder for debtors to choose
Chapter 7 (under which most debts are discharged) and instead required them to file a
Chapter 13, under which the personal borrowing is discharged only after the debtor has
repaid some portion.
As pointed out in White (1998), individuals often financially benefit from Chapter 7
filing, because of high exemptions and because they can easily discharge many times of
unsecured debt. Although the filing rate is around 1%, it is estimated that 15% of US
households would financially benefit from a bankruptcy filing, and this number becomes
larger if households would strategically plan the bankruptcy in advance. Strong debtors’
protection, low social costs stemming from the bankruptcy, and low out-of-pocket costs
of lawyers’ fees and bankruptcy court filing fees has incentivized individuals to abuse the
system.44
In the after-BAPCPA bankruptcy system, filers are not allowed to choose between Chap-
ter 7 or Chapter 13 filing. Rather, a debtor who wants to file for Chapter 7 needs to pass a
two-part means test. In the first part, a formula determines the filer’s ability to pay 25% of
his/her non-priority unsecured debt (e.g., credit card bills). In the second part, the debtor’s
income is compared to the median income of his/her state of residency. If an individual’s
income is about the state’s median and they can afford to pay 25% of the non-priority un-
secured debt, Chapter 7 is not an option. However, if a filer’s income lies below the state’s
median but the first part of the test shows their ability to afford to pay 25% percent of the
unsecured debt, Chapter 7 is an option conditional on the court’s approval. In this new
system, Chapter 13 is the base available option.
44White (1998) estimates that the minimum out-of-pocket costs of filing are around 400$. She also reports
the result of two surveys by VISA U.S.A. providing evidence that the level of social disapproval of bankruptcy
is low.
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The reform also restricts the applicability of homestead exemptions to avoid strategic
house purchases that would reduce losses in bankruptcy thanks to states’ high generosity.
Filers who have not lived in a state for at least two years are entitled to use where they
were domiciled for the longer portion of the 180 day period prior to the two years preceding
the bankruptcy. Moreover, if a house is acquired less than 40 months before the bankruptcy
filing or the filer has violated securities laws or been found guilty of certain criminal conduct,
then the homestead exemption is bounded at $125,000, regardless of the state’s exemption
allowance.
The BAPCPA also modified the Chapter 13 procedure. According to a repayment plan
decided by the court, based on a strict expenses-to-income formula, filers now must use
100% of their future disposable income for the next five years. In addition, whether filing for
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, debtors must now participate in a government-approved financial
management education program before any debt can be discharged. For Chapter 7 filers
failing to complete the course can constitute a ground for denying debt discharge.
The BAPCPA involves other changes aimed at discouraging individuals, who can actually
honor their debts, to abuse the system. Since 2005, the US personal bankruptcy code has
shifted from being highly debtor-friendly to more creditor-friendly. Data on filings confirm
that debtors perceived this reform as weakening their position. Individuals with a positive
option value of bankruptcy filing took advantage of Chapter 7 before the provisions in the
BAPCPA became effective. Figure 3 shows that between the approval of the act on April
20, 2005, and the date when most provisions of the act applied, October 17, 2005, many
individuals correctly anticipated the higher expected costs of filing bankruptcy and rushed to
file for Chapter 7. In 2005, there were over 2 million Chapter 7 filings. This behavior suggests
that expected costs from personal bankruptcy are important determinants of individuals’
decision-making. It is worth noting that my interest is not to assess whether these changes
are socially optimal or not.
In this section, I provided an institutional overview of the US personal bankruptcy sys-
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tem, highlighting the relevance of the costs individuals bear during the bankruptcy filing
and stressing the system’s structural change in 2005 because each of these points plays an
important role in my empirical analysis.
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ABSTRACT
How do powerful unions affect firms’ debt maturity structure? I find that firms increase the fraction
of long-term debt as a response to unionization while keeping their leverage ratio unchanged. Using
a regression discontinuity design I estimate that unionized firms increase by 25% the fraction of
long-term debt as compared to union-free firms. I explore several channels which are consistent
with a maturity structure reshape rather than a strategic leverage increase. I find that financially
constrained, less flexible, and small firms exploit the positive effects of union’s monitoring activity
to lengthen their maturity structure so that to reduce refinancing risks. My findings support the
view that bond market values positively the presence of powerful non-financial stakeholders with
aligned interests and incentives to monitor over the firm’s policies.
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Introduction
What is the effect of a better organized and more powerful workforce on the firm’s debt maturity
structure? The relation between employees power and the firms’ policies is a long-standing question
in the literature. On the one hand, the strand on strategic use of debt predicts a positive relation
between employees’ power and firms’ leverage. Raising new debt and distributing it to equity
holders reduce the potential wage requests because future cash-flows are pre-committed debtholders
and, thus, not available for bargaining (see Bronars and Deere (1991) and Perotti and Spier (1993)).
On the other hand, it is expected that powerful workers would oppose policies that increase the
probability of firm’s default (e.g such as increasing debt financing for strategic reason). Another
strand on risk-sharing predicts that workers would actually make wage demands as compensation
for bearing extra risk of firm’s default (see Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010)).
In this paper, I show that firms respond to an increase in workers’ power by reshaping their
debt maturity structure while keeping the leverage ratio unchanged. I use unionization election
at firm level to capture shifts in the employees’ power. A firm respond to the unionization of its
workforce by increasing the proportion of long term debt over the total debt by 25% more with
respect to firms who escape unionization. I show that unionized firms do not display statistically
significant changes in their leverage ratio (neither book leverage nor market). This result suggests
that unionization causes a shift in the maturity structure. Short-term is substituted with long-term
debt such that to keep the leverage ratio constant. The average firm in my dataset that becomes
unionized increases the fraction of long-term debt from 49% to 61%. This effect is also economically
significant, in my sample translates to $135 millions increase of long term debt financing, which is
equivalent to 3% of the average firm’s assets.
My paper proposes an alternative view to the theory of strategic use of debt. My empirical
evidence are consistent with the idea that firms respond to stronger employees by exploiting the
positive spillover effect of their monitoring on the credit markets. Specifically, the usual argument
about a strong employees involves costs related to the firm’s loss of operating flexibility. This can
be seen as a negative effect on the first moment of the cash flow distribution. However, workers have
a fixed claim on the firm’s cash flow and, hence, they do not gain from risk taking behavior. Thus,
powerful workers have incentives to oppose risky policies. These incentives are shared with the
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firm’s debtholders. Thus, costs due to the loss in flexibility are then balanced by a lower volatility
in the cash flow. Research has focused on the first moment effect. My paper suggests that one
should also consider the effect on the second moment to assess whether powerful workers have a
net negative impact on firms.
I use establishment-level data on unionization elections to capture changes in workers’ power.
Every eligible employee has the right to vote in favor or against the formation of a bargaining
unit represented by labor union. A union wins if more than half of eligible workers vote in favor.
I assume that a union victory affects positively the workforce ability of coordinating and taking
actions to protect its interests. The National Labor Relations Board1 (NLRB) is an independent
US government agency responsible for organization and supervision of the secret ballot elections.
These institution features provide a suitable laboratory to study the firms’ response to unionization
by means of a regression discontinuity design (RDD).
I gauge the treatment effect of unionization by contrasting the leverage and debt maturity
response of firms in which union barely wins with those in which union barely loses an election.
The RDD provides causal inference by using local variation in the margin of victory that leads
to discrete changes in union legal status. The sharp RDD implies that the treatment probability
jumps to one whenever an election casts more than 50% of votes in favor of a union representation.
The causal inference of this methodology rests on a set of regularity conditions. I provide evidence
that these are satisfied in the data.
My empirical results support the view that maturity changes are preferred to aggressive financial
leverage policies. I find that in the second year after the election is closed, on average, unionized
firm holds a fraction of long-term debt between 22%-28% higher as compared to non-unionized
firm. However, the change in leverage ratio does not statistically differ between unionized and
non-unionized firms. These results are robust to different measures of long-term debt and leverage.
Moreover, I control for time-varying and time-invariant industry-specific unobservables.
I study the characteristics of firms which are more sensitive to unionization events. I perform
subsamples analysis. I split the sample according to financial constraint, operating flexibility, size.
I find that financially constrained, less flexible, and small firms are more sensitive to changes
in the employees’ power. These firms strongly respond to the change in the legal status their
1More info can be found on the website: https://www.nlrb.gov/
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employees by reshaping their debt maturity while keeping their leverage-implied risk unchanged.
This is consistent with the hypothesis that some firms might give more weight to the exploitation
of union’s positive effect rather than to the strategic reaction.
Finally, I provide evidence that the driving force of my results is indeed the union power and
its ability to improve worker’s coordination and credibility in taking actions. In states covered by
Right-to-Work laws (RWLs) unions are expected to be weaker. First, they cannot oblige workers of
unionized firms to be union members and pay fees. This makes them financially weaker. This also
reduces their incentives to exert high effort. I find a statistically significant response to unionization
in states that are not covered by RWLs. However, I do not find significant effects in states in which
these laws are in place. This result reinforces the idea of an active role of unions within the firm.
Related Literature. My paper related to a recent strand of literature that lies in the intersec-
tion between corporate finance and labor. The main interest focuses on understanding how labor
market frictions affect firms’ optimal financial policies. My study is related Chen, Kacperczyk, and
Ortiz-Molina (2012). They show that firms in more unionized industries are able to finance cheaper.
Their paper does not identify causal link but rather conduct detailed cross-sectional analysis at in-
dustry level. My paper uses their results as support for the assumption that bond market takes
positively the presence of a union within the firm. However, I then move my focus to the causal
link between unionization and the firm’s financial policy response. Campello, Gao, Qiu, and Zhang
(2015) test the hypothesis that unions increase bankruptcy costs and so in expectation bondholders
recovery less in default state. Unions inefficiently lengthen the firm’s liquidation. My focus is more
on state of the world away from the default state. My assumption is that as long as firms in not
in financial distress unions and bondholders have aligned interest. Lin, Schmid, and Xuan (2015)
study firm’s financial policy when labor representatives sit at the supervisory board. This paper
is related because looks at the effect of workers’ representative that actually have the legal status
of affecting firms’ policy. My mechanism is related to the implicit power that unions have on the
management through different type of actions (e.g. political power, strikes, etc). Schmalz (2015) is
also closely related to my paper. However, he is interested in providing evidence uniquely on the
strategic use of leverage. My paper differs from several aspects. First, I introduce a new possible
financial strategy that involves firms keeping the leverage ratio stable but changing the their debt
maturity structure. This optimal choice is a result of the trade-off between firm’s specific costs and
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benefits of the leverage or maturity as response to shocks on the firm’s labor-side. Moreover, there
is a fairly large number of papers that use unionization elections as empirical setting to study the
labor and management interactions. Among others, Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2015) look at the
effect of unionization on innovation. Unionization causes a 8.7% decline in patent quantity and
quality three years after the election has been closed. R&D expenses also drop.He, Tian, and Yang
(2016) study the change in payout policy after unionization. They find that unionization leads to
a reduction of corporate payout policy. They estimate 8.7% lower dividend ratio and 17.9% lower
total payout ratio with respect to firms that escape unionization.
The paper unfolds as follow. Section 1 presents data and key outcome variable. Section 2
contains the empirical strategy and main results. Section 3 explores economic mechanisms through
subsample analysis. Section 4 concludes.
1 Data Description, Variables Definition and Summary Statistics
I study the effect of a better organized labor force on firms’ debt financing decisions by using
unionization elections at the establishment-level from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
I manually match elections data to Compustat industrial. Following the literature, I exclude fi-
nancial companies (SIC 6000-6999) and regulated utilities (SIC 4900 4999). In the next section I
discuss the content of the election dataset and matching procedure with Compustat. I then present
the key outcome variables and summary statistics.
1.1 Unionization Elections
The establishment-level data on elections are from NLRB, covering the time period from 1977
to 2014. Data contain full information about the certification procedure of a representative union
for a specific firm’s establishment. Elections relative to the 1977-1999 period are from Holmes
(2006) available on Thomas Holmes’s website: www.thomas-holmes.com. Elections for the 2000-
2014 period are taken from the NLRB website. I collect information on the calendar date in which
an election has been officially closed, the number of eligible workers, valid votes cast in the election,
votes in favor of a union, votes against, and the final outcome. An establishment is unionized if
half plus one eligible workers vote in favor.
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I merge the election dataset to Compustat industrial from WRDS. The election dataset lacks
of a firm’s identifier. This makes the matching procedure not trivial and cumbersome. I follow
Lee and Mas (2012) and match datasets by using the legal name of companies. I implement the
Jaro-Winkler distance,2 which is an algorithm that compares two strings and assigns a matching
probability q, with q = 1 for a perfect match. I initially keep matches with a probability q ≥ 0.9,
then manually discard all those ones that are wrong. This procedure lead to a total of 3,400
elections.3 Around 21% of elections are held in the same State in which the headquarter is located.
Moreover, 41% of establishments have the same 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code than the headquarter. Finally, about 63% elections exhibit the same 1-digit SIC code. These
numbers, similar to those in DiNardo and Lee (2004), are reassuring about the matching procedure
quality. States and the industry code of establishments and headquarters need not be the same,
given certain firm’s structure and diversification of business.
Firms can display multiple elections across years. This happens either because an election is
held many times for the same establishment (e.g. workers can re-apply for an election) or because
the firm has more than one establishment hosting a unionization election. My variable of interest
is computed over multiple years, I need to make sure that firms do not appear in both treated and
control group because of two consecutive elections. For this reason, my main analysis is performed
on a sample of firms that do not host elections in the past 4 years.4 This procedure reduces the
number of elections to 1,480. My final dataset only uses those observations for which I have full
information on maturity variable. I report the number of observations/elections in each table.
Elections mostly take place at the beginning of the sample period. Figure 1 shows the total
number of elections held in each year from 1977 to 2014. The average number of elections for the
2Given two strings s1 and s2 the Jaro-Winkler distance is computed as dw = dj + lp(1−dj), where l is the length of
common prefix at the start of the string up to a maximum of 4 digits, p is a constant scaling factor set to p = 0.1 as in
the original Winkler’s work, finally dj is the Jaro distance with dj = 0 if number of matching characters, m, between
the two strings, s1 and s2, is equal to zero. If m 6= 0, then dj = 1
3
(
m
|s1| +
m
|s2| +
m− t
m
)
, where t is half of the
number of transpositions. The Jaro-Winkler, as compared to the Jaro distance, gives a more favorable probability to
strings that have the same prefix up to a maximum of four characters. This feature is appealing for matching firms’
name. In these two datasets, differences in names for a given company are given by words, acronyms, abbreviations
which are generally located at the end of the string. Example s1 = ROBERTO and s2 = ROBETRO with s1 = 7,
s2 = 7, m = 7, t = 1, l = 4, and p = 0.1 give dj = 0.95 and dw = 0.97. The common prefix gives an additional two
percentage points probability of a correct match.
3Examples of imperfect matches are Shaws Supermarkets and Shaws Supermarket or typos such as Willamette
and Wilamette.
4I perform robustness checks to ensure that my results are not driven by the choice of a specific dataset.
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entire time period is 83. Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution of the union elections across
industries, which are identified by the 2-digit SIC code. Around 70% of elections takes places in
firms with 2-digit SIC code from 10 to 40, including Mining, and Construction (SIC from 10 to
17) and Manufacturing (SIC from 20 to 39). These numbers are in line with the dataset in Lee
and Mas (2012). I also exclude elections with less than 50 eligible voters. This exclusion helps to
alleviate the concern of systematic manipulation of elections’ outcome. The underlying assumption
is that the probability of manipulation is decreasing in the number of election’s voters. Section 2.3
discusses this assumption in more details.
1.2 Unionization Response Variables and Financial Controls
I test firms’ joint response to unionization by focusing on maturity and leverage choices. I use
the fraction of long-term debt5 over the total debt and the ratio of long-term debt over the total
assets (hereafter, long-term debt ratio) as measures of the firm’s maturity structure. For the debt
level variable, I use the standard book and market measures of leverage.
In the spirit Barclay and Clifford (1995) and Custo´dio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013), I isolate
the maturity choice from leverage decisions by computing the percentage of total debt with long-
term maturity. Compustat provides the value of debt due in more than one, two, three, four,
and five years from the firm’s fiscal year-end. As Barclay and Clifford (1995) point out, whether
considering debt with maturity longer than three, four, or five years is an arbitrary decision. I
ensure robustness for different maturity measures.
The second maturity variable of my analysis is the long-term debt ratio. The important differ-
ence with respect to the previous measure is that this variable does not include short-term debt.
The fraction of long-term debt can increase mechanically if, ceteris paribus, the firm’s short-term
debt matures and is not substituted with a new issuance. The long-term debt ratio variable helps
me to filter out this effect, so that I can capture the maturity structure changes due to the issuance
of new long-term debt.
Leland and Toft (1996) and Leland (1998) stress the importance of considering the joint decision
of both maturity and amount of debt when looking at financing policies. I use book and market
5I use the terminology long-term as general word for debt with maturity longer than five years. However, I follow
the literature and present results also for debt with maturity longer than three.
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leverage to test for debt level changes as consequences of unionization events. This test is needed to
make sure that the effect on the capital structure is not due to the mechanism of strategic using of
debt. Panel B in Appending A describes in more details the computation of all outcome variables.
In my regression, where controls are included, I use standards corporate finance variables.
Panel C in Appending A reports the list of control variables with detailed explanations of the their
computation.
1.3 Summary Statistics
Tables 1 presents summary statistics. Panel A highlights the characteristics of election variables.
The mean of the variable Dummy Win, which takes value one if a union wins an election and zero
otherwise, is 0.35. That is, 35% of elections results in a unionization. The sample consists in 747
observations, which is the number of elections that have information on the firm’s debt maturity.
The proportion of winning over losing elections is 35% even considering the full dataset of 1,480
elections (e.g. including multiple elections). The average election casts a share of votes in favor of
union of 46%. Figure 1 shows a stable dynamic of this statistic over the sample period. The median
election comprises 122 eligible voters with an average of around 233. Following the literature, I
include only elections with at least 50 eligible voters. The largest election have 4,816 eligible voters.
Panel B reports summary statistics for the corporate finance variables.
2 The Causal Effect of Unionization on Debt Maturity Policies
2.1 Empirical Strategy
I use a regression discontinuity design to establish the causal link between the event of union-
ization and the firm’s debt maturity choice. Firms who experience union elections are assigned to
a treated and control group depending on the outcome. If a union wins, then the firm is in the
winners/treated group. In case of a loss, the firm goes into the losers/control group. The threshold
that divides treated from control is exogenously given by the election rules. A union wins if more
than 50% of eligible workers vote in favor. I measure the debt maturity and leverage response to
unionization as the size of the outcome variable discontinuity at 50% threshold point.
This empirical design is not assumption-free. One important assumption is that the assignment
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of ”patients” to the treatment and control group is random. Union elections are conducted with a
secret-ballot mechanism. This means that the outcome of an election, from an ex-ante perspective,
maintains random components. Moreover, as stressed before, the threshold separating treated and
control firms is exogenous. This allows me to comfortably rely on the theoretical econometric
results of the sharp RDD approach.
In order to comply with the random assignment assumption, I need to minimize the risk that the
election’s outcome can be manipulated. It could happen that an employer and its employees find
an agreement before the election, affecting the randomness of its outcome. I follow the literature
and use two strategies to minimize this concern. First, I only allow elections with at least 50 eligible
workers, implying that manipulation is harder when the number of voters is large. Second, I control
for the elections’ winning margins. If a manipulation takes place, then we are likely to observe a
sharper election outcome (e.g. everybody votes in favor or against the union).
I estimate the following regression,
∆Yi = β0 + β1Dummy wini + f(Xi) + i (1)
where ∆Yi is the firm’s i maturity response to unionization, Dummy wini is a dummy variable
equal to one if a union wins an election in firm i, and zero otherwise, and f(Xi) is a flexible
functional form of the Xi. The latter, often referred as running variable, is the Share of Votes casts
in favor of a union an election. Details on the computation of this variable can be found in Panel
A of Appendix A. The running variable assigns firms to treated (or control) group and also gives
information on the election’s winning/losing margin.
The general definition of the financial response to unionization is given by the following equation,
∆Yi = ln(Y¯i;t,t+m−1)− ln(Y¯i;t−1,t−n), (2)
where Y¯ is the average of the financial response variable computed over m and n years. The time
t is the fiscal year in which the election takes place. All RDD results presented in the tables are
obtained with the setting: n = 3 and m = 2. Figure 3 shows how estimates change by letting m
going from one to three. However, I fix n = 3 because firms’ debt maturity dynamic is downward
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sloping over the years (see Custo´dio et al. (2013)), this means that taking the mean over more years
in the past make it harder to find positive discontinuity for long-term debt.
2.2 RDD Main Results: Unionization on Debt Maturity
In this section I present the main RDD results. I show that, as consequence of unionization
event, firms increase the fraction of long-term debt while keeping their leverage ratio stable. In the
following specification I use changes in the fraction of debt with maturity longer than five years and
book and market leverage changes as outcome variables. Results are similar for other maturities.
In Section 3, I explore potential mechanisms that explains firms’ decisions to change their maturity
structure.
Figure 3 provides graphical evidence on the discontinuity of the maturity policy at the 50%
winning threshold.6 The left panel reports changes in the fraction of debt with a maturity longer
than three years (variable ∆Mat. > 3Y ). The right panel is obtained by using changes fraction of
debt with a maturity longer than five years (variable ∆Mat. > 5Y ). Moreover, for each of these two
variables, I use different values for the parameter m when computing the average of the outcome
variable. I look at maturity response after the first (m = 1), the second (m = 2), and the third
(m = 3) year the election has been closed, with n = 3 for all specifications.
Figure 3 shows that firms respond to unionization by increasing the fraction of long-term debt.
The effect is statistical significant already in the first year after the election has been closed and
becomes stronger in the second year. The figure shows discontinuities at the 50% winning threshold
and no-overlapping 90% confidence intervals for the middle plots. As one would expect this effect
fades as m increases. The bottom plots show the effect becoming weaker in the third year after
the election, with some overlap between confidence intervals, although statistical significant. Firms
are subjected to many other events, then it is hard to isolate the unique effect of unionization as
the time goes by. I repeat the analysis for the book and market leverage. Figure 4 shows no jumps
at the winning threshold of 50% for neither the measures of leverage, suggesting non significant
difference between treated and control groups in terms of leverage policies and market leverage
6The figure is obtained by fitting a quadratic polynomial separately to the left and right of the 50% threshold.
Moreover, I split each side in equally-spaced bins and compute the conditional average of the outcome variables:
∆Mat. > 3Y and ∆Mat. > 5Y . Finally, I jointly plot the fitted polynomial (solid lines) and scatter the conditional
averages (dots) in a unique graph. This graphical exercise is useful and informative because it shows that my findings
are not driven by a particular functional form choice of the running variable.
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reaction to unionization.
In the context of RDD is important to show the jump in the outcome variable at the prede-
termined 50% threshold. However, the main quantitative results are formally presented in tables.
I estimate the model specification in equation (1) specifying the functional form of the running
variable, f(Xi), as a polynomial of order three, four, five, and six, respectively for each estimate.
Table 3 and 4 contain the main results. Firms react to unionization by increasing the fraction of
long-term debt while keeping their leverage ratios unchanged. On the maturity policy side, Panel
A in Table 3 shows all positive and statistically significant coefficients. The event of unionization
causes a reshape in the firm’s debt maturity structure. The estimates indicate that, on average,
a unionized firm holds a fraction of long-term debt between 22%-28% higher as compared to non-
unionized firm.7 By considering an average treatment of 25%, then in my sample a representative
firm that experiences a union election increases the fraction of debt with maturity longer than five
years from 49% to 61%.9 This effect is also economically significant, in my sample translates to an
increase of $135 millions of long-term debt financing.
On the leverage side, I do not find statistical significant treatment effects for both book and
market leverage changes.10 The former tests for the possibility that firms use leverage as strategic
tool to gain bargaining power over unionized and more powerful workers (see Perotti and Spier
(1993) and Bronars and Deere (1991)). The latter captures the markets’ reaction to unionization
events rather than the manager debt financing choices. Panel A in Table 4 shows that coefficient for
all the polynomial orders are statistically non significant. Panel B in Table 4 confirms the previous
result also for changes in market leverage. This finding rules out the concern of strategic behavior
and equity markets’ negative reactions. Overall my results point towards a shift in the maturity
structure. Unionized firms find optimal to increase the maturity of their debt.
Lastly, I estimate the RDD using changes in long-term debt ratio (variable: ∆LongTerm(> 5))
as response to unionization. This variable has the advantage of considering the joint determination
of the amount and maturity of long-term debt. It also takes care of mechanical increase of long-term
7As pointed out by Lee and Lemieux (2010), the RDD does not need covariates to identify the causal effect.8
However, I show that including firms characteristics and industry fixed effects in my regression specifications do not
affect my results. Panel B of Table 3 show that estimates are quantitative larger and statistically stronger even with
sample size shrinkage due to missing observations of covariates.
9The estimated treatment effect for the fraction of debt with maturity longer than three years (variable Mat. > 3Y )
are quantitatively smaller (on average 17% increase) but statistically significant.
10This result is in line with Schmalz (2015).
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debt due to short-term debt maturing. The variable LongTerm(> 5) increases only if a firm issues
new debt with maturity longer than five years. In order to strengthen my evidence, I also estimate
the same model using changes in the short-term debt ratio (variable: ∆ShortTerm(≤ 1)).
Panel A and B in Table 5 show that unionized firms change their maturity structure by taking
on more long-term debt. Estimates in panel A are all statistically significant.11 This strengthen
the previous funding that unionization leads to an increase of the long-term debt. Unionized
firms substitute short- with long-term debt, without changing the leverage ratio. Although not
significant, Panel B shows a negative effect on the short term debt ratio. The dynamic of the
maturity substitution is gradual. If I consider the response in first year after the election (m = 1), I
find statistically significant evidence that unionized firms reduce the short-term and weakly increase
the long-term debt.
This section provides compelling evidence that firms respond to unionization by changing their
maturity structure. Empirical results show that firms reduce the short-term debt in the first year
after the unionization. Simultaneously they weakly increase the long-term debt and continue in the
subsequent year. My estimates show a 25% increase in the fraction of long-term debt during the
first two years after an election has been closed.
2.3 Validity Tests: Continuity of the Running Variable and Firms’ Character-
istics
RDD setting relies on the assumption that election’s outcomes cannot be perfectly predicted.
The failure of this assumption would not completely discard my results but undermine the inference
power. It suffices to think that a rational manager able to perfectly forecast the result would
anticipate it and react accordingly before the election is held. In this section I provide evidence
suggesting that the assignment to treated and control groups can be considered as locally random.
I do so by showing the compliance of two important conditions: continuity of the running variable
and firms’ observable characteristics at the 50% cut-off point.
Elections’ results can have predictable components. However, it is important that they preserve
some randomness in the outcome. There does not exists a formal way to completely rule out the
possibility of manipulation. A standard condition that need to be satisfy is continuity of the
11I obtain similar result by considering the alternative long-term debt ratio variable LongTerm(> 3).
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running variable distribution (Share of Votes) around the assignment threshold of 50%. If the
manager could systematically manipulate elections’ outcome, then we should observe a break of
the Share of Votes distribution right above and below assignment cut-off. An upward break of
the distribution should also be observed if the sample suffers of self-selection. It might be that
employees only file for an election if they are sure of the victory. This last concern is less severe
because these elections would likely cast a sharp election outcome, while the RDD analysis focuses
on the local effect between close unionized and escapees.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of running variable Share of Votes and provide preliminary
evidence regarding its continuity at the 50% threshold. I perform the formal discontinuity test
procedure suggested by McCrary (2008). Figure 5 plots the estimated distribution of the running
variable. The function appears continuous at the threshold. The visual evidence is confirmed by
the formal statistical test. The Z-statistic obtained by using the McCrary’s test is 0.76, which
results from an estimated coefficient of 0.141 with a standard error of 0.185). We cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the distribution is continuous at the prespecified threshold of 50%.
The other important condition that needs to be satisfied is the continuity of firms’ observable
characteristics at 50% cut-off. Winners (treated) and losers (control) of an election should not be
ex-ante systematically different in observable characteristics. The maturity response to unionization
between these two groups should be the result only of the treatment effect. I run a standard validity
test by looking at firm-level characteristics in the year preceding an election. Table 6 shows that in
the year before the election firms are not statistically different, and so comparable. These results
are obtained by running the following six order polynomial12
yi = β0 + β1Dummy Wini +
6∑
j=1
θjShare of Votes
j
i + i, (3)
where the dependent variable is a lagged observable firm’s characteristic, Dummy Win takes value
one if union wins an election and zero otherwise. I estimate this model for different election’s win-
ning/losing margins from the 50% cut-off. The coefficient of interest is β1. If firms are comparable
we should not find statistical significance.
Results of these tests suggest that even though some manipulation might have taken place, this
12Robustness checks deliver similar results using polynomials of different orders.
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is not strong enough to undermine the causal inference of the RDD framework. Moreover, unionized
and escapee firms in the sample appear to be comparable from the observables perspective.
2.4 Robustness Checks
In this section I explore the sensitivity of RDD main results to changes in model specification.
I run several robustness checks to ensure that results are not driven by: the global polynomial
approach, the exogenous 50% threshold, and finally I show that the sample selection is not a
driving factor.
An important concern to address in an RDD framework is the trade-off between precision
and bias of estimations. The global polynomial approach makes use of all the available data to
estimate the treatment effect. This makes estimates more precise because of the large amount
of information provided by the entire sample. However, observations away from the assignment
cut-off point introduce bias. It is often difficult to guarantee that the functional form relating the
conditional mean of the outcome and running variable is specified correctly over a large range of
data. The local linear approach, instead, reduces the likelihood of bias because it uses only a subset
of data around the assignment cut-off point. However, this approach can be statistical weaker given
the lost of information due to sample size shrinkage.
To address this concern I run a set of local linear regressions using subsets of data with different
bandwidths around the 50% threshold. Bandwidths span from five to forty percentage points
around the 50% cut-off. Moreover, I perform the analysis using optimal bandwidths suggested by
Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (IK) and recently further modified by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (2014) (CCT).13
Table 7 reports results for local linear regressions of close winners and losers. Estimates are sta-
tistical significance with both CCT and IK optimal bandwidths. Estimates with other bandwidths
are also statistically significant. Sign and magnitude of the treatment effect are similar to the
estimates using global polynomial regressions. Model (1) estimate is not statistically significant.
However, the bandwidth (5%) is much smaller than the optimal suggested by CCT (18%) and
13These two methods belong to the so-called ”plug-in” procedures. The optimal bandwidth is estimated in terms
of actual data characteristics. The objective is to find an optimal level that balances the degree of bias and precision.
Heuristically more estimated bias lead to smaller bandwidth, higher conditional variance of the estimate leads to
larger bandwidth. These two forces lead to an interior optimal.
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IK (16%). Given the existing precision-bias trade-off, a small bandwidth can affect the statistical
power of the model. This is also supported by other results which increase in statistical significance
as the bandwidths approaches to the optimal.
The election setting allows me to use a sharp RDD framework. In this model the probability
of treatment jumps from zero to one once a given exogenous threshold has been passed. However,
it is informative to show that arbitrary chosen assignment cut-off points do not produce the same
results as the exogenous imposed by the election system. Table 8 reports estimates of the model
in Equation (1) for a six order global polynomial and a set of arbitrary chosen cut-off points plus
the true 50% threshold. Except for the latter, estimates are not statistical significant and most of
them have a reversed sign. This evidence suggests that the effect of unionization on firm’s debt
maturity choice is not likely driven by randomness. I am indeed capturing the treatment effect of
unionization on the maturity structure of debt.
The last concern regards the possibility that sample selection is driving my results. In order to
minimize this concern, I estimate the RDD model using a sample in which I include only the first
time that a firm experiences an election.14 This sample contains 610 elections, 407 lost and 203
won by unions. The complete sample is 747 elections 489 lost and 258 won by unions. The sample
is smaller but the proportion between winners and losers is comparable. Moreover, the average
share of votes in favor of the union is also comparable between these two datasets: 0.47 for the
former versus 0.46 for the latter. Table 9 presents RDD results for two sets of global polynomial
regressions. The first set does not include financial control, while the second contains controls
for firm’s characteristics and industry fixed effects. Panel A and B show that all coefficients are
statistically significant and similar in magnitude to the main RDD estimates. It is unlikely that
the sample selection is driving my results.
14I estimate the RDD model on the full sample of 3,400 elections. Results display a positive and statistical significant
treatment effect of unionization on the maturity structure. I also look at a subsample of firms who experienced a
unique election during the sample period. The magnitude and sign of the effect is comparable to other estimations.
However, the statistical power is reduced. There are few firms which have a unique election and only a small subset
of theme have data on debt maturity.
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3 What Makes Maturity Changes an Optimal Response to Union-
ization?
In the previous section I document a maturity change as firm’s response to unionization. Firms’
substitute short- with long-term debt while keeping the leverage ratio stable. It is still the case
that only certain types of firms find the maturity lengthening an optimal strategy. In the remaining
sections I explore the mechanism that leads firms to change the debt maturity structure. I connect
my findings to the existing ones in the literature and show that the maturity structure plays an
important role in the financing policy response to unionization.
I estimate the RDD using subsamples constructed according to measures that aim at capturing
financial constraints, operating flexibility, agency costs of debt, and different legal status. Subsam-
ples are obtained from the main election dataset. I verify robustness of results by employing a
dataset from which I do not exclude any election. Results display similar patterns.
3.1 The Effect of Financial Constraints
I analyze the unionization response of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. I use
the Whited-Wu (ww) measure to proxy financial constraints. A firm is unconstrained if it lies
below the sample median according the ww -index distribution in year before the election. Schmalz
(2015) finds that financially constrained firms increase their leverage in response to unionization,
while unconstrained firms do the opposite. This is the result of a trade-off between strategic use of
leverage and risk management. My estimates partially support his results. However, I furthermore
show that financially constrained firms respond to unionization by lengthening their debt maturity
structure. Table 10 reports the response to unionization estimates for leverage, maturity, and long-
term debt ratio. This helps to convey the message that leverage may not be the unique or most
relevant strategic policy variable that a firm can use.
On the one hand, results confirm previous findings that financially constrained firms use debt
policies when the labor force becomes more organized and powerful. On the other hands, my
findings suggest that financially constrained firms exploits the positive effects of a union in place
by increasing the fraction of debt with longer maturity.15 The intuition is that constrained firm may
15Although not reported explicitly in the table. I also estimate the RDD by using the change in short-term debt
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have limited access to debt financing. Long-term debt reduces the refinancing risk due to roll-over
of maturing debt. Supposedly, this risk is more acute in financially constrained firms. My results
suggest that constrained firms both use unionization as an opportunity to reduce refinancing risks
and at the same time they also gain bargaining power by increasing the debt level.
Financially unconstrained firms have relatively less problem to raise external debt financing and
this also makes the refinancing risk less severe. These firms do not have a clear incentive to change
their debt structure. RDD results confirm this intuition by not showing statistical meaningful
effects for these firms.
3.2 The Effect of Operating Flexibility
A common belief is that firms with more unionized workers are less flexible. The intuition is that
in case of negative economic shocks these firms are more constrained in laying off workers or reducing
their wages. Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2014) show that increases in the operating leverage crowd
out financial leverage. In their paper, the reduction in flexibility stems from changes in employment
protection.
In this section I study the different response of firms with high and low operating flexibility to
unionization. If firms use leverage as strategic tool, then I should find a positive effect for firms
with low operating flexibility and negative for the other group. The maturity choice direction is
not clear ex-ante. However, Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) show that firms hedge refinancing
risk, arising from holding short-term debt, by keeping more cash. I use cash holding as a measure
of financial flexibility. Firms that lie below the sample median according to the cash holding
distribution are considered to have less operating flexibility. I test whether firms with low cash
increase the maturity of their debt such that to reduce their refinancing risk.
Table 11 shows that the leverage response to unionization does not follow Simintzi et al. (2014)’s
predictions. Estimates are weakly statistical significant for firms with low cash and I find no
statistical significant impact on firms with high cash. Our settings are not completely comparable. I
do not take into account State law heterogeneity in terms of worker protection (i.e. Unemployment
Insurance). However, my results suggest that the operating flexibility is not a channel through
ratio. I find a negative coefficient but not statistical significance. This supports the idea that firms keep the debt
ratio unaltered but they change the maturity structure.
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which firms find optimal to use leverage as strategic tool.
Panel B and C of Table 11 show that in general both flexible and non-flexible firms react to
unionization by increasing the maturity of their debt claims. Consistently with Harford et al. (2014),
I find that the effect for firms with lower flexibility (low cash) is larger in magnitude and it has more
statistical power. On average firms with lower operating flexibility increase the fraction of long-term
debt by around 8-percentage-points more respect to firms with higher operating flexibility.
3.3 Firm Size, Tangible Assets and the Unionization Effect
The presence of asymmetric information between firm and bond market generates a premium
in the form of yield spread. I cannot test directly the presence of union’s monitoring activity
on firms policies. However, I can provide evidence that the presence of unions generates changes
that are consistent with this hypothesis. Researchers use firm’s size as a measure for potential
asymmetric information and for testing theories related to agency costs of debt. Custo´dio et al.
(2013) document that firms’ size is positively associated with the maturity structure. Large firms
hold a larger fraction of debt with long maturity. They obtain similar results by focusing on
tangibility, which measures the fraction of tangible assets over the firm’s total assets. Small and
low tangibility firms have potentially higher information asymmetry and thus subjected to larger
costs of debt.
I estimate a global polynomial on subsamples split according to the sample median of firms’
size and tangibility distribution. I report results for both characteristics. The firm’s size can
be interpreted both as proxy for financial constraints and information asymmetry. Tangibility
measures the extent to which a firm can collateralize its assets. As stress by Rajan and Zingales
(1995), tangible assets are easy to collateralize and thus they reduce the agency costs of debt.
If unions’ monitoring activities improve the information asymmetry or in general have a positive
effect on agency costs of debt, then this is expected to be particularly strong in firms who are more
exposed to these problems. Small and low tangibility firms are expected to have a stronger response
to unionization. A caveat is due. My sample is skewed towards large firms, as compared to the
whole Compustat universe. If one assumes that asymmetric information decreases continuously in
the firm’s size, then my result can be interpreted as a relative effect.
Table 12 reports the RDD results. Focusing on Panel A, I do not find statistically significant
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effects on the firm’s leverage as response to unionization. The size does not affect leverage decisions
as consequence of unionization. However, firm’s size is important factor to determinate the maturity
structure of debt as response to a union’s victory. Small firms respond by increasing substantially
the fraction of long-term debt. On average, in the second year after a union victory, smaller firms
have increased by 57% their fraction of long-term debt. A further analysis on the immediate respond
to unionization suggests that the process happens gradually. There is a statistical significant
increase of around 40% in the first year after the election. Large firms do not exhibit a similar
reaction to unionization.
It is interesting to note that results for the subsample split by tangibility are different for what
it concerns the leverage response to unionization. Panel B shows that low tangibility firms do
not respond to unionization by changing their leverage ratio, as for small firms. However, high
tangibility firms respond to unionization by following the strategic-use-of-debt theory predictions.
This implies that tangibility captures some aspect that is missing when splitting by size or using
financial constraints measures such as White-Wu index. Results for the maturity response are
consistent with the previous evidence. Firms with low tangibility have a stronger response to
unionization.
This positive effect can be, at least for some part, attributed to a reduction in agency costs of
debt. I cannot disentangle all the forces that play a role in this process. However, these findings
support the idea that capital markets value positively the presence of a non-financial stakeholders,
such as unions, which have incentive to monitor over the firm’s activity. Firms gain access to
cheaper long-term financing. Some firms find it optimal to grab this opportunity, others are not
affected. Consistently, firms that react by increasing the maturity structure of debt are those who
have potentially higher agency costs of debt.
3.4 Right-to-Work Laws and the Union Power
I now turn to investigate the response to unionization conditional on the power that a union
has on a given territory. The underline assumption of this study is that a union is able to improve
coordination and effectiveness of workforce’s actions. This means that weaker unions should not
be as effective as stronger unions. To provide evidence on the relevance of unions’ power, I use the
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Right-to-Work Laws (RWLs) as discriminant between weak and strong unions.16 Unions in States
covered by RWL are expected to be less powerful. The main reason is that in these States workers
in unionized firms are not obliged to pay union fees. This makes unions financially weaker.
If my results are indeed due to unions being able to affect management decisions, then I should
find a weaker effect in States where unions are weakened by RWLs. In order to test this hypothesis
I perform the RDD analysis separately for elections that take place in States with and without
RWLs. Figure ?? shows in blue US Sates covered by RWL. The majority of States have RWLs in
place before my sample period starts. However, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin have introduced
these laws only recently.
Results in Table 13 confirm the hypothesis that unions have an active part when forming the
a bargaining unit within a firm. The RDD estimates show no statistical significant changes in the
maturity structure for firms whose unionized establishment is located in a State with RWLs. On the
contrary, I find a strongly statistical significant effect in States without RWLs. Model (1) to (3) test
maturity changes as response to unionization during the first, second, third year after the election
has been closed. Estimates are robust to these changes in the maturity response specification.
4 Conclusions
In this paper I study the effect of powerful unions on firms’ debt maturity decisions. When a
employees decide to form a bargaining unit represented by a union, then they become more powerful
and better organized. I use union elections as exogenous variation of the employees power to study
the firms’ financial policy response.
I find that firms respond to unionization by increasing the fraction of long maturity debt. I do
not find evidence on strategic use of leverage. Moreover, I find that financially constrained, less
flexible, and smaller firms exploit the positive externalities induced by the presence of a powerful
non-financial stakeholder (union) to lengthen the maturity of their debt to reduce refinancing risk.
16The basic idea of these laws is to secure employees’ right to decide for themselves whether or not to join or
financially support a union. The 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) introduce the employees’ right to
organize into unions, engage in collective bargaining to gain better contractual terms, and take actions such as
strikes. The act authorizes unions to serve as workers “exclusive bargaining representative”. This requires that all
employees of a unionized firms to accept the union contract. Individuals may not negotiate separately, whether or
not they belong to the union. Then unions started negotiating contracts that made paying their dues a condition
of employment. In response many states passed “Right-to-Work laws (RWLs) that prohibit these provisions. Under
RWLs, unions cannot make fees compulsory for non-members.
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I contribute to the literature by establish an important link between labor frictions and financing
policies. Moreover, I provide a new perspective in which firms do not respond to unionization by
aggressive leverage policies. My findings support the idea that bond market value positively the
presence of non-financial stakeholders with aligned interests and incentives to monitor over the
firm’s activity.
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A Variable List and Descriptions
Variable Label Description
Panel A: Unionization Elections Variables
Total Votes Number of valid votes cast in an election at the firm’s establishment
level
Votes for Union Number of valid votes cast in an election in favor of the unionization of
the firm’s establishment
Votes against Union Number of valid votes cast in an election against the unionization of the
firm’s establishment
Eligible Voters Total number of employees with the right to vote in an union election
Share of Votes The ratio between the variable Votes for Union and the variable Total
Votes
Dummy Win Dummy variable which takes value one if the union is the winner of a
given election, and zero otherwise
Panel B: Variables for the Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
Mat. > 3 Fraction of debt with maturity longer than three years. It is computes
as the dollar value of debt with maturity longer than three years
(Compustat variables dltt − dd2 − dd2 − dd3) over the total dollar
value of debt (Compustat variables dltt+ dlc)
Mat. > 5 Fraction of debt with maturity longer than three years. It is computes
as the dollar value of debt with maturity longer than three years
(Compustat variables dltt − dd2 − dd2 − dd3 − dd4 − dd5) over the
total dollar value of debt (Compustat variables dltt+ dlc)
LongTerm(> 3) The ratio between debt maturity longer than three years (Compustat
variables dltt− dd2− dd2− dd3) over the total value of assets (Com-
pustat variable at)
LongTerm(> 5) The ratio between debt with maturity longer than three years (Compu-
stat variables dltt− dd2− dd2− dd3− dd4− dd5) over the total value
of assets (Compustat variable at)
Leverage Ratio between the total book value of debt (Compustat variables dltt+
dlc) over the total value of assets (Compustat variable at)
MarketLeverage Ratio between the book value of debt (Compustat variables dltt + dlc)
over the sum of market value of equity (Compustat variables csho ∗
prccf ) plus the book value of debt
ShortTerm(≤ 1) The ratio between debt maturing withing one year (Compustat variables
dlc) and the total asset value (Compustat variable at)
(Continued)
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Variable Label Description
Panel C: Other Corporate Finance Controls Variables
Total Asset Total value of assets (Compustat variable at)
Book Equity The difference between asset value (Compustat item at) and total debt
(the sum of compustat items dltt and dlc)
Cash Ratio between cash and short term investment (Compustat variable che)
and the total value of assets
Operating Leverage Following Novy-Marx (2011), it is the ratio between cost of goods sold
(Compustat item cogs) plus selling, general and administrative ex-
pense (Compustat variable xsga) over total value of assets
Market to Book (M/B) Ratio of market value of assets (Compustat variables at+ csho∗prccf −
ceq) over the total value of assets
Collateral (Cltr) Ratio between the sum of inventories (Compustat variable invt) and
property, plant and equipment (Compustat variable ppent) over the
total value of assets
Whited-Wu (ww) Computed using the following equation,
ww =− 0.091 ∗ ib− 0.062 ∗D-divid
+ 0.021 ∗ (dltt/at)− 0.004 ∗ ln(at)
+ 0.102 ∗ (SIC3-growth-sale)− 0.035 ∗ (firm-growth-sale),
where ib is the Compustat variable income before extraordinary items,
dummy-dividend is a dummy variable which takes value one is the firm
pays dividend and zero otherwise, dltt/at is the ratio between long
term debt to total asset, ln(at) is the natural logarithm of total asset,
the last two terms are industry (as defined by 3-digit SIC code) sales
growth and the firm’s sales
Abnormal Earnings Ratio of difference between the income before extraordinary items, ad-
justed for common or ordinary stock equivalents (Compustat item
ibadj ) for time t and t− 1 over the market value of equity (Compus-
tat variables csho ∗ prccf ).
Tangibility Ratio between tangible assets measured by property, plant and equip-
ment (Compustat item ppent) and total assets.
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B Figures
Figure 1. This graph plots the dynamic of the total number of elections held in each year of the
sample period. Union elections data are from the National Labor Relations Board (NLBR) over
the time period from 1977 to 2014.
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Figure 2. This figure shows the cumulative distribution of unionization elections across industries.
The x-axis reports the 2-Digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. The y-axis reports
the cumulative density of elections. Union elections data are from the National Labor Relations
Board (NLBR) over the period 1977-2014.
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Figure 3. The figure plots debt maturity response to a unionization election. ∆Mat. > 3 and
∆Mat. > 5 are respectively changes in the fraction of total debt with maturity longer than three
and five years. The x-axis reports the running variable Share of Votes, which is computed as the
fraction of total votes cast in favor of unionization. The left column shows the maturity response
for ∆Mat. > 3 computed over the first, second and third year after the election. The right column
shows the maturity response for ∆Mat. > 5 computed over the first, second and third year after
the election. The blue and green solid lines are fitted quadratic polynomial estimates. The gray
solid lines plot the 90% confidence interval. The dots are averages of ∆Mat. > 3 and ∆Mat. > 5
computed over 20 equally-spaced bins. The discontinuity of the outcome variable at the 50%
threshold of Share of Votes represents the estimated causal effect of unionization. Elections data
are from NLRB. Data on the maturity are taken from Compustat.
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Figure 4. The figure plots book (variable ∆Leverage) and market (variable ∆MarketLeverage
) leverage responses to a unionization election. The x-axis reports the running variable Share of
Votes, which is computed as the fraction of total votes cast in favor of unionization. The left column
shows the leverage response for ∆Leverage computed over the first, second and third year after the
election. The right column shows the maturity response for ∆MarketLeverage computed over the
first, second and third year after the election. The blue and green solid lines are fitted quadratic
polynomial estimates. The gray solid lines plot the 90% confidence interval. The dots are averages
of ∆Leverage and ∆MarketLeverage computed over 20 equally-spaced bins. The discontinuity of
the outcome variable at the 50% threshold of Share of Votes represents the estimated causal effect
of unionization. Elections data are from NLRB. Data on the maturity are taken from Compustat.
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Figure 5. This figure shows the distribution of the running variable: Share of Votes. This variable is computed
as the ratio between valid votes cast in favor of the representative union over the total valid votes cast in an election.
The distribution is constructed by computing frequencies of 20 equally-spaced bins in the Share of Votes variable.
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Figure 6. The figure plots the density of the variables Share of Votes (the ratio between votes for union and the
total valid votes cast in an election). The procedure followed to compute and test for a break at the threshold of 50%
is like in McCrary (2008). The dots represent the estimated density. The solid thick line the fitted density of the
running variable. The thin solid line is the 95% confidence interval around the fitted density. Union elections data
are from the National Labor Relations Board (NLBR) over the period 1977-2014.
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C Tables
Table 1. Summary Statistics for Elections and Corporate Finance Control Variables
This table reports the summary statistics for the unionization election dataset. Panel A reports summary information
on the establishment-level elections. Dummy Win is a variable that takes value one if the election is won by the
representative Union, and zero otherwise. Share of votes is the ratio between votes in favor of the union over total
votes cast in the election. Eligible voters indicates the number of workers with the right to vote in the unionization
election. Total votes is the number of valid votes cast in an election. Vote for and against union are the number of
valid votes cast in an election in favor and against the representative union respectively. Panel B reports summary
statistics of standard corporate finance variables. The sample period goes from 1977 to 2014. All the corporate
finance variables are Winsorized at 1% tails. Dollar value variables have been adjusted for inflations and express to
a constant 2000 dollars.
25th 75th Standard
Variable Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max Obs
Panel A: Election Variables
Dummy Win 0.35 0 0 1 0.48 0 1 747
Share of Votes 0.46 0.30 0.41 0.57 0.22 0 1 747
Eligible Voters 233.35 75 122 229 357.09 50 4816 747
Votes for Union 92.31 29 49 92 153.32 0 1856 747
Votes against Union 118.37 34 60 119 194.37 0 2393 747
Panel B: Other Covariates
Total Assets 4211.62 274.75 992.31 4117.86 7369.15 5.61 29642.87 747
Total Debt 1125.65 62.95 268.81 1090.64 2017.42 0.23 8298.27 747
Book Equity (be) 3022.45 187.90 724.33 2987.53 5387.95 2.97 22283.99 741
M/B 0.95 0.64 0.79 1.07 0.75 0.22 16.17 719
Operating Leverage (ol) 1.49 0.94 1.26 1.67 1.02 0.08 7.68 704
Abnormal Earnings -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.02 0.29 -3.04 3.41 717
Size(Log(Sales)) 7.29 6.09 7.24 8.64 1.74 1.85 10.19 746
Asset Maturity 11.02 6.27 9.28 14.93 7.00 0.32 75.84 727
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.20 0.07 -0.28 0.44 746
Cash 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.00 0.45 747
Collateral 0.60 0.51 0.62 0.71 0.17 0.06 0.95 743
Z-Score 3.36 2.40 3.04 3.95 2.18 -2.37 43.10 698
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for the RDD Outcome Variables
This table reports statistics for the main variables of the regression discontinuity analysis (RDD). Panel A reports
summaries of the raw variables. Panel B of Appendix A describes the construction of all variables in this table.
Mat. > 3Y , Mat > 5Y , LongTerm(> 3), and LongTerm(> 5) are the variables capturing the debt maturity
structure. Leverage and MarketLeverage are the variables measuring firms’ debt level. Panel B reports summary
statistics of the changes in the aforementioned variables. These variables are computed as the log difference between
averages of the raw variable after and before the election event. This specific table reports statistics of the measure
computed using three-year averages before and after the election has been officially closed. All the variables are
Winsorized at 1% tails.
25th 75th Standard
Variable Mean Percentile Median Percentile Deviation Min Max Obs
Panel A: Key Outcome Variable for the RDD Analysis
Mat. > 3Y 0.64 0.52 0.68 0.80 0.22 0.01 1 747
Mat. > 5Y 0.49 0.32 0.50 0.66 0.23 0 1 747
LongTerm(> 3) 0.18 0.10 0.17 0.24 0.13 0 0.96 749
LongTerm(> 5) 0.14 0.07 0.12 0.19 0.10 0 0.82 749
Leverage 0.29 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.15 0.01 0.86 741
MarketLeverage 0.35 0.20 0.34 0.49 0.20 0.01 0.94 719
Panel B: Log-Changes of the Key Variables
∆Mat. > 3Y -0.04 -0.17 -0.03 0.10 0.35 -1.54 1.21 747
∆Mat. > 5Y -0.07 -0.27 -0.04 0.15 0.52 -2.12 1.38 747
∆LongTerm(> 3) -0.06 -0.29 -0.06 0.16 0.52 -2.42 1.78 748
∆LongTerm(> 5) -0.08 -0.34 -0.07 0.21 0.67 -2.77 1.90 749
∆Leverage -0.01 -0.18 -0.02 0.15 0.36 -1.67 1.57 740
∆MarketLeverage -0.02 -0.26 -0.02 0.22 0.44 -1.59 1.83 702
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Table 3. RDD Results for the Debt Maturity Choice
The table presents the RDD results using the global polynomial approach. I estimate the following regression:
∆Mat. > 5Yi = β0 + β1Dummy Wini + f(Share of Votesi) + i, where the ∆Mat. > 5Yi is the firm’s i change in the
fraction of debt with maturity longer than five years, Dummy Wini takes value one if a union wins an election and
zero otherwise, and finally f(Share of Votesi) is a flexible global polynomial in the share of votes casts in favor of
the representative union. The β1 coefficient captures the causal effect of unionization on the maturity choice. Panel
A does not include controls. Panel B adds to the aforementioned regression equation standard controls for firms
characteristics and industry fixed effect at one-digit SIC level. Year fixed effects are includes in both specifications.
I report results for polynomials of order three, four, five, and six. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and
clustered at firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Global (1) (2) (3) (4)
Polynomial Three Four Five Six
Panel A: No Financial Controls
Dummy Win 0.224∗∗ 0.226∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.104) (0.105)
Observations 747 747 747 747
Panel B: With Financial Controls
Dummy Win 0.312∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.114) (0.116)
Observations 655 655 655 655
Table 4. RDD Results for Book and Market Leverage Variables
The table reports RDD estimates as response to unionization for the following variables: ∆Leverage and
∆MarketLeverage. Panel B in Appendix A describes the computation of the Leverage and MarketLeverage
variables. The changes are computed as log difference of the two-year after and three-years before averages. Year
fixed effects are includes in all specifications. Model(1) to (4) report results for polynomials of order three, four, five,
and six, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Global (1) (2) (3) (4)
Polynomial Three Four Five Six
Panel A: Book Leverage
Dummy Win 0.0413 0.0428 0.0750 0.0713
(0.053) (0.052) (0.061) (0.061)
Observations 740 740 740 740
Panel B: Market Leverage
Dummy Win 0.0433 0.0456 0.0914 0.0878
(0.067) (0.067) (0.078) (0.0776)
Observations 702 702 702 702
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Table 5. From Short- to Long-Term Maturity Debt
The table reports RDD estimates as response to unionization for the following variables: LongTerm(> 5),
ShortTerm(≤ 1). They are computed as for the maturity response. The first variable (Panel A) is the ratio
between the amount of debt with a maturity longer than five years over total assets. The second variable (Panel B) is
the ratio between debt maturing within one year over total assets. All estimates include year fixed effects. Model(1)
to (4) report results for polynomials of order three, four, five, and six, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis are
robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Long Term Debt Ratio
Dummy Win 0.272∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.108) (0.108) (0.124) (0.126)
Observations 749 749 749 749
Panel B: Short Term Debt Ratio
Dummy Win -0.163 -0.227 -0.141 -0.147
(0.142) (0.161) (0.182) (0.191)
Observations 749 749 749 749
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Table 6. Continuity of Firms’ Observables Characteristics at the Assignment Cut-off Point
This table reports the validity test results for the RDD analysis. The model tests the continuity assumption of
firms’ observable characteristics in the year before a unionization election. The null hypothesis is that there are no
systematic observable differences between firms that win and lose a unionization election. Results are for a global
polynomial of degree six in the share of votes for union (variable: Share of Votes). Rows report the dependent
variables tested. Columns report coefficients of the explanatory variable, Dummy Win, for different winning/losing
margins from the 50% threshold. Model (1) considers elections with all margins, model (2) winners and losers within
a 20%, model (3) winners and losers within 10%, model (4) winners and losers within 5%. Regressions include year
fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at firm level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Explanatory variable: Dummy Win
Election’s Winning/Losing Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variables [0, 1] [0.30, 0.70] [0.40, 0.60] [0.45, 0.55]
Lag(Log(Sale)) 0.143 0.165 -0.232 -0.207
(0.272) (0.420) (0.701) (1.229)
Lag(Book Leverage) 0.015 0.015 -0.025 0.086
(0.026) (0.039) (0.058) (0.088)
Lag(Cash) 0.006 0.0131 0.022 0.041
(0.012) (0.020) (0.032) (0.057)
Lag(M/B) 0.021 0.079 0.178 0.401
(0.129) (0.202) (0.297) (0.602)
Lag(Operating Leverage) 0.119 0.073 -0.136 -0.623
(0.160) (0.236) (0.268) (0.377)
Lag(ROA) -0.003 0.006 0.0150 -0.009
(0.022) (0.019) (0.026) (0.042)
Lag(Z-Score) 0.213 0.041 0.495 0.246
(0.379) (0.568) (0.805) (1.447)
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Table 8. Robustness: RDD using Arbitrary Chosen Winning Threshold
The table reports estimates of a six order global polynomial of the main RDD model by using arbitrary assignment
thresholds points. Model (1) to (3) assign to the treatment group elections that cast a share of votes in favor of the
union more than 5%, 15%, and 35%, respectively. Model (5) to (7) assign to the treatment group elections that cast
a share of votes in favor of the union more than 65%, 80%, and 95%, respectively. The model in the center is the
one that uses the true exogenously given threshold of 50%. All specifications do not include firms characteristics and
industry fixed effects. Year fixed-effects are included. Standard errors are robust and clustered at firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Arbitrary Winning Thresholds
(1) (2) (3) True (5) (6) (7)
5% 20% 35% 50% 65% 80% 95%
Dummy Win 0.248 -0.099 -0.093 0.284∗∗∗ -0.112 -0.127 0.175
(0.308) (0.153) (0.099) (0.105) (0.176) (0.247) (0.197)
Observations 747 747 747 747 747 747 747
Table 9. Robustness: RDD with First Time Elections
The table reports RDD estimates of global polynomials. The sample includes only observations of elections happened
for the first time at the firm level. I used the official closing date (year and month) to determine the first election for
firms who experienced multiple elections during the sample period. Model (1) to (4) estimate a global polynomial
of order three, four, five, and six, respectively. Panel A reports results without including financial controls. Panel B
presents results including standard controls for firm’s characteristics and industry fixed effects at one-digit SIC level.
Year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
Global (1) (2) (3) (4)
Polynomial Three Four Five Six
Panel A: No Financial Controls
Dummy Win 0.291∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.103) (0.119) (0.121)
Observations 610 610 610 610
Panel B: With Financial Controls
Dummy Win 0.340∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.112) (0.133) (0.136)
Observations 552 552 552 552
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Table 10. Effect of Financial Constraints
This table reports the unionization response of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. A firm is financially
unconstrained is lies below the sample median according to the Whited-Wu (ww) index. Model (1) to (4) estimate
a global polynomial of order three, four, five, and six, respectively. Panel A presents the leverage response to
unionization. Panel B reports the maturity response to unionization. Finally, Panel C reports the RDD results for
the long-term debt ratio. Appendix A describes the computation of the leverage, debt maturity, and long-term debt
ratio. All model specifications include financial controls, year and one-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Standard
errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Panel A: ∆Leverage
Dummy Win (Non-Constrained) 0.036 0.035 -0.025 -0.023 323
(0.078) (0.0778) (0.096) (0.095)
Dummy Win (Constrained) 0.115 0.121 0.210∗∗ 0.194∗∗ 330
(0.076) (0.076) (0.085) (0.086)
Panel B: ∆Mat. > 5
Dummy Win (Non-Constrained) 0.169 0.169 0.260∗ 0.264∗ 324
(0.126) (0.126) (0.157) (0.158)
Dummy Win (Constrained) 0.510∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 331
(0.150) (0.152) (0.173) (0.184)
Panel C: ∆LongTerm(> 5)
Dummy Win (Non-Constrained) 0.193 0.191 0.281 0.289 324
(0.150) (0.149) (0.182) (0.182)
Dummy Win (Constrained) 0.609∗∗∗ 0.622∗∗∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 331
(0.179) (0.181) (0.205) (0.217)
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Table 11. Effect of Operating Flexibility
This table reports the unionization response of firms with low and high operating flexibility. A has low operating
flexibility if lies below the sample median of the distribution of the variable Cash. Model (1) to (4) estimate a global
polynomial of order three, four, five, and six, respectively. Panel A presents the leverage response to unionization.
Panel B reports the maturity response to unionization. Finally, Panel C reports the RDD results for the long-term
debt ratio. Appendix A describes the computation of cash holding, leverage, debt maturity, and long-term debt ratio.
All model specifications include financial controls, year and one-digit SIC industry fixed effects. Standard errors in
parenthesis are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Panel A: ∆Leverage
Dummy Win (Low Cash) 0.148∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.0995 0.0997 334
(0.0616) (0.0620) (0.0749) (0.0748)
Dummy Win (High Cash) -0.0804 -0.0669 -0.0518 -0.0427 351
(0.0969) (0.0953) (0.110) (0.110)
Panel B: ∆Mat. > 5
Dummy Win (Low Cash) 0.376∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.475∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 336
(0.132) (0.133) (0.167) (0.167)
Dummy Win (High Cash) 0.308∗∗ 0.332∗∗ 0.345∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 351
(0.144) (0.145) (0.174) (0.178)
Panel C: ∆LongTerm(> 5)
Dummy Win (Low Cash) 0.484∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 336
(0.149) (0.150) (0.193) (0.193)
Dummy Win (High Cash) 0.306 0.336∗ 0.398∗ 0.432∗ 351
(0.191) (0.195) (0.227) (0.234)
39
Table 12. Effect of Size and Tangible Assets
This table reports the unionization response of subsample of firms split by size (Panel A) and tangibility (Panel
B). Size is computed as the natural logarithm of sales. Tangibility is the fraction of tangible assets. Small and
low tangibility firms are the ones below the sample median according to the distribution of size and tangibility,
respectively. Model (1) to (4) estimate a global polynomial of order three, four, five, and six, respectively. For both
subsample, I report results for leverage and maturity response to unionization. Appendix A describes the computation
of the leverage and debt maturity. All model specifications include financial controls, year and one-digit SIC industry
fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively
(1) (2) (3) (4) Obs.
Panel A: Sample Split by Size
Panel A.1: ∆Leverage
Dummy Win (Small) 0.099 0.108 0.179∗ 0.156 334
(0.085) (0.085) (0.093) (0.095)
Dummy Win (Large) 0.049 0.048 0.013 -0.009 319
(0.065) (0.066) (0.079) (0.083)
Panel A.2: ∆Mat. > 5
Dummy Win (Small) 0.560∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.590∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 334
(0.158) (0.161) (0.186) (0.194)
Dummy Win (Large) 0.200∗ 0.192 0.264∗ 0.243 321
(0.121) (0.122) (0.153) (0.154)
Panel B: Sample Split by Tangibility
Panel B.1: ∆Leverage
Dummy Win (Low Tangible) -0.019 -0.011 -0.055 -0.080 332
(0.084) (0.084) (0.102) (0.103)
Dummy Win (High Tangible) 0.132∗ 0.131∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 321
(0.069) (0.068) (0.072) (0.072)
Panel B.2: ∆Mat. > 5
Dummy Win (Low Tangible) 0.507∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 332
(0.165) (0.166) (0.202) (0.208)
Dummy Win (High Tangible) 0.209∗ 0.208∗ 0.237 0.254∗ 323
(0.122) (0.123) (0.149) (0.152)
40
Table 13. Effect of Right-to-Work Laws on Unions’ Power
This table reports RDD results of the debt maturity response to unionization in States with and without Right-
to-Work laws. Model (1) to (3) estimate the RDD model using different specification for the dependent variable
∆Mat. > 5 computed over the first, second, third year after. All models include financial controls, year and one-digit
SIC industry fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the firm level. ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variable: ∆Mat. > 5
(1) (2) (3)
First Year Second Year Third Year
Dummy Win Dummy Win Dummy Win
With Right-to-Work 0.163 0.186 0.177
(0.179) (0.175) (0.200)
No Right-to-Work 0.295∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.345∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.123) (0.127)
Observations 721 655 613
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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of information disclosure on banks’ portfolio risk. We cast
a simple banking system into a general equilibrium model with trading frictions. We find
that the information disclosure lowers the expected risk-adjusted profits for a non-negligible
fraction of banks. The magnitude of this effect depends on the structure of the banking
system and, alarmingly, it is more pronounced for systemically important institutions. We
connect these theoretical findings to the stress test procedure, where bank information is
disclosed by the regulator. The 2011 and 2014 stress tests are used in an empirical study to
further support our theoretical results.
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Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, policymakers were faced with a task of
restoring the soundness and safety of financial systems. An extra effort has been made to
ensure the stability of financial institutions and to make their balance sheets as transparent
as possible.1 The stress test procedure has been developed as a part of this endeavor, aiming
at “assessing the resilience of financial institutions to adverse market developments, as well
as to contribute to the overall assessment of systemic risk in the EU financial system”.2
Alternatively, one could view the stress test as a stability analysis of financial institutions in
various adverse scenarios.
As a part of the procedure, banks are required to disclose otherwise unavailable informa-
tion.3 There is an ongoing debate on whether such information should be disclosed and if
so, how detailed it should be. A growing strand of literature, both theoretical and empirical
(see Prescott (2008) and Goldstein and Leitner (2017) for theories and Schuermann (2014)
for empirical evidence), provides mixed results on the issue. The advantages appear to be
clear: information disclosure helps to discipline banks, reduces adverse selection, and leads
to more informative prices. One could easily agree that market transparency seems like a
desirable feature. However, Goldstein and Leitner (2017) find that during normal times, no
disclosure is optimal. They show that during bad times some disclosure is necessary, but too
much may destroy risk-sharing. Moreover, Goldstein and Yang (2017) show that disclosing
1Further details can be found in the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel Accords for the US and Europe, respec-
tively.
2European Banking Authority (EBA) definition of the stress test’s purpose.
3From 2011 the stress test procedure is coordinated by the EBA. The scope is to analyze the evolution
of banks’ capital under both a baseline as well as an adverse scenario over a two-year period. The setup
of the two scenarios is provided by the European Commission (baseline) and the European Systemic Risk
Board (adverse). The European Central Bank is responsible for interacting with banks during the exercise
and for the validation of banks’ data and results. Although stress test methodology can differ from one
year to another, the basic timeline of the procedure stays the same. In the first step, the EBA announces
the new round of stress tests. In the second step, it publishes the methodology and the scenarios that
will be used. In the third step, it publishes the final template for the test such that banks can simulate
the scenarios themselves. Finally, the EBA reports both results and the micro-data used during the pro-
cedure. This last step is what we mean by information disclosure. For details on current methodology see
http://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-issues-2018-eu-wide-stress-test-methodology-for-discussion.
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public information has a potential negative indirect effect of changing price informativeness.
Our main finding indicates that the information disclosure may result in a reduction of
risk-adjusted expected profits for a non-negligible fraction of banks in the system. We refer
to this change of risk-adjusted expected profits as the disclosure effect. Interestingly, in our
model, systemically important banks4 gain the least from the disclosure and bear the highest
cost in terms of its volatility. Moreover, their likelihood of experiencing a negative disclosure
effect (as a result of new information) is higher.
These results follow from a simple one-period general equilibrium model in which agents
(hereafter banks) face trading frictions. Being the main ingredient of our framework, trading
frictions can be seen as a network of connections. Bank A is said to be connected to bank
B if and only if A is not constrained in investing into B’s asset. Therefore, the network is
simply a way of writing down the portfolio constraints in a systematic way, which allows us
to assess the structure of these restrictions.
The simulation exercise suggests that disclosure is beneficial in a sense that an average
bank is expected to attain a positive profit. However, there are multiple factors that could
possibly tip the scales towards non-disclosure. Firstly, we show that systemically important
banks are more likely to be negatively affected by the disclosure. Alarmingly, these are
the players that could potentially destabilize the whole system.5 Secondly, one needs to
take into account the network density (the level of banks’ interconnectedness) when drawing
policy implications. We find that a negative disclosure effect is more likely to be observed
in low-density networks.
We further show that these results are robust across different connection structures. The
effect is present in simulated homogeneous networks as well as in network structures more
similar to the actual financial systems. Moreover, we include an empirical section where
4We focus on the network component of systemic risk where the institutions’ positions play a vital role.
Throughout the paper, we use the terms systemic risk and network systemic risk interchangeably.
5The literature provides several examples in which systemically important banks can endanger the in-
tegrity of the network via contagious defaults (see Allen and Gale (2000) or Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer
(2006)).
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we test our model predictions using the actual 2011 and 2014 stress tests. Results support
our theoretical findings - i.e., banks subjected to a stress test procedure exhibit lower future
expected risk-adjusted profits.
Related literature. Our work contributes to a few strands of literature. Broadly, our
paper fits within the scope of the literature on public information disclosure. In frictionless
markets, more information is always ex-ante better for a decision maker, a result known as
Blackwell’s Theorem (Blackwell (1951)). However, when operating in an environment with
asymmetric information, more information does not necessarily imply an improvement.
The proponents of public information disclosure argue that it disciplines markets, reduces
adverse selection, and improves price informativeness (Tarullo (2010), Bernanke (2013)). Di-
amond (1985) shows that optimal disclosure reduces information asymmetries and enhances
trade. Moreover, Korn and Schiller (2003) show that firms lose the ability to misreport
under mandatory disclosure. Additionally, Admati and Pfleiderer (2000) demonstrate how
correlated firms’ values can increase the welfare under mandatory disclosure.
However, there are also arguments why public information disclosure can be harmful.
Hirshleifer (1971) shows that releasing information about the future state of the economy
destroys ex-ante risk-sharing incentives. Goldstein and Leitner (2017) apply this idea to
study the optimal disclosure policy in banking systems. They find that disclosing too much
destroys the risk-sharing, but disclosing too little might result in a market breakdown in
the time of a crisis. Andolfatto, Berentsen, and Waller (2014) show that it is only optimal
to disclose information to prevent agents from its costly acquisition. Alvarez and Barlevy
(2015) show in a model of information spillover that the decision to disclose depends on the
presence of contagion. Furthermore, Gigler, Kanodia, Sapra, and Venugopalan (2014) show
that frequent disclosure requirements may lead to managers’ short-termism.
Morris and Shin (2002) provide an argument which is based on the dichotomy between
public and private information. If there is no private information, public disclosure is always
welfare enhancing. However, in the presence of private information, an increase in public
4
information precision can be detrimental. If access to the private information is costly, agents
have less incentive to obtain it and rely on the - possibly imprecise - public information. In
comparison, disclosure in our model is unanticipated. This ensures that the only friction in
the agents’ decision making is their portfolio constraints.
Prescott (2008) provides an additional argument against information disclosure, namely
possible detrimental welfare effects caused by disclosure during bad times. As a result, by
disclosing banks’ private information, the regulators’ ability to obtain such information in
the first place is threatened. In comparison, there is no business cycle in our model. ?
show that disclosure can also simply reduce investors’ incentives to acquire and trade on
private information. Earlier literature also argues that mandatory information disclosure
may simply be unnecessary because firms have plenty incentives to disclose information by
themselves (see Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman (1981), and Milgrom (2007)).
This paper adds to the existing literature by showing that the information disclosure
may have negative effects even in a simple general equilibrium framework with portfolio
constraints. We show the implications of the banking system network structure on the effect
of information disclosure. More importantly, our paper shows that systemically important
banks are more likely to suffer from disclosure.
Our work is closely linked to many of the papers we have already mentioned. Similarly
to Admati and Pfleiderer (2000), our framework is also built around different effects of cor-
related assets, only we do not focus on a welfare analysis. Unlike Tarullo (2010), Bernanke
(2013) or Diamond (1985) who focus on agency problems, our model uses a general equilib-
rium market mechanism with trading frictions instead. Similarly to Goldstein and Leitner
(2017) and Andolfatto et al. (2014), we question the purpose of disclosure. The same goes
for Prescott (2008), except instead of incorporating a business cycle into our model, we focus
on a market-implied riskiness resulting from a general equilibrium.
Our work also contributes to the literature on financial networks (see e.g. Upper (2011),
Poledna, Molina-Borboa, Martnez-Jaramillo, van der Leij, and Thurner (2015), or alterna-
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tively Roukny, Battiston, and Stiglitz (2016)). We offer a novel modeling approach based
on a simple general equilibrium framework. It has a closed form solution which makes it
computationally attractive while being easily implemented by a regulator at the same time.
Translating the portfolio constraints into network connections constitutes a new perspective
on systemic risk. Empirical works on the subject include Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and
Richardson (2017a) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016).
As suggested by the title, a practical example of information disclosure is the stress
testing procedure. We strive to contribute to the debate on its proper design (see Goldstein
and Sapra (2014)). Our paper provides a potential channel (trading frictions) to complement
the literature on negative effects of information disclosure.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 1 introduces the theoretical framework. Section
2 describes the simulation exercise. Section 3 presents the main results. Section 4 presents
the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
1 The Model
1.1 Two-period Finance Economy with Network Constraints
In order to study the effect of information disclosure we employ a general equilibrium
framework in which agents (banks) are treated as portfolio maximizers.6 The economic
environment is a standard one-period (two dates) finance economy, with dates labeled as
t = 0, 1 and N banks.
At t = 0, bank i ∈ {1, ..., N} has an endowment of size 1 as well as access to its own
investment opportunity (referred to as an asset or project).7 The value of this endowment is
6Other papers in the literature address information disclosure in a game-theoretic framework with strate-
gic interactions, see Goldstein and Leitner (2017) for instance. We have settled for a general equilibrium with
simulated networks because it provides tractable solutions while not losing the potential applicability to a
real-world data. Even though networks in our model are simulated, we still regard our work as a theoretical
paper. The main advantage of our approach is that it allows us to study the market effects instead of the
player’ strategic interactions. The idea behind this framework is that prices are determined in equilibrium
and banks’ risk-adjusted profits are indirectly affected as a result.
7These projects can be seen as a bank’s external assets on international markets. Hence the correlation
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a (t = 1)-measurable random variable and can generally be interpreted as bank i’s project.
The access to their respective projects is then traded among banks for the purpose of diver-
sification and risk-adjusted profit maximization. Projects/assets are perfectly divisible into
arbitrarily small amounts. Due to a one-to-one relationship, we will further refer to banks
and their assets (or projects) interchangeably. The assets’ returns, X, are assumed to be
jointly normally distributed with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix V . Moreover, each
bank has access to an unlimited quantity of risk-free asset that delivers 1 unit of consumption
at time t = 1 per 1 unit invested at time t = 0.
Banks are not allowed to trade freely with each other. We assume that each bank has its
own specific set of counterparties available for trading. More precisely, bank i is said to be
connected to bank j if and only if bank i can purchase asset j. Therefore one can represent
the banking system as a network in which nodes correspond to banks and edges stand for
trading opportunities. This network is characterized by an adjacency matrix G.8
Formally the maximization problem of bank i at t = 0 is given by:
max
{φi,θi}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
pi = p
′φi + θi
Yi = X′φi + θi
φi ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(1)
where X = [X1, . . . ,XN ]′ is a t = 1-measurable random vector of assets’ returns, φi =
with other banks in the network.
8Each element, gij , of G is either 0 or 1, that is, gij ∈ {0, 1}. If gij = 1 then bank i is connected to bank
j, otherwise it is not. Connections need not be symmetric, e.g. i being connected to j does not imply j
being connected to i. Also, since we assume that every bank can always decide to hold some fraction of its
own asset, self-connections are feasible such that gii = 1 for all i.
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[φi1, ..., φiN ]
′ is a vector of bank i portfolio exposures, θi is bank i’s holding of the risk-free
asset, p = [p1, ..., pN ]
′ is the price vector of risky assets, Yi is the value of bank i’s portfolio,
and gij is the (i, j) element of the adjacency matrix G. The first constraint is the resource
constraint. At time t = 0, the market value of bank i’s initial endowment is equal to pi.
This represents the wealth that is allocated between risky assets (having value p′φi) and the
risk-free asset (having value θi). The second constraint says that the value of the bank i’s
portfolio at time t = 1 is the sum of payoffs from the risky asset holdings X′φi and the risk
free-rate θi. Finally, the last two lines restrict banks to invest only into counterparties that
they are connected to.
We follow a standard definition of equilibrium:
Definition 1.1. An equilibrium is characterized by a price vector p∗ and allocations {φ∗i }Ni=1
and {θ∗i }Ni=1 such that
(i) every bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N} solves the maximization problem in (1) taking prices as
given
(ii) markets clear
φ∗1 + φ
∗
2 + · · ·+ φ∗N = 1 (2)
Under the assumption of jointly normally distributed asset payoffs, the equilibrium price
vector and demand functions can be obtained in closed form. Proposition 1.1 presents this
result.
Proposition 1.1. Assume that the vector of asset payoffs, X, is jointly normally distributed
with mean µ and variance-covariance matrix Σ, then the demand function for risky assets
of bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is given by
φi = Σ
−1 (µ− p− λi) (3)
where λi := [λi1, ..., λiN ]
′ ≥ 0 is the vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with the appro-
priate network constraints. Given the demand equations in (3), the market clearing condition
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in (2) determines the equilibrium price vector
p∗ = µ− 1
N
Σ1− 1
N
N∑
j=1
λj. (4)
The proof is in Appendix A.
1.2 The Model with Disclosure
In our model, the disclosure mechanism works via the information about the variance-
covariance matrix of assets’ returns. In the previous section, banks had access to matrix V
when making their decisions. In the current section, banks do not observe V . Instead, they
form identical beliefs about it, represented by a matrix W . Therefore, W can be seen as a
noisy observation of the true variance-covariance matrix V .9 The matrix V is revealed to
banks with zero probability after their initial portfolio choice. This modeling approach of
assuming zero probability event builds on Allen and Gale (2000).10
At t = 0, banks form the optimal portfolios based on the N × N positive definite ma-
trix W . We denote the vector of allocations of risky assets based on this initial belief by
{φi (W )}Ni=1 to stress their dependence on W . If no disclosure takes place, then banks keep
these allocations until returns are realized and the model is identical to (1) with Σ = W .
In the zero probability event (where the true variance-covariance matrix V is revealed)
banks can readjust their existing portfolios upon learning new information. In such a case
9Section 2.1 contains detailed information about the banks’ belief structure.
10In Allen and Gale (2000) a financial contagion is spread in the system after a liquidity shock is realized.
Given that the shock is assumed to be a zero probability event, banks do not take it into account when
making their decisions at time zero.
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bank i solves the following optimization problem:
max
{φi(V ),θi(V )}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
p′(V )φi(W ) + θi(W ) = p′(V )φi(V ) + θi(V )
Yi = X′φi(V ) + θi(V )
φi(V ) ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
(5)
This problem does not introduce any new variables. We merely stress the dependence
of φi, θi, and p on either W or V . The difference between the two optimizations lies in
the bank’s endowment, which is now equal to the market value of its portfolio (see the first
constraint in (5)).
Everything else stays the same, including the network constraint. Thus, Proposition 1.1
applies with Σ exchanged for V .
1.3 Discussion of the Main Assumptions
We assume that banks are risk-averse, which is a necessary condition for their interest
in diversification. Risk aversion can be seen as a modeling device to capture regulatory
requirements (e.g. requiring banks to keep some level of capital according to Basel III). In
the literature, it is often assumed that banks are so well diversified that they behave in a
risk-neutral fashion. However, this is only true for the marginal investment. In our case,
banks’ connection constraints create a limit to diversification.11
11The banks in our model are not subjected to any explicit regulatory capital requirements. Risk aversion is
implicitly capturing such effects as more risk-averse banks would invest a higher fraction of their endowment
into the risk-free asset and de facto keep a higher capital buffer. In our model investment in the risk-free asset
is basically a cash accumulation. Another option is to include an additional constraint which forces banks
to keep a given fraction of safe capital. For example, Efing (2016) includes an explicit regulatory constraint
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We assume mean-variance preferences. For any other standard preference structure, we
expect to observe qualitatively similar results.12 Mean-variance preferences allow for the
equilibrium price vector and the demand schedules to be obtained in closed form.
We assume that the network of connections is fixed. Preventing banks from changing
their respective sets of counterparties can be justified by two arguments. Firstly, undertaking
new business relationship might be a long process which is not captured in our one-period
model. Secondly, creating new connections might be too costly.
2 Simulation Framework
2.1 The Structure of the Banks’ Beliefs
We use the following structure to ensure consistency between beliefs and the true variance-
covariance matrix. We assume that the vector of asset payoffs, X, is conditionally normally
distributed
X|V, µ ∼ NN (µ, V ) (6)
where µ is the vector of expected payoffs and V the variance-covariance matrix of the assets’
payoffs. We keep µ constant and equal across all assets since we want to isolate the effect of
disclosure with respect to the uncertainty about the variance/covariance matrix, V .
We sample V from the inverse-Wishart distribution. That is,
V ∼ W−1N (S, d) (7)
in a model very similar to ours. Building on his paper and incorporating such additional constraint in our
model brings several negative aspects and no qualitatively improvements. First, we would not be able to
solve the model in a closed form which is one of the nice features that makes this model computationally
feasible. From an economic perspective, a regulatory constraint would definitively affect the initial portfolio
allocations. The set of allocations would differ if the constraint is binding for at least one bank. However,
the mechanics of the information disclosure would still be in place as banks will try to re-optimize upon
receiving new information. Thus results would be affected only quantitatively but not qualitatively. It is
worth noting that a regulatory constraint would eliminate our disclosure effect only if it completely prevents
banks to invest in risky assets. As our model aims at providing qualitative results on the negative effect of
information disclosure created by network frictions, we opted to shut down the regulatory constraint channel.
12This is due to banks acting as individual (atomistic) optimizers.
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where N is the total number of banks in the system, S is an (N×N) positively definite scale
matrix, and d > N−1 measures the degrees of freedom. We let banks form their beliefs about
the true variance/covariance matrix, V , by estimating the empirical variance/covariance
matrix of asset payoffs W .13
2.2 Simulation Settings
In order to model a regulator’s limited knowledge about the structure of the system, we
use a simulation that samples over different random networks. Even though our model is
not meant to produce quantitative predictions, it potentially could. Still, the main objective
is to obtain qualitative economic insights. Another reason for using simulation methods is
to observe the impact of different network structures.
We solve the model from Section 1 with the belief structure described in Section 2.1.
Each simulation begins by generating a random network represented by an N×N adjacency
matrix G. The number of banks, N , is set to either 50 or 100, and the number of iterations
to 15,000.
Once the network structure is generated, we sample a random positive definite scale
matrix S and follow the procedure described in Section 2.1. Having generated both V
and W we proceed to solve the model under both scenarios (with and without information
disclosure). Allocations and prices are recorded under both scenarios.
2.3 Key Outcome Variable: Risk-Adjusted Expected Profits
We look at changes in risk-adjusted expected profits of banks to analyze the effect of
information disclosure on the distribution of risk. The risk-adjusted expected profit of bank
i under the no-disclosure scenario is defined by the following ratio
Πndi
def
=
(µ− p∗ (W ))′φ∗i (W ) + p∗i (W )√
φ∗′i (W )V φ
∗
i (W )
(8)
13Each bank uses the same sample, which results in an equal information set.
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Under the disclosure scenario, the risk-adjusted expected profit for bank i is given by
Πdi
def
=
(µ− p∗(V ))′φ∗i (V ) + (p∗(V )− p∗(W ))′ φ∗i (W ) + p∗i (W )√
φ∗′i (V )V φ
∗
i (V )
(9)
Equations 8 and 9 can be thought of as pseudo-Sharpe ratios on bank i portfolios.
We define the disclosure effect, DE i, as the percentage change in the risk-adjusted ex-
pected profits, which is
DE i def= log
(
Πdi
Πndi
)
, (10)
This quantity allows us to study the effect of information disclosure on the distribution
of risk within a banking system. By constructing (8) and (9) as the ratio of expected returns
and their standard deviation, we are capturing the Basel III capital adequacy requirements
where risk-weighted assets are considered. Therefore, disclosure ought to be considered
beneficial when DE i ≥ 0 and detrimental when DE i < 0.
2.4 Network Structure and the Banks’ Systemic Relevance
We consider two types of network structure. The first type is a banking network generated
by the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) model. In this framework, every bank has the same probability,
q, to be connected to any other bank in the network. The resulting structure is therefore
homogeneous.
The second type is a core-periphery network structure where the probability of a con-
nection is empirically calibrated (see Puhr, Seliger, and Sigmund (2012) for data and Frey
and Hledik (2014) for the calibration method). Our interest in this type of network struc-
ture is motivated by its frequent appearance in banking systems.14 To model this observed
heterogeneity of real-world interbank networks, we slightly modify the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi setting.
14Many empirical papers document that various financial networks take core-periphery structure (see Boss,
Elsinger, Summer, and Thurner (2003), Minoiu and Reyes (2013), Fricke and Lux (2014), and Lelyveld and
Veld (2014)). Moreover, core-periphery networks often appear as an equilibrium outcome of the network
formation process as in Farboodi (2017).
13
Instead of assuming that each pair of banks forms a connection with the same probability
q, we divide banks into two groups (core and periphery). The difference between these two
groups lies in their respective probabilities of forming connections with other banks. Any
core bank has a high probability of establishing a connection both with other core banks and
with other peripherals, while a connection between two peripherals is less likely. The result
of this method is a random network with the desired core-periphery structure.
Figure B.1 shows a stylized representation of both types of network structure.
We study the properties of the average disclosure in relation to the characteristics of
banking network. In particular, we characterize a network by its density, D(G):
D(G) =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i 6=j
gij (11)
where gij is the the ij-th element of adjacency matrix G such that the numerator corresponds
to the number of all actual connections (edges) while the denominator represents all potential
connections in the system (excluding self-connections). By such a construction, a complete
network has a density of one, while an empty network has zero density.
Moreover, we examine how the bank’s position in the network affects its risk-adjusted
expected profit. In particular, we look at how the disclosure effect varies across banks of dif-
ferent network-systemic relevance. Usually, one thinks of systemically important institutions
as the ones whose failure could endanger the whole system. If such institutions were more
prone to suffer from the disclosure, then the stabilizing intention of the information revela-
tion policy could potentially be harmful from the systemic risk perspective. In our model,
a simple way to characterize systemic important banks is to consider the ratio of in- and
out-degrees of a bank (the ratio of the number of its in-connections and out-connections).15
Formally, we define the following systemic index for any bank i,
15A degree is a graph-theoretic concept that characterizes the number of links of a given node in the graph.
In our context, an in-degree of bank i refers to the number of banks that can invest into bank i’s project,
whereas the out-degree of bank i is the number of projects it can invest into itself.
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SI i(G) =
∑N
j gji∑N
j gij
, (12)
The idea behind this index is that a distressed bank with a relatively large in-degree
(i.e. there is a large number of banks exposed to the asset of this bank) could negatively
affect its neighboring banks via contagion.16 The in-degree of the bank is deflated by its out-
degree because banks with fewer diversification opportunities are expected to be riskier. We
would like to emphasize that this index is specifically designed to capture the network-related
systemic importance of a bank. According to the Financial Stability Board, it is standard
to take into account bank’s size, complexity and other factors besides interconnectedness
when evaluating its systemic importance.17 In our model, banks are identical in terms of
their other observable characteristics. Therefore we evaluate banks’ systemic relevance solely
according to their position in the network.
3 Simulation Results
3.1 The Disclosure Effect in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Random Networks
Figure B.2 plots the full distribution of the disclosure effect. A non-negligible fraction
of the banking system is expected to have its risk-adjusted expected profit decreased (a
negative disclosure effect). This implies that there is a considerable part of the system which
is expected to suffer as a result of the disclosure. In other words, there is a non-negligible
probability that the information disclosure generates a negative effect on a given bank’s risk-
adjusted performance. This figure also underlines that a bank in a lower density network
16Notice that the index contains self-connections in both the numerator and the denominator. This is a
purely technical reason to avoid division by zero.
17Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are financial institutions whose distress or dis-
orderly failure, because of their size, complexity, and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant
disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. - http://www.fsb.org/what-we-do/policy-
development/systematically-important-financial-institutions-sifis/
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has a higher likelihood of exhibiting a negative disclosure effect.18
[Figure B.2]
Figure B.3 displays the average disclosure effect as a function of the underlying network
density. The figure underlines the importance of network characteristics for evaluating the
effects of information disclosure. The average disclosure effect exhibits a hump shape with its
peak at an intermediate density level and stays above zero throughout, thus, suggesting that
disclosure is beneficial in expectation. The same pattern can be observed for the standard
deviation of the disclosure effect, resulting in the observed pattern. The important takeaway
from this figure is the positive relationship between average disclosure effect and its standard
deviation.19
[Figure B.3]
The increase in a bank’s riskiness could undermine the stability of the bank itself or,
in some cases, even the stability of the whole banking system through a contagion effect.
Despite the fact that we do not model contagion explicitly, there is a vast literature showing
the devastating effects of such an event (see for example Elsinger et al. (2006) or Roukny
et al. (2016)). Papers in this strand of literature show how a default of a single institution
can cause a large portion of the financial system to become distressed.
The fact that a part of the banking system is expected to become riskier is not surprising.
What seems to be more important is the relationship between a bank’s disclosure effect and
its network systemic importance. In order to get an idea about that, we rank all banks
based on the index in equation (12) such that bank 1 has the highest value of SI(G) and
bank 50 has the lowest. Figures B.4a and B.4b plot the average and standard deviation
18Higher density does not necessarily correspond to a higher probability of contagion. For instance, an in-
stitution with many equally spread exposures is more likely to withstand a default of one of its counterparties
(provided its other debtors stay healthy). This is the old story of diversification applied to network-systemic
riskiness, see e.g. Frey and Hledik (2014).
19We observe a zero disclosure effect for an empty network with no connections as well as for a full network
without any trading frictions as expected from standard theory.
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of the disclosure effect based on this ordering. More systemically important banks tend to
experience a lower disclosure effect. Moreover, the uncertainty associated with the disclosure,
as measured by the standard deviation, is slightly larger for such banks. In order to be more
specific, the more systematically important the bank, the higher the likelihood that the
disclosure effect will be negative. The effect is opposite for less important banks where the
disclosure effect is on average higher.20
[Figures B.4a and B.4b]
The intuition behind this result is simple. In our model, information is only valuable to
the extent that it allows banks to optimally re-adjust their portfolio holdings. At the same
time, systemically relevant banks are at the center of other banks’ exposures. This implies
that they are the ones least enjoying the benefits of new information while suffering the costs
imposed by the other banks’ re-adjustments.21
3.2 The Disclosure Effect in Core-Periphery Random Networks
In order to verify that our results persist if we move from the basic case of Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random networks, we calibrate our network structure on the data of Austrian interbank
market. Since the network density is given in this case, we can only report the relationship
between disclosure effect and network systemic importance.
[Figures B.4c and B.4d]
Figures B.4c and B.4d again show that the most systemically relevant banks are expected
to gain the least from the information disclosure.
20Our simulations are qualitatively unchanged for different system dimensions. We have tested the frame-
work on networks of sizes 50 and 100. Increasing the overall dimension of the system improves banks’ ability
to diversify and therefore decreases the variance of the disclosure effect.
21Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2017b) argue that banks tend to invest in assets that
are heavily correlated with each other, hence increasing their systemic importance. In our model, the assets
that are heavily invested in are the ones belonging to heavily connected-to institutions.
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The basic intuition behind this result is the same as the one presented for Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
random networks: information is only valuable to the extent that it allows banks to opti-
mally re-adjust their portfolio holdings. In the core-periphery random network, we observe
an even stronger negative disclosure effect for systemically relevant banks because of the
structural characteristics of this type of network. Here it arises naturally that banks with
many in-degree connections have fewer out-degree connections. This furthermore reduces the
value of the new information for systemically important banks, as compared to the previous
environment with Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random networks.
4 Empirical Evidence
We provide a simple empirical analysis using the 2011 and 2014 stress tests conducted by
the European Banking Authority to support our results.22 Our theoretical model suggests
that being subjected to information disclosure is expected to have an impact on bank’s
risk-adjusted expected profits.
We develop a simple event study to explore this hypothesis using the following baseline
linear model:
Πbct = β ·D.Stress Testbct−1 + γ ·Xbct + act + ab + bst, (13)
where Πbct is the risk-adjusted expected profit of bank b in country c at time t. D.Stress
Test is an indicator variable equal to one if a bank was subjected to a stress test in the
previous quarter and zero otherwise. Moreover, our model accounts for time-varying banks’
characteristics by including the set of standard controls X (see Ellul and Yerramilli (2013),
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013)). It contains the following variables: Tier 1 capital
ratio, size as measured by the value of total assets, total gross loans, and total deposits. More
details on the definition of all variables can be found in Table 1. Lastly, we take steps to
22We do not account for the stress tests conducted in 2009 and 2010 because the stress testing has been
subjected to a significant restructuring by the EBA in 2011.
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account for bank-specific time-invariant unobservables and country-specific common trends
by including the appropriate fixed effects.
In addition to this baseline scenario, we also consider a specification with further control
variables, particularly the Loan Loss Reserve and the ratio of Liquid Assets over Liabilities.
These are also described in Table 1. We also use leads of the main explanatory variable
(D.Stress Test) to account for a possible systematic difference in the trends of the dependent
variable for treated and control group of banks. Moreover, we use lags to account for potential
after treatment reversals.
Our interest lies in the parameter β which quantifies the marginal contribution of the
stress test participation towards the risk-adjusted expected profits.
We use data from SNL Financial. Our sample in the baseline specification includes 1,818
bank-quarterly observations over the years 2011, 2014, and 2015.23 Our sample includes 725
unique banks. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical
analysis. This suggests that we are working with a representative sample. Importantly, as a
proxy for the unobservable risk-adjusted expected profits, Π, we use the ratio of net income
and risk-weighted assets.
Column (1) in Table 4 shows results from the estimation of the baseline scenario in
Equation (13). Columns (2)-(4) add subsequent controls to this specification as well as
further differentiation between listed and non-listed banks. Across all these specifications,
the point estimate for β is negative and statistically significant. In our model, this inverse
relationship would correspond to a negative disclosure effect DE . Since the banks chosen for
the stress test are arguably the systemically important ones, it is reasonable to claim that the
observed relationship is in line with our theoretical results. This claim is further supported
by the slight increase of β when performing a subsample analysis on publicly listed banks in
column (2). Columns (3) and (4) serve as a further robustness check of our approach.24
23These years correspond to the time when stress tests took place. The first was conducted in the third
quarter of 2011, while the second took place in the fourth quarter of 2014 (hence the need for including the
year 2015).
24Column (3) adds the banks’ loan loss reserve and the ratio of their liquid assets over all liabilities. Both
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One should not view our estimates as causal, exactly due to the non-random choice
of stress tested banks. Hence, we can only argue correlation, not causality.25 However,
Figure B.5 shows no statistical difference in risk-adjusted profits between the two groups of
banks (stress-tested and not stress-tested) in the quarter before and the quarter during the
stress test. The effect observable in the quarter following the stress test can, therefore, be
attributed to whether a bank was part of it or not.
5 Conclusion
In a world without frictions, banks are only subjected to the market risk such that the
introduction of new information cannot possibly be detrimental. However, the situation is
different if banks are constrained in their trading opportunities. In such a case the new
information generates non-hedgeable risk. This additional risk comes from the negative
externalities imposed by other banks’ portfolio adjustments.
We show that - in such a constrained economy - the disclosure of information results in a
reduction of risk-adjusted expected profits for a non-negligible fraction of banks. This effect
depends on the structural features of banks’ portfolio constraints and is more pronounced
for systemically important banks. We observe this result in both the homogeneous and
core-periphery systems and we provide empirical evidence supporting these findings.
Altogether, our results suggest that a regulator should carefully consider possible effects
of information disclosure via an interbank network channel, especially on systemically im-
portant institutions. Using the information on system structure in line with our reasoning
may prove beneficial for a policy design. Quantitative results could potentially be obtained
measure the flexibility of a bank when threatened with a particular type of shock. Column (4) further includes
contemporaneous, leading and lagging D.Stress Test variable. The results show statistical significance only
in the quarter directly following the stress test exercise.
25To pin down the causal effect of disclosure is of great interest in the accounting research. Leuz and
Wysocki (2016) review the existing empirical literature and provide avenues for future research. As pointed
out in their paper, there is lack of good counterfactuals that would move the field forward and allow to make
causal statements on the effect of disclosure. We relate to that literature as our experiment does not provide
the ideal research environment to pin down the causal effect of the information disclosure as a consequence
of the stress test procedure.
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by calibrating our framework to a network structure observed by the regulator.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The proof follows immediately by solving the following maximiza-
tion problem,
max
{φi,θi}∈RN+1
{
E[Yi]− 1
2
Var [Yi]
}
s.t.
pi = p
′φi + θi
Yi = X′φi + θi
φi ∈ Ai1 × Ai2 × · · · × AiN
Ain =

R if gin = 1
{∅} if gin = 0
∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
(14)
After plugging the first two constraints into the objective function we obtain the La-
grangian for bank i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
L = µ′φi + pi − p′φi − 1
2
φ′Σφi − λ′iφi, (15)
where the last term corresponds to the network constraint.
The first order condition gives bank’s i optimal demand for risky assets, φ∗i . That is,
∂L
∂φi
= 0 =⇒ φ∗i = Σ−1 (µ− p− λi) . (16)
The optimal demand for the risk-free asset, θ∗i , follows from the resource constraint,
θ∗i = pi − p′Σ−1 (µ− p− λi) (17)
The equilibrium price vector is obtained by equating the aggregate demand to the aggre-
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gate supply of risky projects in the economy, that is
φ∗1 + φ
∗
2 + · · ·+ φ∗N = 1 (18)
substituting the optimal φ∗ from equation (16) and solving for p yields:
p∗ = µ− 1
N
Σ1− 1
N
N∑
j=1
λj (19)
This concludes the proof.
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B Figures
(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network. (b) Core-periphery network.
Figure B.1. One realization of a random network for N = 100 banks.
(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=50 banks. (b) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.2. Distribution of Disclosure Effect as a function of network density. This
figure plots the cumulative distribution of the average disclosure effect for different network
densities. The dashed line corresponds to networks with a density below the median, while
the dash-dotted line stands for networks with density above the median. The disclosure effect
is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-adjusted profits with and without
disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations and the networks are generated using
the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model.
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(a) Core-Periphery network with N=50 banks. (b) Core-Periphery network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.3. Disclosure effect +/- one standard deviation as a function of network density.
The disclosure effect is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-adjusted profits
with and without disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations and the networks
are generated using the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model.
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(a) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=50 banks. (b) Erdo˝s-Re´nyi network with N=100 banks.
(c) Core-Periphery network with N=50 banks. (d) Core-Periphery network with N=100 banks.
Figure B.4. Disclosure effect as a function of systemic importance. This figure plots the
disclosure effect +/- one standard deviation for banks ranked according to the SI index,
which corresponds to the network systemic importance of a bank. The bank ranked SI = 1
is the most systemically relevant, while the bank ranked SI = 50 is the least systemically
relevant. The disclosure effect is measured as a percentage change of the expected risk-
adjusted profits with and without disclosure. The simulation comprises 15, 000 iterations
and the networks are generated using either the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi model (Figures B.4a, B.4b) or
the core-periphery model (Figures B.4c, B.4d).
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Figure B.5. The coefficient estimate for the contemporaneous, leading and lagged variable
D.Stress Test as seen in column (4) of Table 4
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C Tables
Table 1. Variable Description
Variable Label Description
Panel A: Dependent Variables
Risk-Adj Profit Ratio between net income and the value of risk-weighted
assets.
Panel B: Explanatory Variables
D.Stress Test Dummy variable equal to one if a bank is subjected to
stress test assessment, and zero otherwise.
Tier 1 Ratio Ratio between Tier 1 capital, as defined by Basel Accord,
and the value of risk-weighted assets.
Size The natural logarithm of the value of total assets.
Total Gross Loans The value of total gross loans divided by the value of risk-
weighted assets.
Total Deposit The value of deposits divided by the value of risk-weighted
assets.
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) The ratio between liquid assets and total liabilities as de-
fined by SNL Financial.
Loan Loss Reserve The accounting measure loan loss reserve scaled by the
value of risk-weighted assets.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
The table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Data are from SNL
Financial covering the years 2011, 2014, and 2015. There are a total of 1,818 bank-quarter observations for
a total of 725 unique banks. The dependent variable, Risk-Adj Profit, is computed as the ratio between net
income and the value of risk-weighted assets. More details on the computation of covariates can be found in
Table 1. All variables are Winsorized at 1% tail.
Mean SD P25 Median P75
Dependent Variable
Risk-Adj Profit 0.17 0.84 0.08 0.25 0.43
Control Variables
D.Stress Test 0.04 0.19 0 0 0
Tier 1 Ratio 0.15 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17
Size 15.41 2.37 13.50 14.95 16.91
Total Gross Loans 1.35 0.69 0.99 1.25 1.53
Total Deposit 1.12 0.52 0.85 1.09 1.33
Loan Loss Reserve 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.06
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) 31.8 20.93 17.32 25.99 41.09
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Table 4. Event Study on 2011 and 2014 Stress Test
The table reports the results from estimating Equation (13). The dependent variable is the Risk-Adj Profit
for all specifications. It is computed as the ratio between net income and the value of risk-weighted assets.
The covariates include: D.Stress Test, Tier 1 Ratio, Size, Total Loans, Total Deposit, Loan Loss Reserve, and
Liquid Assets/Liabilities. More details on the definition of variables can be found in Table 1. All variables
are Winsorized at 1% tail. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at bank level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Risk-Adjusted Profits
Baseline Listed Robustness
D.Stress Testt−2 -0.039
(0.121)
D.Stress Testt−1 -0.386∗∗ -0.483∗∗ -0.575∗∗ -0.594∗∗
(0.175) (0.240) (0.233) (0.239)
D.Stress Testt -0.050
(0.149)
D.Stress Testt+1 -0.054
(0.122)
Tier 1 5.774∗∗∗ 11.543∗∗∗ 3.681∗∗ 3.355
(1.689) (4.309) (1.786) (2.110)
Bank Size 0.482∗∗ 0.589∗∗ 0.479∗∗ 0.437∗∗
(0.194) (0.288) (0.210) (0.215)
Total Gross Loans 0.054 -0.306 0.049 0.062
(0.066) (0.260) (0.072) (0.077)
Total Deposit 0.077 0.241 0.308∗ 0.359∗
(0.127) (0.180) (0.178) (0.184)
Loan Loss Reserve -2.485 -2.285
(3.204) (3.340)
Liquid Assets/Liabilities (%) -0.011∗∗ -0.010∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter by Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,818 1,091 1,031 961
Adjusted R2 0.751 0.787 0.756 0.764
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